

The Queen City of the Savannah: Augusta, Georgia.
During the Urban Progressive Era, 1890-1917

By

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PREFACE

Since Charles C. Jones and Salem Dutcher's Memorial History of Augusta was published in 1890, there have only been two major books written about varying aspects of the city's historical past. Earl L. Bell and Kenneth Crabbe's The Augusta Chronicle, Indomitable Voice of Dixie, 1785-1960 is without a doubt the account of the rise of the most important newspaper in the community and the South's oldest newspaper, including, to a certain extent, intermittent glimpses into the social life. Florence Corley's Confederate City is a brilliant, brief analysis of antebellum urban industrial growth, greatly emphasizing the ways in which the Civil War stimulated further economic growth. Except for the Augusta Bicentennial and Augusta, both extremely cursory and admittedly less than scholarly endeavors, no publications have seriously attempted to develop the history of the Queen City of the Savannah in the twentieth century.

In studying the history of Augusta during the urban Progressive Era, 1890-1917, in every conceivable way I have

endeavored to pose questions, create objectives, explore issues and develop different topics not previously considered by others, attempting to go beyond routine explanations by encompassing a far broader frame of reference on the history of a major textile city of the New South.

Every dissertation, no doubt, has certain limitations imposed upon it by the lack of availability of source materials. Unfortunately, some of the primary source materials of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era were not found, having been either destroyed by fires, floods and other natural disasters, or remaining buried in closets, locked up in attics, filed away in ancient vaults and tucked away in obscure, remote places. Furthermore, as is often the case, few diaries, memoirs, journals and biographies were written or preserved for the historian, making his task far more difficult.

Despite diligent, concerted efforts to discover and preserve historic records, it has been virtually impossible to locate all contemporary records and newspapers. Private business records, exceedingly crucial to the study of the development of corporations, were not available. Yet, had they been discovered, subjected to examination and carefully evaluated, they would have unquestionably provided invaluable insights into the internal growth of the major enter-

prises and critical decisions often made in closed conference rooms.

The files of certain public newspapers, moreover, were apparently lost or inadvertently destroyed; or at least their whereabouts are not presently known. The Augusta Herald files from 1894 through 1904 are not available at the public library, local newspaper library records, county-city building, Richmond County Historical Society Collections, nor even the University of Georgia library. Several other different weekly and daily newspapers, including The Augusta Evening News, 1878-1895, The Augusta Progress, 1888-1890, The Augusta Sunday Phoenix, 1885, and The Augusta Daily Tribune, 1895-1907, existed, but are not currently available. Both The Labor Advocate and The Augusta Union Weekly, 1889-1904, were exceedingly fiery union newspapers that would have provided additional, considerable insights, enormously beneficial to the scholar studying the complexities of labor unrest and revolt, but the files have vanished, possibly lost forever.

Several black newspapers existed, running off editions which apparently strongly protested conditions in the ghetto, greatly advocated reforms and carefully documented the rise of a small, but important middle class element in Negro life. The Georgia Baptist, edited by Reverend William

Jefferson White, D.D., existed for a period of more than a quarter of a century, from 1881-1909. It was proclaimed to have been one of the oldest colored newspapers in America, but the files have apparently been ruined, discarded or concealed. Moreover, The Methodist Union, published by A. W. Wimberly, was another paper, commenting upon the nature of the black experience, but it and a third paper, The Weekly Sentinel, were not discovered to exist---most regrettable circumstances, to say the least.

Nevertheless, a tremendous abundance of crucial, primary source materials exist for the eager scholar. City-county records, including the minutes of the council, various subcommittees, departmental reports, year books, directories and legal archives, are most complete and primarily located in Augusta. The "Minutes of the Augusta Flood Commission" are part of the special library holdings of S. Herbert Elliott, former county-commissioner. Board of Health records, albeit complete, are located in Augusta and Athens. Some of the early presidential reports of the board, however, are even tucked away in the drawer of a commode in the rare book room of the Medical College of Georgia, possibly known only to Dr. Walter B. Sheppard and myself. The files of The Augusta Chronicle, dating back to the pre-Civil War era, are carefully preserved on microfilm,

providing a wealth of information. Original editions of The Augusta Herald, beginning in February, 1905, and dating through March, 1919, are also repositied in the Augusta-Richmond County Library. Moreover, limited editions of The Augusta Daily Tribune and The Augusta Evening News are also available. Responding to the overtures of a student, it was discovered that Mr. and Mrs. Walter B. Murray had almost a complete collection of The Wool Hat and scattered, badly tattered copies of The Augusta Daily Tribune. Despite suggestions to others that these newspapers be microfilmed and made part of "The Murray Collection" of the Richmond County Historical Society, they presently remain in a cardboard box in Dorothy Murray's bedroom. Learning about a newspaper advertisement, placed by Sidney and Norma Preffer, led to the discovery of a six-month file of The Augusta Herald (July-December, 1898) and its purchase by A. Ray Rowland, President of the Richmond County Historical Society. Invitations by William Bush and Joseph B. Cumming to present various papers to the board of trustees of Historic Augusta, Incorporated, resulted in fruitful discussions, comments, criticisms and invitations to attend various social gatherings, but, to date, there have been no further leads on additional primary source materials pertaining to any aspect of urban life.

By no means should this dissertation be regarded as the definitive, exhaustive study, eliminating the need for additional research and further inquiry. On the contrary, there are many areas that remain to be explored in the near future, involving travel, research, revisions of certain portions of the original work and eventually new conceptions about the meaning and significance of my work. Until time and money, both critical factors for the researcher, converge, however, future professional study will be unavoidably delayed.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	ii
PREFACE	vi
LIST OF TABLES	xvi
ABSTRACT	xvii
CHAPTER	
I THE LOWELL OF THE SOUTH	1
The Confederate City and Wartime Expansion	1
Postwar "Recovery" and Uninterrupted Growth	7
The Nature of the New City	34
NOTES	38
II BREAKING THE RING	44
The Origins of a Reform Spirit	44
Patrick Walsh, The Reformer	55
The Structure and Strategy of the Walsh Reformers	62
NOTES	78
III KNIGHTS, CAPITALISTS AND LINTHEADS	82
The Making of the Lintheads: From Baying Expectations to Grim Realities	82

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

CHAPTER		<u>Page</u>
III (cont.)	The Beginnings of Industrial Wars: Augusta, The Storm Center of the New South.	89
	The American Federation of Labor and the Augusta Textile Strike of 1898- 1899	93
	NOTES	118
IV	CHALLENGES TO THE REFORM COALITION.	121
	The Death of Mayor Patrick Walsh . . .	121
	City Politics in the Post-Walsh Era. .	126
	Charles A. Robbe and the Special Mayoralty Election of 1899	137
	Alfred M. Martin, Jr., Jacob Phinizy and Continuation of Reform Politics. .	140
	NOTES	148
V	RETURN TO REFORM.	150
	Limits of Victory.	150
	Return to Municipal Reforms.	153
	One More Time.	169
	NOTES	185
VI	THE TRIUMPH OF THE REFORM SPIRIT.	188
	Like Father, Like Son.	188
	Resurgence of the Reform Spirit. . . .	195
	The Reform Spirit Triumphant	205
	NOTES	216

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

CHAPTER		<u>Page</u>
VII	AUGUSTA, SUMMERVILLE AND THE SAVANNAH . . .	218
	The Businessman's Campaign for Mayor .	218
	The Battle for Annexation of Summerville.	222
	The "Destructive Freshets" and the City	227
	The Building of the Augusta Levee. . .	242
	NOTES	245
VIII	SOME UNFINISHED BUSINESS.	248
	Thomas Barrett, Jr., and the Uncon- tested Mayoralty Race.	248
	The Annexation of Summerville and the Battle for Commission Govern- ment	254
	The March Flood of 1912 and the Completion of the Augusta Levee. . . .	264
	NOTES	274
IX	STRIKERS, SCABS, SOLDIERS AND ARBITRATORS	277
	The Trolley Car Strike of 1911 and Temporary Resolution of Differences. .	277
	The Trolley Car Strike of 1912 and Martial Law.	286
	The Georgia Railroad Strike, Atlanta Joint Terminals Strike and the Threat of a Southeastern Rail Transportation Strike.	314
	NOTES	335

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

CHAPTER		<u>Page</u>
X	THE LAST BATTLE	340
	The Mayoralty Muddle of 1912: The Hayne Revolt Against the White Primary Committee.	340
	Putting an End to Political Revolts and Progressive Democracy.	354
	NOTES	360
XI	IMPRESSIONS OF AN ERA	362
	The Economic Significance of Augusta and American Historiography.	362
	The Significance of the Augusta Strikes, Southern Labor and Na- tional Unions.	367
	Augusta Politics in the Age of Re- form: Progressivism, Pluralism or Southern Elitism?	372
	NOTES	390
	APPENDIX.	396
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.	416
	BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	420

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		<u>Page</u>
I	Declining Wages of Textile Workers in the King and Sibley Mills: 1880-1898	397
II	Declining Wages of Textile Workers in Augusta, Georgia: 1880-1900.	397
III	Wages of the Textile Labor Force by Sex and Age Groups in 1900	397
IV	A Statistical Record of the History of the Savannah River Floods and the City of Augusta	398
V	The Special Bond Election for the Levee, University Hospital and the New Water- works System of 1912.	399
VI	Councilmen and Business Associations, 1897-1917	400
VII	Mayors and Business Associations, 1897-1917.	403
VIII	Aldermanic Elections, Primary & General, 1897-1917	406
IX	Rival Candidates in City Council Elections and Their Business and Social Affiliations, 1897-1917	413
X	Mortality Statistics of Whites and Blacks, 1880-1918	415

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THE QUEEN CITY OF THE SAVANNAH: AUGUSTA, GEORGIA,
DURING THE URBAN PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1917

By

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Understanding Augusta during the urban Progressive Era revolves an appreciation of at least eight related patterns of facts. First, the economic growth since the Civil War revealed not only a relative continuity in the development of railroads, banks, textile factories and other enterprises, but also showed that key important groups of businessmen were responsible for the rise of the Lowell of the New South. Second, local men in business were greatly involved in a reform movement for "Good Government" in the 1890's against "The Ring," a group of politicians charged with controlling urban government to the detriment of the "good people" and accused of failing to provide critical municipal services by Patrick Walsh and his supporters. Third, despite challenges to the Walsh Progressive reform coalition, it originally represented a fairly well-organized, strongly moralistic crusade, encompassing Protestants and

Catholics, but far more importantly, the socio-economic elite and the lower class whites and blacks. Fourth, although the Progressives were triumphant in getting the "right kind of people" elected as mayors and aldermen, the lower class ethno-cultural groups that had originally responded to the appeals of business leaders, who were actively seeking political power, were not only mostly deprived of access to positions of responsibility, but they were gradually excluded from even participation in elections. Fifth, initially Negroes were massively involved in urban politics, but a cluster of rationales and means was invoked and devised by white reformers to disfranchise them, creating the first large segment of society to be denied participation in so-called democratic primary and general elections and subsequently leading to the total inability of blacks to directly influence the political, decision-making process--factors which probably substantially contributed to the grossly inadequate public services and the depressed conditions that prevailed in growing ghetto areas. Sixth, among the important priorities established by the ruling elite was the common consensus that those fundamental, pre-existing, long-range problems, that had not been properly resolved through ordinary voluntary civic associations and non-political organizations, could be best

resolved by effectively utilizing the power of municipal government. Seventh, recurrent labor strikes erupted in the mills, trolley cars and railroads of the "Greater Augusta Area," indicating acute social tensions between capitalists and laborers, revealing that the former were always the victors, not the vanquished, showing the decisive role of local and state officials in putting down civil disturbances and pointing out that the city emerged as a significant storm center in the New South as the representatives of the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor attempted to unionize it as part of an overall "Southern Campaign Strategy" to crack the bastille of anti-unionism in the nation. Last of all, overconcentration of wealth created a corresponding centralization of power largely into the white primary executive committee to the detriment of massive democratic participation in most elections, primary or general, and to the probable disadvantages of the non-business groups.

CHAPTER I

THE LOWELL OF THE SOUTH

The Confederate City and Wartime Expansion

Augusta was extremely fortunate during the Civil War. The war did not disrupt the economic development of the emerging antebellum industrial city but, in many respects, accelerated industrial growth. Numerous private textile corporations increased their industrial production due to the military needs of the Confederacy. Large-scale defense industries such as the Powder Works, Augusta Arsenal, Confederate Clothing Bureau and Army Quartermaster supply depot--which manufactured artillery projectiles, cartridges, balls, gunpowder, guncarriages and caissons--emerged as part of the military-industrial enterprises of the Confederate City. Under the exigencies of the war, new manufacturing concerns, which produced candles, soap, blankets, twilled cotton goods for uniforms, canvas for tents, army capes, overcoats, tarpaulins, horse covers, small arms, rifles and military field equipment for infantry, artillery and cavalry units, sprang up almost overnight as government contracts

were let to private entrepreneurs. Thousands of "Johnny kebs" benefited from the food products and consumer goods that were produced, packed and shipped to the front lines. Great quantities of valuable machinery were shipped by rail into Augusta and became part of the new industrial equipment. The work of expanding the plant operations of existing factories and building new enterprises in turn stimulated a general boom in the construction business. Scores of wagon teams were busy daily hauling lumber, brick and other construction supplies to the mills, defense industries and railroad yards of the city. Wartime expansion, moreover, promoted an expenditure of large sums of money in permanent factory improvements and the utilization of large tracts of suburban property in the West End. Also, among the whole progression of responses to the booming wartime economy was very rapid increases in the urban population; from 1840-1860 the city's population jumped from 7,502 to 12,493 people.¹

Wartime visitors arriving in the city were frequently amazed at the thriving activities. They observed the arrival of trains and wagon teams bringing machinery for the new industries and departing with troops, food supplies, military equipment and other articles of war. Walking along the banks of the old canal, they noted that flat-bottomed barges were jammed around the dock areas of the factories.

Peering up into the sky, they saw huge columns of dense black smoke wafting upward from chimneys. Touring the mills, they listened to the hiss of steam engines, the clanking of wheels and the grinding of massive rollers producing weapons of war. Driving down the main thoroughfares of the business district, they watched shoppers and merchants haggling over the prices of those imported goods which had succeeded in running the Union blockade. "To judge from Augusta, no one would have supposed that two formidable armies were confronting each other within a twenty-four hours' journey," Fitz Gerald Ross noted in his journal. "Every one seemed engrossed in business, and the shops were all plenteously filled with merchants and customers."²

Augusta, furthermore, was spared utter destruction by General William Tecumseh Sherman in his "infamous" march through Georgia. The "Apostle of Modern Warfare" chose to by-pass Augusta and miss his Thanksgiving dinner engagement in order to spend a "jubilant Christmas in Savannah." For strategic military reasons--not romantic legendary accounts of his infatuation with an Augusta belle, nor sentimental feelings for the city--Sherman chose to drive straight through from Atlanta to Savannah, cutting Georgia in two. He was aware that Brigadier-General Birkett D. Dry had

fortified Augusta against an impending attack. Reliable informers had also told him that General Braxton Bragg and other high ranking Confederate officers and several thousand troops had arrived to defend the city and, it was hoped, completely break up and disperse his sixty thousand "bummers." These military situations alone dictated that he avoid a prolonged seige and continue his "grand military picnic" to the sea.³

Augusta was one of the few southern cities which was not destroyed by Union forces during the course of the war. Unlike Atlanta, Richmond, Charleston, Columbia, Vicksburg and Galveston, it suffered no physical damage, nor was it afterwards plundered by foraging soldiers. There was no "Battle of Augusta." No artillery units lobbed screaming shells and cannon balls into the city, leaving the town's streets pockmarked with shell holes and filled with debris. Nor had bombardment left behind skeletal remains of warehouses, buildings and homes standing in the midst of smoldering blackened war rubble. The railroad tracks of the major lines leading into and out of the city were not ripped up nor the cross-ties stacked like cords of wood, soaked with kerosene and burned. Nor had invading, hostile cavalry units charged down Broad, Greene or the other thoroughfares laying waste to the town. Nor in their deadly wake had

"damned Yankee" footsoldiers invaded the city, shooting out windows, slaying rebels, molesting citizens, destroying business firms, burning warehouses and wharves and otherwise wreaking general havoc.

Augusta in 1865 was hardly a conquered town which had experienced the ravages of modern war. When the war ended it was perhaps in better condition than any other city in the state. The central business district was still intact. Banks, business firms, department stores, grocery stores and other enterprises were not physically ruined. The industrial zone of the city remained untouched by war, "happily spared destruction by burning." Only the Belleville Factory did not remain to operate after the war but its demise was the result of an accidental fire, not the hazards of nineteenth century warfare. Several of the buildings of the Confederate Powder Works were dismantled by occupation armies and some of the machinery removed but the plant and most of the industrial equipment was not totally ruined and could be readily converted to a peace-time industrial operation. Because Augusta had escaped invasion and destruction, many new enterprising immigrants from Atlanta, Savannah, Charleston and other war-torn cities chose to relocate in Augusta and cast their lots with the future growth of the city. Most of those who arrived were former merchants,

businessmen and financiers who believed that such good fortunes would create most favorable circumstances for economic growth in the postwar era. It was also commonly remarked by federal soldiers when they arrived in the "Yankee City" that they found more specie in circulation than they had ever seen since before the war began.⁴

Numerous comments revealed the buoyant, optimistic spirit of material progress. "Stores, whose shelves were then empty, are laden now with the choicest goods. Merchants have been North . . . acknowledging and liquidating the debts contracted by them before the war, [and] have found creditors. We witness stores undergoing repairs. business houses and dwellings Phoenix-like, rising out of ashes The stores are stocked with goods; the streets thronged with men . . . all proclaiming [our] city's increasing prosperity. The flutter of wheels and the song of the saw on the canal are responded to by the lumbering of heavily laden drays along the streets, caught up by the ring of the hammer and the sharp clip of the adz, at the ship yard, and re-echoed by the same from the shores of South Carolina. For from the boundaries of Dublin to the Banks of the Savannah rises an unceasing hum--telling us that we live in the midst of an enterprising and industrious people," Martin V. Calvin explained in the City Directory for 1865.

"Our city has become so great a centre for business that merchants have been obliged to betake themselves to second stories for salesrooms. It looks as if Augusta was growing a little--growing in population some, and in business a great deal," the Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel noted in September, 1865. Vast quantities of cotton were stored in and about the city; perhaps, in greater amounts than at "any other point in the South." None of it had been burned, nor destroyed. "Cotton Row" merchants commented about how business remained "very brisk"; most of them failed to moan about the "good old days." Returning to the city, W. A. Ramsey stated that a "most kind" and "conciliatory spirit" existed towards the South in New York, remarking that the "leading merchants and businessmen of the great metropolis are anxious and striving to have business once more resume its wonted channels with all sections."⁵

Postwar "Recovery" and Uninterrupted Growth

Available evidence suggests that there was significant, substantial and swift "recovery" in the post-Civil War period. According to data collected, three sectors of the Augusta economy showed overwhelming growth: a new banking system was quickly recreated to replace the antebellum banks that had collapsed with the Confederacy; a greater, more complex transportation network evolved as old rail connec-

tions were restored and new, direct rail connections were established with a variety of major South Atlantic cities; and a larger industrial zone was created as the old, established prewar mills continued to prosper, new textile mills were founded along the banks of the enlarged canal and the surplus wealth of Augustans was exported into the Horse Creek Valley region of South Carolina or the "Greater Augusta Area." Instead of a dark, bleak and tragic era--a period of utter destruction in which all aspects of the old economic order were torn asunder--the postwar era was a new epoch of rapid "recovery" and unprecedented expansion. Either Augusta's postwar economic experiences were totally unique or additional "reasonable doubt" is cast upon the traditional hypothesis that few positive accomplishments were attained in the Reconstruction era.

The financial history of Augusta during the Civil War and Reconstruction era revealed that total economic ruin did not transpire; nor were the postwar years an era of lingering financial distress. On the eve of the war a series of banks constituted the "Big Six" in the city and possibly the state. The Bank of Augusta, Mechanics Bank, City Bank, Augusta Insurance and Banking Company, Union Bank and the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company had combined assets of \$2,675,000 out of an aggregate banking capital of \$9,028,078

of the twenty-five banks in Georgia. "At the outbreak of the war the banks of Augusta risked their all on the success of the Southern Confederacy," Charles C. Jones and Salem Dutcher recorded in their Memorial History of Augusta," and at the end of the struggle went down in common ruin."⁶

One bank, however, failed to collapse in hideous bankruptcy. The sole antebellum bank which survived was the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company. The individual who was responsible for its survival was John Pendleton King. President King clearly recognized that the precipitous drop in deposits and discounts were indicative of an imminent financial collapse. Deposits and discounts dropped sharply in 1863-1864; falling from \$626,849 to \$99,844 and from \$559,066 to \$181,319, respectively. Not only did King perceive the impending financial death of the bank but, as he observed the fortunes of war, he foresaw the inevitable collapse of the Confederacy. Because of his recommendations to the board of directors, the bank continued to exist as a de facto institution in the community. Under his able executive leadership it emerged from a prewar position as third or fourth largest bank to become the dominant banking concern in the city. During the so-called era of "Yankee-Bayonet Rule" the capital of the company rose to \$4,200,000; the volume of annual business transactions amounted to

\$75,000,000 and over \$4,000,000 in dividends were paid out to its stockholders.⁷

The continued commercial prosperity and important monetary needs of the city's institutions to handle financial transactions between industrialists, cotton factors, grocers, retail merchants, attorneys, real estate agents and the general urban populace necessitated the creation of other banking facilities. No one bank could service the needs of the entire community. To fill the vacuum created by the collapse of the Big Six, a series of new successor banks were organized by dynamic, enterprising financiers, merchants and businessmen, many of whom were the sons of the "established families."

Within ten years after the end of the war a new cluster of banks were created and in operation. The National Bank was duly organized in December, 1865, and commenced the business of banking. Although two wealthy and powerful New York capitalists had put up the initial venture capital, local entrepreneurs were largely responsible for the administration of the new bank. Under the auspices of William H. Jackson and Charles Eskes, its total resources continued to grow until they were estimated to be in excess of \$550,000. The Bank of Augusta was chartered by the state legislature in the spring of 1866 with Howard H. Rickman

as its President. Alfred Baker, former antebellum state senator, proprietor of the Paragon mills, co-owner of a very large wholesale grocery business, a leading director of the old Mechanics Bank and director of the Enterprise Manufacturing Company and the Georgia Chemical Works, was most influential in assisting Ferdinand Phinizy and other prewar community leaders in organizing the National Exchange Bank in 1871. In later years its average annual deposits were around \$192,000 and loans and discounts exceeded \$340,000. Former governor Charles J. Jenkins, industrialists John P. King and ex-mayor "Colonel" Thomas P. Branch were instrumental in founding during the era of Reconstruction the Planters' Loan and Savings Bank with a capital stock of almost \$1,000,000. The Commercial Bank, originally incorporated in 1863, commenced its financial transactions in 1871. Organized by two industrialists, William Sibley and George R. Lombard; Joseph Rucker Lamar, a very prominent attorney and several other outstanding businessmen, its yearly monetary transactions by the 1890's were greater than \$250,000. "Captain" William B. Young, Patrick Walsh, John P. King, Richard E. Allen and Alfred Baker pooled together some of their economic resources in 1875 to create the Augusta Savings Institute for small depositors. Its deposits steadily increased to around \$314,537 in the 1890's.

Other banks--the Irish-American Dime Savings Bank and the Equitable Building and Loan Association--were also established by the "most substantial" businessmen who, in many cases, were the former incorporators, executives, politicians and officials of the antebellum banks, industries, railroads and other enterprises.⁸

The significance of the new, postwar banking firms cannot be blithely dismissed. Except for the loss of confidence, runs on the banks and suspensions accompanying the national Panic of 1873, clearing house returns published in the financial section of the Chronicle showed a continuous, steady increase over the corresponding period of the previous year. All of the new banks were consistently reported to be in a "very prosperous condition" or doing a "remarkably fine" business and greatly assisting in the normal economic transactions of the community. Indeed, in one case the board of directors announced to stockholders that dividends paid out amounted to the "lively tune" of 12 per cent per annum on its \$1,000,000 capital stock. Secondly, in most instances, the banking firms were also closely allied with the new manufacturing, mercantile and railroad interests. The same men who served as bank presidents were often as not presidents, vice presidents or members of the boards of directors of other corporations. William E. Jackson,

President of the Augusta Factory, played a critical role in determining the policies of the National Bank. Another member of the National Bank, Charles Estes, was the executive leader of the John P. King mill. William Sibley, President of the Sibley Manufacturing Company, was one of the principal organizers and directors of the Commercial Bank. The owner of the major iron foundry, George R. Lombard, was both a member of the board of the Commercial Bank and the National Bank. John P. King, a prominent, wealthy, prewar attorney, ex-United States Senator and President of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, was very influential in establishing the Planters' Loan and Savings Bank, Augusta Savings Institute and the National Exchange Bank. Bankers obviously played an influential role in the procurement of local venture capital for the further growth of the established textile mills, creation of new industries and the swift "recovery" of urban industrial prosperity in the postwar era. Bankers were clearly eager and anxious to lend money to talented businessmen.

The second sector of the postwar economy to reveal significant rapid recovery was the railroad transportation system which converged and departed from Augusta. The war had temporarily disrupted it but the disorders were quickly corrected after Appomattox. By July, 1865, railroad cars

were operating from Chattanooga to Atlanta, indicative of the ultimate successful reconstruction of the Western and Atlanta Railroad. The Macon and Augusta Railroad, a branch of the Georgia Railroad, announced in mid-August, 1865, that its services would be reopened shortly. Work on the restoration of the South Carolina Railroad, it was stated by executives of the "Best Friend," was being "vigorously prosecuted." Two trains were running between Augusta and Savannah per day by February, 1866. By the spring of 1866, Augusta was again united by rail with Charleston, Columbia and points north. Although some of the iron rails of the Central Railroad of Georgia were heated, wrapped around trees and shaped into fashionable "Sherman ties," not all of the main lines were hopelessly destroyed. Officials pointed with pride that within two years after the end of the war the lines were reopened from Augusta to Macon and Savannah and that the value of capital stock had risen to \$5,300,000. In 1873 the Charleston and Western Carolina Railroad Company reopened its lines from Augusta to Port Royal. By the 1870's and 1880's through the railroad lines, Augusta was being connected up with a plethora of southern cities-- Birmingham, Montgomery, Atlanta, Athens, Macon, Columbus, Laurens, Spartanburg, Greenville, Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, Norfolk, Port Royal and Baltimore--making it a

hub of one of the important rail centers of the New South. Most contemporaries were impressed with the great energy, remarkable enthusiasm and tremendous zeal exhibited by the owners in rebuilding, repairing and restoring the old transportation network that converged and departed from Augusta. But they also perceived that a vast, new and far more complex railroad network was being built that would create greater commercial and agrarian trade relationships with their city.⁹

The Georgia Railroad Company, especially, showed the continuation of the boom that had accompanied the outbreak of the Civil War. Superintendent E. W. Cole's financial report for May 15, 1865, to March 31, 1866, showed that net income paid before interest charges to investors exceeded \$514,908. It had "definitely not been ruined by the war." There were numerous explanations offered for the postwar prosperity of "Old Reliable." War veterans, refugees and other displaced persons were returned to their homes. Cotton, hoarded during the last days of the Confederacy, was being shipped for export. The temporary elimination of some competitors assured the Georgia Railroad more than its normal volume of trade.

It was not until 1874 that there was a decline in net profits, but even then annual net profits often surpassed

\$500,000. Furthermore, in a proper perspective, the decline represented actual earnings and reflected sound company policies. Additional miles of track were laid and the overall mileage increased. New locomotives and cars were purchased from the gross profits. Many of the old, wood-burning engines were overhauled and converted to coal burners. Newer, more "elegant and comfortable" cars, which had become the "symbol of safety and luxury," also were bought. All these expenditures naturally cut into the margin of net profits but represented long-range investment gains rather than short-term losses. Despite these alleged losses, from 1860-1881 the Georgia Railroad paid out to its stockholders dividends amounting to \$5,154,576.¹⁰

Railroads played a crucial role in the rapid development of the city in the late nineteenth century. First, they made Augusta the gateway through which passed most of the agricultural products of several southeastern states. The trunk lines and branches of these railroads travelled through some of the best farm counties. Railroad cars loaded with every variety of cash crops--wheat, oats, corn, rye, beets, sweet potatoes, artichokes, peaches, pears, plums and grapes--were bound for Augusta and other urban markets. Extensive agricultural trade helped to make it into a commercial market for farmers and merchants of the

surrounding villages, towns and smaller cities. To the business community, this steady stream of products from the farm strengthened the rural-urban trade relationships and assured it of greater profits.

Second, most of the lines reached the cotton growing sections of Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina and even western Tennessee where fertile black lands yielded tons of "southern snow" each season, making Augusta the second largest inland cotton market in the United States. Each year after the war as the railroads continued to increase their mileage of track, they increased the size of the Augusta cotton territory and shipped more cotton into the city to be processed, refined, baled, consigned, marketed and transshipped in box cars or cargo holds of steamers to other cities. A "boom" in cotton receipts was clearly evident. The aggregate volume of cotton receipts from 1876-1886 amounted to over 1,400,000 bales--or an average of around 134,000 bales. Cotton receipts jumped from 1889-1900 to over 2,600,000 bales and a new average of 241,000 bales per year. From 1900-1911 the total volume of cotton receipts jumped to over 3,700,000 bales and reached a new yearly average of 343,000 bales. Over 4,700,000 bales were shipped from 1911-1922, representing a higher annual average of 435,000 bales. Cotton was unquestionably one of the major

forces creating the prosperity of Augusta in the urban Progressive Era.¹¹

Third, without the railway and shipping facilities, Augusta would not have conceivably experienced an "internal boom" in urban growth, industrial expansion, business sales and aggregate banking assets. "Cotton Row" merchants busily constructed huge new warehouses and wharves all along the Savannah to store the increased volume of cotton and to expedite the transfer of cotton from railroad box cars into the holds of ocean-bound steamers. "It is quite an interesting scene at the wharf these days," a reporter noted, "with the quantity of freight all around and the number of teams loading and unloading." At the port of Augusta "nothing but the smokestacks of steamers could be seen." The boom in cotton receipts also had significant repercussions upon the textile industries, creating a tremendous impetus to the enlargement of existing mills, promoting the installation of more looms and spindles in all factories and increasing the volume of industrial production. Manufacturing enterprises were probably flooded with more orders, turned out more finished products and paid out greater profits than possibly at any time in the past. Concurrently, the substantial growth in the volume of freight receipts was a major factor in the parallel rise in bank clearings. Annual

bank clearings throughout the Progressive Era rose from a record high in 1900 of over \$68,000,000 to an all time annual peak of \$230,000,000 in 1919. Financiers readily explained that the marked increase was due to the "active cotton traffic."¹²

Fourth, through the railroads and steamers, Augusta's "local" economy become part of a regional and national economy. The various railroad and steamship companies linked up Augusta with the port shipping facilities of Jacksonville, Brunswick, Savannah, Charleston, Newport, Port Royal, Wilmington and Norfolk. Ships were loaded at these South Atlantic port cities with cargoes and passengers bound for Providence, New York, Boston, Washington and Richmond as well as many of the major ports of Europe.

The economic pattern of recovery in banks and railroads was especially rapid but postwar industrial growth proceeded more slowly because it necessarily involved greater long-range decisions and preparations; acquisition of additional mechanical equipment; enlargement of the canal for adequate power; incorporation and construction of new enterprises; internal migration of people and the formation of a larger urban population; import and export of a greater volume of goods; and, especially, the steady rise in the volume of capital formation and financial commitments.

Industrial recovery, however, was not subjected to sporadic, frequent interruptions nor drastic, sharp upward and downward movements commonly characteristic of business-cycle fluctuations. Instead, the pattern was an overall upward trend, showing the continuation of certain substantial forward gains made during the war, revealing additional immediate postwar advances through careful planning and indicating to a great extent that there was an "interlocked" sequence of changes occurring in all three sectors of Augusta's urban economy culminating in the successful rise of the city as a major textile center for Georgia and western South Carolina.¹³

The rate of growth, net profits and other business gains of the Augusta Factory, for instance, clearly reflected the continuity of industrial development. Founded in 1847 and reorganized in 1859 by William E. Jackson, Thomas Barrett and other prominent Augustans, the "Pioneer" mill showed almost uninterrupted growth during peace, war and reconstruction. During the first three years after Appomattox, it liquidated its debts, acquired a surplus fund of nearly \$250,000 and owned property valued at more than \$900,000. Aggregate net earnings from 1865-1870 far exceeded \$800,000, out of which \$540,000 was paid to stockholders, President Jackson reported in his annual report to

the board of directors. In May of 1873, Jackson reported that stock paid in dividends amounted to a steady 20 per cent per annum since the war and its value had more than doubled. That fall the company reported that from 1868-1873 net earnings amounted to \$790,500 and profits divided up among stockholders exceeded \$660,000. Moreover, the mill had quadrupled the number of looms and spindles in operation, jumping to 800 looms and 26,000 spindles. Corporate profits were very good from 1865-1875, paying out dividends equal to 198 per cent on the original capital stock, or approximately 15 per cent per annum.¹⁴

The most important and most striking feature of postwar growth, however, was the plan formulated by the white leaders of the "established families" to create, through the enlargement of the canal, a new, more vast industrial zone in the city. Mayor Joseph V. H. Allen's inaugural address of December, 1869, included comments that "the power of the old canal was not sufficient to run even the two mills of the Augusta Factory." The mayor also expressed belief that the construction of the Langley mill in South Carolina by Augustans had been the result of the inadequate power provided by the old canal. Concluding his address, Allen stated that the canal contained "the germ of the future greatness of our city, and needs only to be developed to

bring a large increase of industrious population, millions of added wealth and profitable labor for our poor."¹⁵

Businessmen, industrialists, financiers, merchants and attorneys eagerly desired to improve the old canal to allow for future growth, enlarge plant operations of the Augusta Factory and other mills and encourage the founding of a cluster of new industries, establishing Augusta as the "LOWELL of the SOUTH." Many pointed out that the canal, completed in 1845, was no longer adequate--supplying neither sufficient power for existing mills nor providing power for increasing the number of spindles and looms in the established mills, much less for any new industrial enterprises. Concerned interest groups, furthermore, pointed out that since the city had a heavy investment in the original canal, its enlargement was naturally a matter of cooperative effort between municipal authorities and the representatives of private business firms. They also stressed that a bold, new plan of expanding its size would be a major factor of inducing investors at home and elsewhere to put up the venture capital for "mammoth" new manufacturing concerns.

Convinced of the enormous importance of the proposed project, Mayor Charles Estes recommended that experienced engineers be hired to survey the canal, estimate the costs and present their findings to the City Council for an

ultimate decision in the matter. Chairman Thomas Barrett, Jr., Patrick Walsh and two other members of the special canal committee accepted the findings of the engineers, submitted a report endorsing the building of a "new" canal and recommended that a special election be held. After voting unanimously in favor of the project, the council called for a special election. Consolidated returns of the October, 1871, canal election showed that a majority of voters favored the project. On the basis of the mandate at the polls, the city purchased the necessary dredging equipment, awarded the contract to a private corporation and arranged for the importation of several hundred Chinese laborers to assist in the digging of the canal. Sluiceways were cut from the canal to the river. A second and third level to the old canal were built. After several years of arduous labor, the project was completed at a cost of almost \$1,000,000.¹⁶

As construction of the new canal neared completion, it prompted shrewd, cool-headed, business-minded Augustans to travel North in search of Yankee money in order to re-establish old financial and commercial ties, create new business associations, promote the expansion of the old industries and found new factories along the banks of the enlarged canal. Like many Bourbon crusaders of the New

South, they believed that the economic resources were being drained away to the textile industries in New England. They were further convinced that the low cotton prices were responsible for the drain of these resources. Anxious to retain that wealth and to beat the "Yankee Captains" of industries at their own game, they believed that the cotton mills ought to be brought to the cotton fields. The new business leaders who emerged as the economic elite--while lamenting the demise of the Confederacy--shared a common vision of an industrial, business civilization for the South.¹⁷

Completed in 1875, the new Augusta canal was responsible for converting the "persistent" swampy lowlands, stagnant ponds and thick marshes on the estates of Cumming, Phinizy, Eve and other community influentials into a valuable industrial park. But of utmost importance was the fact that the plans, preparations and actions pursued by "Southern Yankees" had secured subscription of funds from some northern capitalists, succeeded in raising local venture capital and been responsible for the founding of a plethora of new textile mills and the proliferation of secondary or collateral industries. The John P. King, Josiah Sibley, Enterprise, Algernon, Sterling and Warwick cotton mills, along with Clark's Flour Mill, Artic Ice

Factory, Singleton Silk Mill, Cotton Seed Oil Company, Lombard Iron Works and other major industries were built along the banks of the enlarged canal. The rise of "mammoth" new industries, in turn, stimulated the growth of over sixty new collateral industries, including railroad shops, boiler repair shops, lumber mills, compresses and brick works.¹⁸

The Enterprise Manufacturing Company before 1873 was a "small old stone mill, which had long reposed on the old canal, and ground for its neighbors its slender lots of Flour and meal." In October of 1877, H. M. Clark of Boston, Charles Estes, G. T. Jackson, Francis Cogin and James Grey pooled their resources to reorganize the company. Within less than a decade, the "giant" new corporation had over 30,000 spindles, 900 looms and employed 700 mill operatives. In November of 1879, Eugene F. Verdery, a leading industrialist and financier; Patrick Walsh of the Augusta Chronicle; Z. McCord, a prominent businessman; and former mayors, Robert May and Joseph V. H. Allen, pooled \$160,000 of local capital to organize the Sibley Manufacturing Company. Josiah Sibley and William C. Sibley travelled to New York and Cincinnati, securing additional subscriptions from Samuel Keyser and Walter Smith amounting to \$540,000. The following spring, construction began at the site of the old Confederate Powder Works. Completed and in operation in

February, 1882, the Sibley mill partially utilized the refinery, laboratory and incorporating mills and other buildings of the powder works. Initially it housed 35,000 spindles and 1,000 looms but increasing production demands dictated increasing its operation to 40,256 spindles and 1,409 looms. Also on the first level of the new canal was the King mill. Charles Estes, after travelling to Boston, New York and Philadelphia, obtained subscriptions amounting to almost \$500,000. Returning to the South, he visited Charleston and Savannah, raising the remainder of the funds necessary for capitalization. Although the board of directors included C. H. Simpson and C. C. Baldwin, the vast majority were prominent Augustans--H. B. King, John Davison, Patrick Walsh, Alfred Baker, Thomas G. Barrett, Josiah Sibley, James P. Verdery, William T. Wheelless and R. A. Fleming. Within nine years the industrial capacity of the John P. King mill increased from 544 to 880 looms and from 26,464 to 96,500 spindles.¹⁹

The Augusta Factory, Sibley, King and Enterprise mills, collectively, constituted the galaxy of large textile factories in the city. Around them were a cluster of smaller cotton mills including the Globe, Warwick, Algernon and Sterling mills and a variety of secondary industries. The rise of a well-developed money market, rapid railroad con-

struction, a greater volume of trade, significant urban-suburban expansion and the growth of the acute need for technological repair services to the basic textile industries produced a wave of incorporations and construction of a plethora of collateral industries by shrewd, perceptive entrepreneurs. They correctly realized that there was a direct correlation between the new level of urban-industrial activity and the need for additional, effective subsidiary industries. Thus, an economic "subsector" consisting of the Georgia Chemical Works, Lombard Iron Foundry, Augusta Lumber Company, Perkins Manufacturing Company, Augusta Ice Factory and some sixty other, smaller supplementary industries evolved. The completion of the canal had created a new urban industrial sector valued at approximately \$4,000,000 which produced over \$3,000,000 annually in manufactured goods. By 1885 the aggregate capital investment in the total industrial sector increased to almost \$8,000,000 and the manufactured products were valued in excess of \$10,000,000. Augusta, in the Gilded Age, was clearly making rapid strides toward becoming a significant urban industrial city in Georgia as well as western South Carolina.²⁰

The growth of banks, railroads and industries was directly responsible for the increasing population of Augusta. Hundreds of people left the cornfields, cotton

patches and redclay hills of rural Georgia every year to find so-called "high-paying" industrial work in Augusta. Every one of the major mills had a sizable labor force and the other industries employed large numbers of wage-earners. As a connecting point between rail and water transportation systems, Augusta required great numbers of semi-skilled and unskilled laborers. Because the goods handled were bulky in size, they required numerous hands to assist the transfer of freight from the warehouses to railroad box cars and steamers. Thousands of dollars of crates of merchandise, boxes of canned goods, furniture, stoves and other consumer goods needed to be efficiently unloaded from the ships which docked at the port of Augusta and lifted from the wharves to the streets above where stevedores, draymen and truckmen carted it away in their horse-drawn wagons. The continuous construction of new residential homes, business firms, larger mills and warehouses was also responsible for encouraging bricklayers, carpenters and other skilled construction workers to migrate to the city. The abundance of job opportunities, therefore, naturally attracted more people to the city. In 1860 the population of Augusta was little more than 12,000; but by 1880 it had grown to over 20,000. Two decades later it had almost doubled, reaching 39,441. By 1920 the number of people living in Augusta reached

59,551. In six decades the urban population had increased about five times.²¹

The rise of the "Lowell of the South" was not restricted to the confines of the city limits, nor the boundaries of Richmond County, nor, for that matter, the geographical dividing lines between Georgia and South Carolina. Another significant aspect of the third sector was, therefore, industrial expansion into the Palmetto state. The genesis of Augusta's "industrial colony" dated back to the 1840's with the founding of the Graniteville and Vaucluse mills. Although located across the Savannah, both were Augusta enterprises since a substantial portion of the capital and many of the men who incorporated and directed them were Augustans. In 1847 the Graniteville mill was built. The following year the Vaucluse mill was built from the surplus profits of its parent corporation. Both experienced almost continuous growth for two decades, building additions to the plants, acquiring several thousand acres of land and constructing small wooden frame houses and company stores in the emerging industrial plantations. President William Gregg, returning to Augusta after an extended business trip abroad, announced that he had purchased considerable new equipment for greater expansion. Over 680 cases of equipment and large quantities of building materials arrived

from Liverpool in May, 1866. But, in 1867, declining value of shares, expenditures for the planned enlargements and other internal business complications contributed to the temporary cessation of production.²²

Under the single management of President H. H. Hickman of Augusta, the Graniteville and Vaucluse mills from 1867-1899 showed considerable forward strides and significant profits. Colonel Hickman successfully restored the joint business corporation to a firm basis, eliminated unnecessary expenditures, increased the volume of business sales and effected a thorough-going managerial revolution. In the annual report for 1872, it was proudly announced that during the last five years stockholders had received an average annual dividend ranging from 10 to 20 per cent of the total capital investment. Net gains for just the Graniteville mill had added \$166,526 to the surplus funds in 1872; the following year they exceeded \$190,000. Gross profits in 1873 amounted to \$217,685 and dividends paid out were in excess of \$100,000. The combined profits of the two mills exceeded \$356,000. In 1874, although directors lamented that profits were "not very satisfactory," according to business records the company recorded a net return of 22 per cent on its \$700,000 capital. From 1874-1878 the Graniteville alone paid out dividends amounting to \$299,650,

representing almost 50 per cent on its capital stock. From 1878-1883 Graniteville earned gross profits of \$468,977 and paid out almost \$250,000 to stockholders. In April, 1899, Hickman rendered a thorough account of his thirty-two years of "stewardship" before turning over the direction of the company to Tracy Hickman. The retiring president pointed with great pride that shares had risen in value from sixty cents on the dollar to \$200 per share. Stockholders had received \$1,800,000 in dividends. Property holdings had substantially increased, new machinery had been purchased, physical facilities had grown with constant enlargements, several hundreds of thousands of dollars had been transferred to the surplus funds out of the gross profits and other industries had been founded in the "Greater Augusta Area."²³

The continual return of steady, high profits to the Augusta capitalists meant that they were most eager to continue to invest their surplus wealth in their "industrial colony." In the 1870's, 1880's and 1890's an "aggressive spirit" resulted in further "imperial exporting" of capital to found the Langley, Aiken, Warren and Clearwater manufacturing companies. The men who raised the capital stock, promoted the ventures, organized the milltowns and made all the key administrative decisions were prominent citizens of

Augusta. By 1900 they had invested a total of \$2,200,000 in their four Carolina-based factories.

The subscribed capital for the Langley Manufacturing Company came in 1870 from William Langley of New York; William E. Jackson, President of the Augusta Factory; William C. Sibley, President of the Sibley mill; and other leading local businessmen--Josiah Sibley, Edward Thomas, John Jay Cohen and Thomas Barrett, Jr. The new corporation lived up to their hearty expectations, showing net profits of \$325,403 for the period 1872-1877 which represented about 13.5 per cent average annual return. President Thomas Barrett, Jr. reported that the corporation was a real "going-concern," earning net profits of \$338,525 from 1878-1883 or an 85 per cent return on the initial investment in a four-year period.²⁴

At Bath, just six miles from Augusta, the Aiken Manufacturing Company was organized, built and in operation in the 1890's. Among its important promoters and officials was Charles Estes, President of the King mill, former mayor and close business associate of several mills, banks and other industries. President Thomas Barrett, Jr., executive head of the Langley mill since 1878, had greatly stressed the importance of the plant's location between the Southern, South Carolina and Georgia railways, pointing out that the exist-

ing spur switches afforded the company excellent rail facilities for shipping goods to other markets. Within five years, the three-story brick plant was enlarged to accommodate 27,500 spindles and 766 looms, thereby almost doubling its original industrial equipment.

James P. Verdery, President and Treasurer of the Enterprise mill; Charles A. Robbe, prominent construction contractor; Linwood C. Hayne, a rising young financier associated with two important Augusta banks; and Eugene F. Verdery combined their fortunes and talents to take over a mill at Warrentonville when it became "financially embarrassed." President E. F. Verdery successfully raised the capital funds to liquidate its debts and to equip it with 1,000 looms and 31,000 spindles. By 1900 the Warren Manufacturing Company, it was frequently said, was larger in size, production, and equipment than both the Graniteville and Vaucluse mills.

Experienced Augusta cotton men--Charles Estes, Thomas Barrett, Jr., Frederick B. Pope and Landon A. Thomas, Jr.--perceived that most of the southern cotton mills had to send their goods North to be bleached and then re-shipped back down South. Recognizing that a demand existed, they willingly put up the venture capital for the Clearwater Bleachery and Manufacturing Company. Since it was the only firm

of its type in the region, they knew that it would steadily grow, paying back high profits to its subscribers.²⁵

The Nature of the New City

Rapid urbanization and industrialization had substantially changed the nature of life in the new city. Vast new municipal problems emerged, placing greater demands and strains upon city government and the decision-makers. Water for the people was a very crucial matter, requiring long-range urban planning. Bad taste, strong odors, thick green algae and flitting water bugs in public wells often caused them to be "abandoned by man and beast." Sewerage and drainage systems were rendered hopelessly inadequate by the growing city. Existing sewers and drains were in an acute state of decay. Decaying animal cadavers demanded removal by scavengers hired by the city. It was obvious to many, especially professional medical authorities, that such urban sanitation conditions were confronting the city fathers with major challenges and requiring a greater centralization of authority.²⁶

Second, the rise of urban Augusta had created a series of small, independent village clusters lying beyond the official city limits. Summerville, Harrisonville, Monte Sano, North Augusta and Wellieville, for example, were on the peripheral fringe of the city proper. Most of these

newer residential areas on the periphery developed as an inevitable result of the increase in material wealth of the more prosperous white citizens. Property owners, anxious to display their material success, endeavored to make full use of their building sites to create the image of a sophisticated, aristocratic society devoted to a leisurely way of life. Grand and stately homes, surrounded by large plots of ground, gardens and trees were inhabited by the wealthy industrialists, bankers, brokers, merchants, attorneys and other well-to-do residents. Streets were shaded with elm, oak, pine and poplar trees to beautify the areas. Suburban real estate corporations advertised that all lots and homes were sold with "proper restrictions" to insure the "quiet and comfort" of the new suburbanites and the "absence of objectionable people." "The Loop" circled the city, offering quick, fast and dependable trolley service in "first-class" cars to the commuting members of the "respectable strata of society." Rising, younger political aspirants, who had often assisted in the building of the city and the development of the suburbs, frequently were of the strong opinion that certain, select suburban areas ought to be annexed, forming a "Greater Augusta."²⁷

Urban life styles in the "factory district" and "The Terri" were far different from the leisure way of life in

suburbia. The region between the central business district from upper Broad Street to around Lake Olmstead emerged sharply defined as the "factory settlement." The vast majority of the white wage-earners lived in that district. Most of the large textile mills took up a considerable amount of space and were visibly present. Other industrial concerns--ice plants, lumber yards, machine shops--also characterized the area, contributing to its distinctiveness as the heart of industrial Augusta. Tall two-story brick and wooden tenement houses, crowding several families into one building with dark, ill-ventilated, dreary tiny apartments were a common distinguishing feature. Company-owned cottages, small wooden frame houses and other homes were built in order to provide lodgings for the mill operatives and their families.

The great mass of the black population resided almost wholly in the region south of Gwinnett Street and southwest in "The Territory." During the war, and particularly after the death of the Confederacy, many colored people abandoned the plantation lands and flocked to the city in the hope of gaining a better way of life. "The Terri," as the Negroes called it, emerged in the postwar industrial city as a community within a community. Living and working within the city, they were nevertheless shut off from white society and

prohibited by law from entering certain establishments, such as theatres, restaurants and hotels. Separate business firms, churches and schools emerged to provide for the needs of the urban blacks, giving rise to a very small, but exceedingly ambitious black bourgeoisie. Merchants, grocers, undertakers, saloon-keepers, ministers, professors, lawyers and teachers catered to their exclusively colored clientele. Rows of low-rent tin shanties, ramshackle buildings, wooden shacks and older, former white residential homes lined the dusty roadways, streets and alleys of the region, giving it another distinct characteristic which separated it from the lower class white factory district and the upper class white suburbs.²³

Third, rapid urban growth and industrial expansion had contributed to acute new social tensions, especially between the business groups and the non-business elements, confronting the established political and economic elites with several critical issues. The first fundamental problem was the dramatic emergence of a new, highly moralistic public sentiment favoring "Good Government" and advocating "responsible," "business-like" leadership in city politics instead of "ward factionalism" and "corrupt elections."

NOTES

1. Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, May 15, 1860, April 7, 18, May 15, 28, August 2, 29, September 7, 11, 1861, May 14, July 26, 1863, May 14, 1864; Charles C. Jones, Jr., and Salem Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, Georgia (Syracuse: D. Mason and Publishers, 1890), 416-425; George Washington Rains, History of the Confederate Powder Works (Augusta: Chronicle and Constitutionalist Print, 1882), passim; Joseph B. Milgram and Norman P. Gerlieu, George Washington Rains (Philadelphia: Foote Mineral and Company, 1961), passim; Florence Fleming Corley, Confederate City, Augusta, Georgia, 1860-1865 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1960), 46-62, 84-86; Richard D. Goff, Confederate Supply (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969), 130-131; Charles B. Dew, Ironmaker to the Confederacy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), 86, 125; T. Conn Bryan, Confederate Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1953), 103; E. Merton Coulter, The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 207-209; Eighth Census of the United States: 1860, Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 74.

2. Fitz Gerald Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), 114-115, 141-144.

3. Corley, Confederate City, 84-86; Robert Selph Henry, The Story of the Confederacy (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), 424-426; Alan Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), 10-14. Conway stresses that Sherman's prime objective was to relocate his base of military operations from Atlanta in the interior to Savannah, a coastal city where he could receive supplies from the Union navy.

4. Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, December 21, 1865, October 19, 1871, October 29, 1872; "Minutes of the City Council, January 2, 1866-December 30, 1871," 740-741; "Minutes of the City Council, January 1, 1872-April 7, 1879," 62-63; Richard W. Griffin, "Augusta Manufacturing Company in Peace, War and Reconstruction, 1844-1877," Business History Review, XXXII (Spring, 1958), 67; William L. Whatley, "A History of the Textile Development of Augusta, Georgia, 1865-1883" (M.A. thesis, University of South Carolina, 1964), 6. The continued postwar existence of the buildings and equipment of the Confederate Powder Works is a matter of local historical controversy. George W. Rains, in his History of the Confederate Powder Works, 28, stated that "nothing" remained after the war. However, municipal records and the files of the leading newspaper confirm the thesis that the equipment and buildings were still in existence, almost undisturbed by the ravages of the war, but that six years of neglect following the war had its toll upon the plant. Roof-tops of remaining buildings had caved-in, floors were warped, rotted-out and badly damaged by the elements and the machinery that had not been purchased by businessmen was rusted, possibly beyond physical repair. The point is well-stated, however, that greater damages had developed through neglect rather than by the war and military occupation forces.

5. Calvin's Augusta City Directory for 1865-1866 (Augusta: Constitutionalist Job Office, 1865), 98; Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, September 20, November 28, December 15, 1865; Augusta Chronicle, May 10, 1885; Sidney Andrews, The South Since the War (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1866), 353. Willard Range's, A Century of Georgia Agriculture, 1850-1950 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954), 90, points out that the "long starved cotton mills" of New England, Britain and France paid very high prices for southern cotton, offering 43 cents and 31 cents a pound in 1866 and 1867, as compared to 8-10-11 cents per pound in the 1850's.

6. Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 329, 338-340, 342-344, 346-348, 356.

7. Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, December 20, 1865, January 3, April 2, 1866, July 3, 1870, September 1, 1872; Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 3, 359-361, 488-501; Joseph B. Cumming, A History of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company and Its Corpor-

ate Affiliates, 1833-1958 (Augusta: Private Printer, 1958), 8-12; James F. Doster, "The Georgia Railroad and Banking Company in the Reconstruction Era," Georgia Historical Quarterly, XLVIII (March, 1964), 1-5.

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Book of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Phoenix Printing Company, 1920), 30; Nineteen Twenty-One Year Book of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Phoenix Printing Company, 1922), 17; The Year Book of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia: 1935, 28; The Industrial Advantages of Augusta, 49-50, 142.

13. Range, Georgia Agriculture, 77-159, stresses that a "Long Depression" prevailed in Georgia from 1865-1900. The Civil War had destroyed the textile mills and Georgia industrialists had to start "almost from scratch." Such was certainly not the case in Augusta; yet Range failed to mention in any way whatsoever the mills of "Greater Augusta" as an example of industrial wartime prosperity and the post-war increase in the volume of production and the return of high net profits to their owners.

14. Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, August 21, 1868, February 1, June 25, 1870, July 25, September 5, 1871, May 7, October 2, 1873; Augusta Chronicle, May 10, 1885, July 13, August 13, 1899, February 11, 1900, December 6, 1905; Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 417-421.

15. "Minutes of the City Council, January 2, 1866-December 30, 1871," 531-532; Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 418-419.

16. Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, April 16, 21, 23, June 18, 27, 29, August 6, 9, 13, 22, 29, September 6, October 5, 1871, January 17, February 24, April 4, May 29, 1872; November 15, December 13, 1873; Augusta Chronicle, May 10, 1885; "Minutes of the City Council, January 2, 1866-December 30, 1871," 561-567; Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 187-188, 418.

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21. Eighth Census of the United States: 1860, Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), 74; Tenth Census of the United States: 1880 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), 127; Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Population (Washington: United States Census Office, 1901), 107; Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1921), I, 385.

22. Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, April 22, 29, May 17, 1866; Augusta Chronicle, May 10, 1885; Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 416, 423-425.

23. Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, March 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, May 3, 1870, March 30, April 28, May 12, 14, 1871, April 21, 26, 1872, April 28, May 1, August 3, September 13, 14, 1873; Augusta Chronicle, May 10, 1885, November 14, 1898, February 11, 28, 1900, December 6, 1905; Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 419-420; Industrial Advantages of Augusta, 68-69, 87, 94-96.

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26. Third Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia: 1880 (Augusta: Chronicle and Constitutionalist Printers, 1881), 19-23; Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia: 1882 (Augusta: M. M. Hill and Company, 1883), 43-45; Fifteenth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia: 1892 (Augusta: Richards and Shaver Printers, 1893), 44-45; Sixteenth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia: 1893 (Augusta: John M. Weigle and Company, 1894), 106.

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28. Augusta Chronicle, May 1, 1899.

CHAPTER II

BREAKING THE RING

The Origins of a Reform Spirit

Arriving in America "tagged like a package" from Bremerhaven aboard a cattle boat, fourteen-year-old Wilhelm Johann Hennig ultimately emigrated to Richmond county, settling down on a farm in Gracewood about ten miles from Augusta. In his spare time from farming his land, Hennig taught himself the English language, acquiring a high degree of proficiency. Greatly disturbed by political chicanery and machinations on election days in his adopted country, he had often thought about taking action expressing his dissatisfactions and observations. When one of the local newspapers had refused to print a polemical editorial, the stubborn forty-year-old German-American, annoyed by the rebuff and convinced of the efficacy of his article, bought a bag of used type, some printers' ink and paper and trudged back home. Using an old, discarded tobacco crate and a sweet gum log covered with an old wool hat as the bed and cylinder, he assembled a crude home-made newspaper press.

Several weeks later in June, 1892, the first edition of The Wool Hat was printed and distributed. Standing on the corners of the main thoroughfares of the downtown district, farmer-turned journalist Hennig hawked the small 6" x 9" flysheet to interested passersby.

Proclaiming to be the "organ of the people," Hennig's weekly newspaper emerged as the sole voice of the Augusta-Richmond County Populist Alliance, championing the cause of "good government," calling for a "reform element" composed of "good and true citizens" to break up "The Ring" and advocating the establishment of a new regime of men "who regard a public office as a public trust." The Wool Hat, and its successor, the Augusta Daily Tribune, were probably the first local newspapers to vividly expose to the general reading public the corrupt machine tactics which enabled "Ringsters" to influence the outcome of most elections in the pre-Progressive Era.¹

Using a combination of "bocdle," "booze" and "bullpen" politics, Ring candidates manipulated "lintheads," "niggers" and, it was rumored, occasionally, even "members of respectable society" to secure their political victories at the polls. Prior to elections, massive drives were made in every ward and militia district to register a full contingent. Men were allowed to register under fictitious

names and to list places of residence which they positively did not occupy. Boys, it was charged, were frequently permitted to register to vote. Many were improperly registered under several names. But "Ring strategy" was especially geared toward registering blacks; indeed, "the crop of 21 year-old negroes seems inexhaustible and the wonderful adeptness of the Democratic workers in finding them and waltzing them up to the registrar's office is nothing short of miraculous."

The evening before the elections, wagons, buggies, surreys and hacks bounced along the rutted roadways in the city and county, rounding up blacks and transporting them to prearranged spots. Corralled into make-shift cattle pens near the polling booths, they were carefully guarded during the long, bleak, dreary early morning hours by the devoted "lieutenants" of the machine candidates. Wood was carted to the sites, fires were built and considerable quantities of liquor and beer were furnished to the penned-up voters to keep them bubbling over with confidence. Night watchers kept the "darkies" happy as brass bands "boom-de-eyed" to keep their spirits high for election day.

Early the next morning, wardheelers funneled them from the "bullpens" into orderly lines and marched them to the polls. On their clothes were bright, shinny tin badges

with either a picture or symbol of their candidates and in their pockets were crisp dollar bills. Some boldly marched into the booths with money pinned on their shirts and lapels; others filed outside, arms outstretched and eager hands greeting the "paymasters." "Repeaters," after voting, were quickly hustled aboard waiting vehicles to cast another ballot. With a crack of the whips, the clatter of the wheels and the click of the horses' hoofs, the wagons lumbered off to the next station, unloading their passengers to vote under assumed names "in plain view of the managers of the election." Throughout election day, in direct violation of city ordinances, "vile, brain-crazing liquors were . . . used to inflame the passions of men," as kegs of beer and demijohns of whiskey were freighted from "Ring-controlled" bars to the houses of "mystery" in the city.²

Vehemently criticizing such practices, Hennig and fellow Populist agitators had substantially contributed to the ground swell of moralistic discontent, favoring the destruction of such corruption, advocating the alteration of the established power structure and calling for a "new deal" in city, county and state politics. But neither he nor his supporters were the sole advocates of reform. Others, too, clamored for changes.

Itinerant evangelists and local ministers comprised a second group of articulate dissenters who advocated reform politics in the 1890's. "Augusta needs a cleaning up, and you know it, but you are afraid to speak," Reverend Samuel Jones exclaimed to an audience of six thousand attending his Tabernacle Revival Meeting on Reynolds Street near Jackson. Pitching into the fracas of corrupt local politics, the Right Reverend shouted "I wish we could get to work for Christ as hard as the gang is at work for the devil in this town." Pastor Weston R. Gales of North Carolina, after touring the "factory district," exclaimed to the vast crowds which attended his revival that he wanted to see the "young men saved from the hell holes of this city, the saloons and gambling shops. There are hundreds of places in the city which are using all their arts they can employ to lead young men and women into sin." H. L. Embry, minister of St. Luke's Methodist Church, delivered stinging, powerful sermons to his congregation about the dishonest outrages and disgraceful conditions. "Look at the shame that is now going on, announced and proven in a public newspaper every day and the Christian people sitting still and allowing a miserable gang of men with white skins hugging Africans and rushing them in and rushing them on. I am ashamed of the Christianity of this town, which sits in

silence and has no word of condemnation for this crying disgrace. If the honest people of this town do not rise up and put a stop to it this city will go down in a worse condition than did Sodom." The time has come, Embry asserted, for every "moral and God-fearing Christian to vote for the Right" and bring an end to the "rule of Sin." Exhorting every good citizen to register and vote in the "mighty struggle" between "good and evil," he pledged that right would triumph. The pastor of the Asbury Methodist Church, Reverend William Dunbar, likewise urged that it was the Christian duty of the "good citizens" to acknowledge the "debauchery going on at the ballot box" and to take action to wrest government from the control of the "wicked."

Many other prominent clergymen of the leading Protestant churches joined forces with the traveling missionaries to sound the alarm for the acute need for thorough-going reforms. The itinerant evangelists and most of the local clergy repeatedly urged that the Christian brethren unite together into "one solemn, earnest determined struggle against the forts of sin in our city, and in an effort to win recruits to our armies." Blistering hellfire and damnation sermons vigorously condemned the "gambling hellholes," "houses of shame," numerous saloons and other immoral places which were pervasive, placing the main burden of responsi-

bility for the existence of such conditions upon city government and rebuking mayors and aldermen to live up to their moral obligations as "stewards" of God Almighty.³

A third dissenting group, more concerned with the physical than the spiritual health of Augustans, was the medical community.

"The taste of this water is so strong and disagreeable that not even horses can be induced to drink it," Dr. Joseph Jones, Professor of Chemistry at the Medical College of Georgia, noted. "The waters of this pump have a decided saline taste, and are unfit for washing clothes, and produce most deleterious effects when used for drinking or cooking. I have experienced the evil effects of this miserable compound in my own person, when I first removed to Augusta . . . not being aware of the condition of the pump water, I used it for several days. The effects were intense, insatiable thirst, followed with derangement of digestion and of the bowels." Commenting upon yet another main public well, he stated that the bad taste and odors were so foul that it had been finally "abandoned by man and beast." After making a careful, scientific, chemical examination of samples taken from over seventy public wells, he discovered that they contained substantial amounts of suspended matters, consisting of "particles of black and white mica, fine

silicious sand, minute particles of different non-fossiliferous primitive rocks, animacules and clay colored red by perioxide of iron." The incredible aspect to Jones was that he had originally examined and recommended to the city council that such conditions warranted condemning these wells in 1860! But well over two decades later, he was still vigorously protesting the lack of municipal action to improve the quality of public water for the dependent urban populace.

Throughout the pre-Progressive Era, other physicians, members of the Board of Health and concerned professional persons continuously complained to municipal officials about the need for pure water and the introduction of other urgent public services. Some blatantly raised the question of how long the people would have to continue to "drink the vile and unhealthful water from pumps stinking with leachings of horse-stables, human excreta and all other forms of life." "That the water of the pumps is highly impure and detrimental to health cannot be denied, and why the city authorities should persist in maintaining them is beyond my comprehension," the President of the Board of Health lamented.

Other critics, further revealing the emergence of a third dissident group, pointed to the disturbing sanitation problem confronting civil authorities and demanding political

action to introduce positive plans for a uniform system of sewers and drains and the systematic removal of the trash, rubble and debris of a growing urban community. Existing underground hollowed-out logs and wooden drains and sewers installed before the Civil War were hopelessly inadequate, either completely rotting away, caving in, splitting open or clogging up with such thick deposits that waste matters seeped up to the surface of streets and yards. Inspection of those that miraculously remained intact revealed that they were almost functionless. In some sections it was discovered that shallow ditches were dug, pipes, drains and culverts had been crudely constructed without grades furnished by an engineer. "It was found that the builders of sewers," in one region, "had frequently attempted to accomplish the impossible feat: to make water run up hill." Many perceptive observers concluded that when the antebellum underground utilities were built there was little concern whether or not they would be incorporated into a city-wide network. "There are scores upon scores of squares in Augusta having neither sewers or drains. In such squares the liquid household wastes are discharged upon the lots, or into mud trenches in the streets, there to stagnate, fester and breed disease."

The population had grown to over 33,000 by 1890, almost

trippling in size since Appomattox. From 1890-1910 it increased almost another 10,000 and the total population in the county neared 60,000 people. New sections appeared. The "factory settlement" in the fifth ward was jam-packed with people living in tenement houses, small frame cottages and other dwellings provided for the textile workers and their families creating a type of urban industrial plantation system for the "lintheads." "The Terri" emerged in the second ward and beyond as a predominantly black ghetto. In these densely populated regions, it was not uncommon for residents to complain of the stench of sewer gases. Nor was it unusual to hear chronic complaints of stinking side gutters, foul drainage ditches, smelly privies and open cesspools. "The drains in many of the streets are open ditches; the privies which are sunk in the ground, are scarcely if ever, cleaned out, and those which rest upon the ground, are cleaned out not oftener than once a year, the soluble portions of the excrement and the urine being allowed to sink into the earth and saturate the soil and contaminate the water. The excrement and urine of horses and cows in the streets, in like manner, are allowed to sink into the porous soil. Lime is extensively employed during the summer season for the purification of the streets, drains and privies, which excites decomposition in the or-

ganic matters." It was obvious to professional medical authorities that the only remedy was for the city to rip up the old, dilapidated utilities and replace them with kaolin or cement pipes, brick side surface drains and sand traps in a uniform city-wide manner, definitely improving the old "hap-hazard system of sewers."⁴

Human wastes, animal manure and decaying bloated cadavers of cows, hogs, dogs and cats in vacant lots, yards, alleys and streets were also cited as substantially contributing toward deleterious public health conditions and demanding public action to cart away offensive and putrefying substances to outlying garbage dumps by scavengers hired by the city. As a justification for such dynamic new programs--public waterworks, sewers, drains, roads, dumps--many pointed to New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Cincinnati, New Orleans, Memphis and Nashville, which, they contended, experienced similar problems and had attempted to cope with them by implementing dynamic new urban policies.

Throughout the 1890's the agitation for an urban crusade had developed, particularly eliciting the moral indignation of literate, middle and upper class citizens of established society. Journalists, ministers, doctors, professors, attorneys, teachers and entrepreneurs had become too painfully aware of the reality of political chicane to

ignore the recurrent charges and complaints recorded in editorials, sermons, municipal reports and other public documents. They were also fully convinced that until "The Ring" forces were destroyed a comprehensive, reform-oriented government totally dominated by efficient, business-minded individuals would not be achieved. Thoroughly disgusted with the past, scandalously corrupt elections and utterly convinced that a new leadership was needed to boldly and openly challenge the "ringsters," they responded to the appeals of the "Good Government" reform mayoralty candidate, Patrick Walsh, pledging themselves to combine together and to "vote straight" in the election of 1897.⁵

Patrick Walsh, The Reformer

"Walsh! Walsh! Honest Pat Walsh! Who's Pat Walsh? He's a Winner!" shouted a crowd of men marching two by two up Broad Street to Walsh's home. Arriving at the former United States Senator's domicile on September 7, 1897, the enthusiastic crowd smashed down the front fence, assembled on the lawn and shouted for him to step out onto the spacious, colonnaded veranda. Stepping out onto the front porch, blond, curly-haired, blue-eyed Pat Walsh gazed out over the friendly group, nodding and smiling. After the brass band ceased blaring, councilman Charles A. Doolittle of the third ward spoke: "Mr. Walsh, I have been delegated

by the large assemblage of your fellow citizens to tender to you in their name the mayoralty of the City of Augusta. (Cheers) We have not come to talk, but we mean business. All that we ask of you now is your formal acceptance of this nomination, and the thing is ended." When the cheers, shouts and cries of "Walsh! Walsh!" died down, the soft-spoken, mild-mannered and urbane fifty-seven year old addressed his supporters: "If elected mayor (Cheers) I will give to the people of this community a fair, honest and economical administration, and I will endeavor in every possible way to promote the manufacturing and commercial interests of this great city. (Cheers)" "This demonstration," he continued after the chanting faded away, "means that my fellow citizens will see ot it that I will be elected."

A week later a Walsh "Good Government" reform meeting was held at the Augusta Opera House. The pit was crowded, the first gallery was filled and clusters of people were gathered in the upper gallery. Many jammed around the entrance, lined the aisles, leaned through the window sills and milled around outside, listening to the campaign pledges of a man whom Henry Woodfin Grady asserted was so Irish that he "walked with a brogue." Over 1,200 Walsh boosters cheered wildly and applauded loudly when their candidate

concluded his speech, stating "I have no machine behind me."⁶

To many Augustans, Patrick Walsh was just the man to break up "The Ring." Through patience, industry and diligence he had gradually worked his way up from an unskilled immigrant to editor and owner of the leading daily newspaper, representing in the minds of the people the phenomena of the American success tradition. For over thirty years since he had first settled in Augusta, after being released from the First South Carolina Rifle Militia in 1862, Walsh had been deeply involved in journalism. Employed first as a "printers' devil" on the Augusta Daily Constitutionalist, he had steadily advanced upward to reporter, city editor and co-owner of the Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, consolidated in March, 1877, by Henry Gregg Wright. Upon the death of his partner, Walsh became the sole editor, owner and president of the Augusta Chronicle, the South's oldest newspaper corporation.⁷

As one of a coterie of southern newspaper owners, Walsh had exerted a powerful influence in championing the doctrines of the New South. Like Francis W. Dawson of the Charleston News and Courier, Virginius Dabney of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, Adolph S. Ochs of the Chattanooga Times, Walter Hines Page of the Raleigh State Chronicle and

Henry W. Watterson of the Louisville Courier-Journal, he had worked untiringly, preaching the gospel of an industrial civilization. In the Empire state of the South, he was close friends of the major journalists, embracing the objectives of Joel Candler Harris, Evan P. and Clark Howell and Henry Woodfin Grady of the Atlanta Constitution. Like them he was intensely opposed to maintaining the artificial divisions between the North and South, firmly believing that the bitter, hyper-emotional feelings of the past be forgotten and a new, cohesive bond of national unity be forged through the attainment of common economic progress. Pleasant A. Stovall, owner and editor of the Savannah Press, Edward Barrett, Owner of the Birmingham Age-Herald and Major John S. Cohen, managing editor of the Atlanta Journal, had all begun their early newspaper careers on Walsh's Chronicle. When the Associated Press extended its business operations into the South, President William Henry Smith made Walsh the general manager for the region. Subsequently, however, Walsh, Howell, Ochs, John H. Estill of the Savannah Morning News and other southern journalists allied themselves with the United Press.⁸

In his capacity as a local entrepreneur he was one of the city's "foremost civic promoters," being personally involved in the promotion of the Augusta Expositions of 1881,

1891 and 1893. As a constant advocate of "Boom Augusta" and the "voice" of the oldest newspaper he zealously endorsed the enlargement of the antebellum canal in the post-war era, greatly supported expansion of existing industries and strongly assisted in the founding of new textile mills in the "Greater Augusta Area." In the Gilded Age, Walsh emerged as one of the leading businessmen of the growing city. A member of the board of directors of the Augusta Real Estate and Improvement Company, the Richmond County Beltline Railway Company, Augusta Savings Institute, Irish American Investment Company and either president, vice president or director of seven other land development corporations, he had obviously diverse business affiliations. The real estate firm of Alexander and Johnson at 705 Broad Street handled all transactions concerning his sizable property holdings in the city and suburbs.⁹

In 1870 the ambitious, talented, youthful dynamic Irish-American made his initial debut in municipal politics, being elected to the city council. In his capacity as "steward of the people" he consistently supported all legislation which favored the business community and was always closely "identified with the important business interests in the city." Mayor Charles Estes, recognizing his merits, appointed him to the special canal commission to

assist Thomas Barrett, Jr., in considering the feasibility of enlarging the old canal so that it would provide more waterpower for additional textile mills.¹⁰

From 1872-1876 he served in the General Assembly as representative from Richmond County, becoming a "warm and effective supporter of every measure looking to the development of the mining and manufacturing interests of the State." During his years in the House he favored not only tax exemptions for woolen mills, cotton factories and iron industries, but he also strongly advocated state aid to the railroads. It was commonly believed that Walsh did not seek personal power for his own aggrandisement, but only for the benefit of Augusta, Richmond County and Georgia.¹¹

Moreover, in state politics, Walsh was regarded by many as a "power." As a Georgia legislator he had gained a reputation for being a very outspoken man, completely candid in his sentiments and convictions and known not to be a "trimmer," nor to deal in "ruse or diplomacy." He gained a solid political reputation as a gentleman of high character, great honesty and personal integrity when, in 1880, he indignantly rejected a deal to drop support of Governor Alfred H. Colquitt at the state Democratic Convention when Colquitt lacked a few votes necessary for the two-thirds majority needed for renomination. The bargain proposed

by the anti-Colquitt faction would have involved Walsh's own nomination in place of Colquitt. Rather than accept such political chicane, Walsh stood up in the convention and with cool deliberation in his clear, robust voice stated, "We have come here to respect the voice of the people of this state, and we are going to do it if it takes until Christmas. The summer sun now warms this historic roof, but before sacrificing the demands of the people, we will stay here until the snow covers it." His unwillingness to bargain was regarded as remarkable, especially since "one of Mr. Walsh's honorable ambitions was to be governor of Georgia."¹²

At the Democratic State Convention held in Atlanta on the ninth day of June, 1880, Walsh was chosen as one of the twenty-two delegates-at-large to the National Convention in Cincinnati. In 1884 he was also a delegate-at-large to the National Convention in Chicago, enthusiastically championing Governor Grover Cleveland for the nomination, believing that the election of a Democratic president would do more than anything else to help recreate stronger national feelings. Local rumors, moreover, persisted that Walsh had been largely responsible for convincing the powerful boss of Tammany Hall to support Cleveland. For four years Walsh served as a member of the Democratic National Executive

Committee. Yet, President Benjamin Harrison, a Republican, appointed the rising young southern Democrat to the World's Columbian Exposition Commission in 1893. The following year, Governor W. J. Northern appointed Patrick Walsh to the United States Senate to succeed the deceased Alfred H. Colquitt, becoming the first Catholic to ever hold that office in Georgia. In 1896 Walsh was a "Gold Bug Democrat" and went as a representative to the Chicago convention that ultimately placed its political fortunes with the Great Commoner from Nebraska, William Jennings Bryan. As a personal friend of Bryan, Walsh was convinced that the "Boy Wonder" was truly responsive to southern interests.¹³

The Structure and Strategy of the Walsh Reformers

Contrary to the traditional interpretation in C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel, of Patrick Walsh being the "Catholic Boss" of the city, maintaining political power through careful, shrewd manipulation of a well-organized "Catholic block," his base of power appeared to be far broader, involving support of three different, contradictory socio-economic, ethno-cultural groups.

As a champion of "Good Government" reforms, he was enthusiastically endorsed as a "businessman's mayor" by the industrial, commercial and professional groups that favored a candidate who pledged himself to further material progress

and an end to the embarrassing spectacle of political corruption at the polls. The distinguished former associate justice of the Supreme Court of Georgia, Joseph Rucker Lamar, delivered numerous eloquent speeches for Walsh and the reform cause. Henry C. Roney, the former judge of the Superior Court of the Augusta circuit, greatly extolled the virtues of "Pat" Walsh and advised voters not to be influenced by the "whiskey and the small coin of the 10-cent politicians." Bright, thirty-nine-year-old Henry C. Hammond, who had served on the Superior Court of Georgia and in the United States Circuit Court, also joined the crusade for a business mayor, clean government and the demand for new urban services. The "Dean of the Georgia Bankers" and President of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, Jacob Phinizy, not only encouraged the owners of half-a-dozen or more textile enterprises to contribute to the Walsh campaign fund but he also actively participated in Walsh-Phinizy political meetings to rally support for the reform candidate. Thomas Barrett, Jr., executive head of most of the cotton mills across the Savannah, similarly, endorsed Walsh and actively campaigned. The founder and former business manager of the Augusta Evening News and ex-alderman from the first ward, John M. Weigle, was another stalwart supporter of the Walsh crusade for good government.

Established politicians, influential judges, prosperous bankers, wealthy factors of the "Cotton Row Crowd," including Charles Estes, Hamilton H. Hickman, George Sibley, George Lombard, James Verdery and William A. Garrett, were staunchly allied together providing one of the main strengths of the Walsh reform movement.

Realizing that he had substantial support from the vast majority of the middle and upper strata, Walsh, as an astute politician recognized that he also needed to muster support from a second powerful segment of the constituency. Especially critical in the outcome of most elections in the Gilded Age, the heavily populated fourth and fifth wards, or the "factory district," figured prominently in his political strategy. Accordingly, he directed his supporters, benefactors, friends and managers to stump in those wards, constantly stressing Walsh's allegedly favorable attitudes towards labor unions, pointing out his critical role as an arbitrator in resolving the Knights of Labor Strike of 1886 and emphasizing his own personal successful rise upward to a better station in life. William H. Lougee, a "super" in one of the mills and candidate for the council from the fifth ward, and George R. Lombard, owner of the major iron foundry in the city and fourth ward aspirant, particularly played an important role.

As a devoted Augustan and veteran politician, Walsh was also very aware of "bull pen" politics with black voters being herded through polling booths on election days, making the black vote an extremely powerful factor. Thus, not only did the coterie of Walsh supporters represent some of the most highly respected members of the established white community and key individuals among the laboring classes in the factory settlement, but they also included many of the prominent black citizens of Augusta. Directing his campaign tactics towards soliciting support from the Negroes, Walsh made a concerted bid for support from an emerging black middle class that constituted the leadership group in "The Territory," recruiting articulate, urbane physicians, teachers, professors, lawyers, ministers and businessmen to speak out against past inefficient white "wardheelers."

Aleck Thomas, President of the colored Young Men's Christian Association, attended a Walsh rally at Hick's Hall in the Fifth ward, addressing the crowd. Anthony Williams of the Republican Committee of the Tenth Congressional District addressed a large audience of over a thousand people, advising them to cast their ballots wisely for a white reform mayor who would consider their best interests. Other speakers attested to Walsh's "liberal spirit toward the negro."

Walsh himself actively campaigned to keep an alliance with the Negro citizens. His campaign speeches repeatedly emphasized his sympathies for all social classes, rich or poor, white or black. Negroes, he stated, were "citizens of the greatest country on earth. God Almighty had put them here; He had put them here. They were all children of Adam; all children of God Almighty. . . . We are here together, we are heirs of the greatest government on earth, and we must work out our destiny, temporal and eternal, side by side," Walsh asserted. Through unity of whites and blacks, he believed, honest, local reform government would be attained.¹⁴

Thus, urban politics in the Age of Reform was based upon a coalition of diverse social classes, apparently involving little class tensions and superficially no racial antagonisms. Upper and middle class whites, lower class white wage-earners and blacks were united in a common drive for supporting new, so-called "Progressive," "business-like" reforms. The cohesive forces binding the contradictory Walsh coalition together involved the powerful, charismatic personality of its leader, common desire to gain new municipal services from urban government, conviction that businessmen-politicians were more ably suited to direct further material gains for all people and the existence of a common enemy to attack.

During the mayoralty campaign of 1897 the fierce wrangle over "Good Government" involved a massive offensive against the "Ring" candidate, Daniel Kerr. Born Daniel Carr in Tyrone County, Ireland, he had emigrated as a seven-year-old boy with his family to Georgia. When the young Irishman grew up he directed his talents towards business endeavors, becoming an enterprising merchant with a thriving retail store on Marbury Street. In 1886 he successfully ran for the City Council, holding his first political office. Once entering politics he continued to serve on the council as chairman of the Water Works Committee, Finance Committee and the Streets and Drains Committee during the administrations of Mayors Robert H. May and James Hillhouse Alexander. Many Augustans were convinced that since he was a close personal friend of Mayor "Cap" William B. Young, he was being groomed for the office.¹⁵

Pat Walsh's Chronicle accused Kerr of having made a "corrupt bargain" with "Billy" Young in the mayoralty election of 1894, pointing out that Kerr had originally and vigorously campaigned against Young, but shortly before election day he had "suddenly and mysteriously" withdrawn from the race and strongly urged his followers to vote for Young. Subsequently, mayor-elect Young had placed Kerr at the head of several city council committees which gave him

prominence in all municipal legislation and helped him to advance his own personal fortunes. Kerr's strategic withdrawal, it was charged, "had a string to it, and the end of the string was attached to the race of 1897; and tied up with that string was the agreement that all the power and influence and machinery of the administration should be used to turn over the office to him at the end of the term of Mayor Young, in whose interests he retired." Documenting its charges, the Chronicle pointed to the fact that the incumbent mayor, chiefs of the fire and police departments, several lieutenants, sergeants and other bureaucratic officials were united into an active political force to secure the triumph of Kerr over Walsh.¹⁶

The Walsh reformers contended that a gang of irresponsible and corrupt bosses had largely determined the nominees in self-appointed and clandestine meetings and secured victories for their candidates for mayor and the council through political manipulation of the electorate, thereby controlling city government and failing to introduce efficient, vitally necessary municipal services. They further maintained that Walsh was free from control by the bosses and thereby in a position to introduce new urban policies. A reform mayor, backed by councilmen with appointive powers, would be able to distribute patronage to

responsible citizens who would then help implement a public waterworks system, create a more adequate fire and police protection, organize an effective department of public health and sanitation and methodically study urban conditions to determine how to best resolve recurrent problems.

Dogmatically convinced of the efficacy of their cause and tireless in their efforts, the Walsh party workers made a systematic canvas of each ward appealing to voters regardless of class or color to turn out and vote. They also staged large political rallies which served to stimulate a tremendous sense of how individual citizens would be personally affected if "The Ring" triumphed. Double carriages, wagons, surreys and hired hacks rushed back and forth along the streets with colorful streamers attached to attract the attention of pedestrians. Concerned individuals crowded into overflowing meeting halls to hear the eloquent speeches and sprightly campaign talks. Amidst great and prolonged cheering, Walsh boldly proclaimed, "I have every confidence in the people of this city, that they will smash the machine and defeat it. I do not underrate the potential influence of the machine, but I do maintain that there is nothing more powerful than public sentiment when it is aroused." Filing out of the halls, hundreds assembled and paraded in torchlight processions shouting "Walsh!" and waved banners pro-

claiming "No Contract Mayor--Down with The Ring"; "Walsh and Good Government"; "Honest Count--No Ring"; "The People Will Prevail" and "The People vs. The Politicians." Two large brass bands accompanied the parades blaring out "A Hot Time in the Old Town."

Concurrently, an earnest effort was made to purge the registry lists, hopefully making it impossible for persons to register under fictitious names. Special precautions were also taken to prevent any irregularities or frauds from transpiring on election day. Spotters, who supposedly knew the registered voters of a given ward, were placed outside the polls to challenge the voters. Private guards, stationed at the booths, were instructed to maintain harmony, break up any disorders and cooperate with the registrars in arresting all illegal voters.¹⁷

In the end, Walsh had "em a gwine and a comin." Singularly free from bad breaks, his supporters exhibited good judgment, tight organization and a well-planned steady campaign pace to bring public moral indignation to a crescendo on election day. Simultaneously, the Chronicle continued daily to keep alive the accusation of the Young-Kerr collusion, charging the incumbent administration with abusing "public trust." Vitriolic, inflammatory editorials unquestionably served to destroy voter apathy and to especially

awaken bourgeois interests about the need for general reforms.

The Kerr campaign, in sharp contrast, was replete with blunders. The personality and temperament of Daniel Kerr charmed many of his backers, but it repelled and offended the aroused upper strata of society. A real public furor arose over the muckraking accusations about the character of Pat Walsh and William Dunbar, the third mayoralty contestant. Kerr, hoping to alienate the textile workers from Walsh, called him a "high-toned, big-bellied, curly-haired old man" who was opposed to "organized labor." When he attacked Captain Dunbar as "the man who lost his arm in the War, and has been sucking the political pig ever since, for all it was forth," most Chronicle readers believed it to be in extremely bad taste. Such vituperative tactics offended the bourgeois sense of traditional honor and morality in politics and brought Kerr the general condemnation as a villain who was obsessed with an ambition to gain power for his own personal glory.

Kerr also lost considerable popular support as various scandals hit the newspapers. He was greatly criticized when the chief of the fire department entered the third ward registry office and attempted to seize the voter registration lists. The Chronicle carried a complete coverage of

the shocking incident. The clerk in charge simply stated, "Frank, I don't think you have any right to enter here." But the chief snarled back, "Don't give me any lip, or I'll kick your God --- --- out of here." Then there was a scuffle. The assault became a public outrage in the community. Another "cowardly assault" was made upon a party of cheering ladies attending a Walsh rally. A "big drunken brute" also attacked a youthful Walsh supporter during a parade. At a meeting in the second ward, a "shooting scrape" disrupted the session. Respectable citizens further reported to the Chronicle that "can-cans and coochee-coochee" girls danced "in the most immodest and abandoned way for the entertainment of the assembled men" at various Kerr meetings. A "Sunday Orgie," complete with drunkenness, gambling and fighting, "besmirched" the Lord's day in a "most shocking and Godless manner."¹⁸

Such scandals greatly heightened public awareness of middle class Augustans that a "proper" political campaign was being conducted by Walsh and that substantially weakened support for Kerr and "The Ring." The alarming news about the Kerr campaign tactics with its unabashed efforts to align itself with the "disorderly elements" was shocking, disgusting and revolting, but probably served to rally support to the Walsh cause, instilling a grim determination to put an end to corrupt politics.

In December, 1897, the Walsh reformers were victorious. Patrick Walsh carried 3,358 votes; Daniel Kerr captured 2,534 votes and William Dunbar mustered 1,610 votes. Walsh carried every ward save one by a substantial margin. Kerr had no chance in the first, second or third wards. He made a sizable showing in the fourth ward but carried it by a mere fifteen votes. Only the fifth ward was carried completely by Kerr. Over 7,000 voters had turned out to the polls on election day, representing possibly the greatest number of ballots cast in any mayoralty election in the history of Augusta.¹⁹

At noon the following day, December 2, 1897, a vast crowd assembled at the Augusta Opera House to observe the inauguration ceremonies. When mayor-elect Patrick Walsh proudly walked to the center of the stage, two large brass bands in the gallery commenced playing "Dixie." "The people --thousands of them, as one rose to their feet; hats and handkerchiefs were waved and mingling with the music there went up a tremendous shout. A cry of victory, of applause that seemed to raise the very roof," a Chronicle reporter recorded. Some of the ladies were so overwhelmed with joy what the "usual waving of handkerchiefs was not sufficient for expression, and they rose from their seats and mingled their voices with those of their brothers, husbands and

fathers." Amidst the discordant notes of the brass bands and the loud "Hurrahs," Mayor Pat Walsh thanked Augustans for their vote of confidence for a reform administration.²⁰

The Walsh-Kerr battle of 1897 had been a "Ring" catastrophe; the reform candidate had captured the executive seat of municipal government by a plurality of votes. Several active partisan and ambitious reformers had also been highly successful in their political campaigns for the City Council. William A. Garrett, one of Walsh's campaign managers, was elected to the City Council to represent the first ward. Garrett, in stumping the city, had frequently stated "vote for Walsh, and never mind me." Jacob Phinizy, another confidante of Walsh, was elected city councilman for the second ward. The Walsh councilman for the third ward was Thomas Barrett, Jr. George R. Lombard and William Lougee, both ardent campaigners for the reform cause, were elected as representatives of the fourth and fifth wards, respectively.²¹

Viewing politics as he did, Walsh naturally thought that new talent should be brought into administrative decisions. In justice to the reform cause, he began to select certain of his advisors for key positions of power and responsibility in civil administration. Honest men, men of merit with considerable talents, he believed, could then implement

indispensable policies and programs for the betterment of the city. Nisbet Wingfield, an accomplished civil engineer and graduate of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, was appointed Commissioner of Public Works to begin the study of constructing a new modern waterworks and sewage and drainage systems. The new city sheriff and assessor was John M. Weigle. William A. Garrett became the new city attorney and several other individuals prominent in the Walsh reform movement were appointed to select positions in the City Council to form the new "business administration."²²

City government was restructured along lines which prevailed in business circles. A new Department of Public Works was created. The City Council appointed and controlled the Commissioner of Public Works. He in turn appointed the officials to supervise the canal, drains, pumps, locks and streets, but the mayor and councilmen were ultimately responsible for every activity of the department. To obtain a purer quality of water, Nisbet Wingfield planned to relocate the pumping station above all sewer outlets. Two power pumps with a combined capacity of furnishing twelve million gallons of water per day were to be purchased. A reservoir basin with a filter system would provide fresh clear water for the citizens and a network of cast iron pipes would be laid to connect the pumping station, reservoir

and settling basin to a new underground series of water pipes for every section.²³

The new duties, responsibilities and functions of the city government officials also included reforming public health policies. Laws concerning health conditions and practices were amended. All city physicians were required to make weekly reports to the Board of Health. The mayor, city councilmen and a hospital committee, composed of representatives from the faculty of the Medical College of Georgia, and in cooperation with the President of the Board of Health, were charged with the responsibility of implementing necessary health inspection of all wards in the city and providing some assistance to indigent, sick and injured people in the community. Furthermore, the city was divided into two "scavenger districts" in order to secure more efficient service in the removal of piles of refuse from the city to garbage dumps in the county.²⁴

There were, of course, some holdovers from the previous administration who remained in office, but in subsequent council elections other Walsh reformers took great pride in identifying themselves with the reform cause and emphasized the need to give Mayor Walsh a friendly majority in municipal government. It was their declared purpose to continue the work in succeeding elections until the City Council

would be representative of the "best elements" in the community. The general belief was that the businessman--a person who was familiar with practical daily economic transactions--would be best suited to hold office, that personal success in the business world would lead to success in municipal government. This idea took deep hold upon the public mind and the people became convinced that the "antagonistic forces" to Walsh should be routed out and be replaced with representatives who would assist the mayor. Subsequently, Alfred Martin, Richard E. Allen, R. E. Elliott, Alexander J. Gouley, Job A. A. W. Clark, who all campaigned as Walsh reformers, were elected to the City Council and duly sworn into office. "All the Good People," the Chronicle explained, had grown weary of corrupt politics.²⁵

NOTES

1. Mrs. Dorothy Murray, private interview, Augusta, Georgia, July 26, 1969. Mrs. Murray is the granddaughter of Wilhelm J. Hennig. She permitted me to organize her private files of The Wool Hat and its successor, the Augusta Daily Tribune. These newspapers are supposed to be micro-filmed and placed on reserve in the Augusta College Library as part of The Murray Collection of the Richmond County Historical Society. Dorothy Murray, "William John Hennig, The Man-The Publisher," Richmond County History, II (Winter, 1970), 7-12; The Wool Hat, January 6, November 17, 1894; Augusta Chronicle, October 17, 1911; Augusta Herald, October 17, 18, 1911.

2. The Wool Hat, July 6, October 1, November 4, December 3, 31, 1892. June 3, December 16, 1893, April 21, September 1, 1894; Augusta Daily Tribune, August 20, 1895, November 11, 1898.

3. Augusta Chronicle, January 17, 28, May 12, 14, 1897; Augusta Daily Tribune, September 2, 1894, August 26, 1895.

4. Joseph Jones, First Report of the Cotton Planters' Convention of Georgia (Augusta: Steam Press of the Chronicle and Sentinel, 1860), 252; Third Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1880 (Augusta: Chronicle and Constitutionalist Printers, 1881), 18-23; Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1882 (Augusta: M. M. Hill and Company, 1883), 21, 42-43; Seventh Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1884 (Augusta: Chronicle Press, 1885), 109; Ninth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1886 (Augusta: Chronicle Book and Job Presses, 1887), 9; Fourteenth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1891 (Augusta: Richards and Shaver, Printers, 1892), 12, 47; Fifteenth Annual Report of the

Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1892 (Augusta: Richards and Shaver Printers, 1893), 44-45; Sixteenth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1893 (Augusta: John M. Weigle and Company, 1894), 106; Seventeenth Annual Report of the Board of Health of the City of Augusta, Georgia, 1894 (Augusta: John M. Weigle and Company, 1895), 152; The Wool Hat, November 4, December 3, 1892, December 16, 1893, April 21, September 1, 1894; Augusta Daily Tribune, August 20, 1895, November 11, 1896; Augusta Chronicle, May 23, 1897; James O. Breedin, "Joseph Jones: Confederate Surgeon" (Ph.D., Tulane University, 1967); James O. Breedin, "Joseph Jones and Confederate Medical History," Georgia Historical Quarterly, LIV (Fall, 1970), 357-380. Breedin's dissertation and article suggests that Dr. Jones was one of the leading southern scientists in the late nineteenth century, teaching at the Medical College of Georgia, the University of Tennessee at Nashville and the Medical Department of the University of Louisiana. When Jones was at the Medical College in Augusta he was certainly one of the sharpest critics of various municipal administrations for their failure to respond to the growing sanitation crisis which had accompanied rapid urbanization and industrialization. Eleventh Census of the United States: 1890, Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1895), 96; Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Population (Washington: United States Census Office, 1901), 107; Thirteenth Census of the United States: 1910, Population (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), III, 355.

5. Augusta Daily Tribune, February 23, 1894, February 1, April 6, August 24, 1895; Augusta Chronicle, May 11, 12, 13, 1897.

6. Augusta Chronicle, September 7, 14, 15, 1897.

7. Charles C. Jones, Jr., and Salem Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, Georgia (Syracuse: D. Mason and Publishers, 1890), 44; Allen D. Candler, Georgia, Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1906), III, 516; Lucian L. Knight, Georgia's Landmarks, Memorials and Legends (Atlanta: Byrd Printing Company, 1913), II, 958-960; Walter G. Cooper, The Story of Georgia (New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1936), III, 239, 343; Earl L. Bell and Kenneth C. Crabbe, The Augusta Chronicle (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1960), 84.

8. Augusta Chronicle, February 9, June 21, 1913; Candler, Georgia, I, 312-314, II, 678-681, III, 388-389; Joel Candler Harris, Memoirs of Georgia (Atlanta: Southern Historical Association, 1895), I, 792, 802, 811, 826-827; John S. Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 299-305; Thomas D. Clark and Albert D. Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 203-210; Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism (New York: Macmillan Company, 1962), 454-458, 549-550, 663-664.
9. Augusta City Directory, 1895-1896 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1896), 17-18; Augusta City Directory, 1896-1897 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1897), 17; Georgia Directory Company's Directory of Augusta, Georgia, 1898 (Richmond: J. L. Hill Printing Company, 1898), 52-53; Augusta City Directory, 1899 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1899), 117; The Industrial Advantages of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Akehurst Publishing Company, 1893), 88-89, 106, 111.
10. "Minutes of the City Council, January 2, 1866-December 30, 1871," 717-720; Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, August 13, 16, 1871; Augusta Chronicle, March 20, 1899.
11. Jones and Dutcher, History of Augusta, 44; Issac W. Avery, The History of the State of Georgia From 1850 to 1881 (New York: Brown and Derby, 1881), 496.
12. Augusta Chronicle, March 20, 1899; Patrick Walsh, The Citizen, The Statesmen, The Man (Augusta: Augusta Publishing Company, 1899), 18; Avery, History of Georgia, 573-574.
13. Bell and Crabbe, Augusta Chronicle, 84; Avery, History of Georgia, 568-569; Candler, Georgia, III, 516.
14. In Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), 419, C. Vann Woodward maintains that "Boss" Patrick Walsh's power was based upon a "solid and strategically important block of Catholic votes in Augusta." Although Robert M. Saunders' article on "The Transformation of Tom Watson, 1894-1895," Georgia Historical Quarterly, LIV (Fall, 1970), 347, disagrees with Woodward's interpretation of Watson, it nevertheless subscribes to the thesis that a "significant contingent of Irish Catholics" was the

main source of Walsh's power. Woodward, however, has essentially agreed to the point that Walsh's political power was derived from several non-Catholic forces in Augusta. Richard H. L. German to C. Vann Woodward, October 22, 1970; C. Vann Woodward to Richard H. L. German, November 10, 1970.

The socio-economic, ethno-cultural axis of the Walsh reform movement in city politics is based upon research findings in the following materials: Augusta Chronicle, September 29, October 2, November 10, 23, 1897; Candler, Georgia, I, 131-132, II, 441-442, III, 215-216, 538-540; Ferdinand P. Calhoun, The Phinizy Family in America (Atlanta: Johnson-Dallis Company, 1925), 91-99.

15. Augusta Chronicle, September 11, October 2, 1898; The Mayor's Message, Department Reports, and Accompanying Documents for the Year 1894 (Augusta: Phoenix Printing Company, 1895), 34; The Mayor's Message, Department Reports, and Accompanying Documents for the Year 1895 (Augusta: John M. Weigle Company, 1896), 20; The Mayor's Message, Department Reports, and Accompanying Documents for the Year 1896 (Augusta: Chronicle Job Print Company, 1897), 48.

16. Augusta Chronicle, November 2, 16, 19, 1897.

17. Augusta Chronicle, October 22, 27, 1897.

18. Augusta Chronicle, October 2, 6, 7, 8, 22, November 27, 28, 30, 1897.

19. "Minutes of the City Council, January 2, 1893-December 31, 1897," 708; Augusta Chronicle, December 2, 1897.

20. Augusta Chronicle, December 3, 1897.

21. Augusta Chronicle, December 2, 1897.

22. Augusta Chronicle, January 9, 1898; Candler, Georgia, III, 538-540, 614-615.

23. Augusta Herald, September 18, 1898.

24. Augusta Herald, December 6, 1898.

25. Augusta Chronicle, December 8, 1898, January 3, February 10, 1899.

CHAPTER III

KNIGHTS, CAPITALISTS AND LINTHEADS

The Making of the Lintheads: From Bouyant Expectations to Grim Realities

Chronic economic problems were among the important reasons for the southern postwar rural exodus. Farming was not good. Postwar adjustments, declining values in farm prices, contraction in currency, steadily increasing tariff rates, rising consumer prices and higher interest rates combined to create serious conditions for the small farmer. Very few "paid out." As years of hardship continued, mortgage payments fell in arrears, debts mounted and homes and lands were foreclosed for want of payment. Each year finding themselves no better off than they were in the preceding year, and, in all probability, confronting the same future situation of depressed prices, poor harvests, natural disasters, personal accidents and greater indebtedness, southern farmers forfeited their homes, abandoned their farms, ignored their rental arrangements, packed up their personal effects and turned their backs upon country life

as a hopeless prospect. Desperate, but fired by the ambition for success in life, they hoped that the "Royal Road" to prosperity was to be found in the new industrial city. Flocking to Augusta, they arrived barefooted, penniless and often starving. Mill presidents hired them, putting shoes on their feet, clothes on their backs, money in their pockets, food in their bellies, employing husbands, wives and children and providing them with shelter in low-rent, wooden-frame cottages and large, multi-story apartment dwellings adjacent to the mills.¹

Mill operatives from 1865-1885 did not express strong dissatisfaction nor objection to the long hours, indoor employment, nor life in a milltown factory district. They had seized upon the opportunity to escape the barrenness and hardships of country living for the hopes of economic advancement and a better way of life. Nor was there any serious objections to their wives, daughters and sons working in the mills. Farm life had been based on the fact that every member of the family had their daily chores; often beginning as early as 2:00 A.M., not 5:00 A.M. as in the factories. Pay was considered by most textile workers as being acceptable and better than the low incomes of most farmers. Besides, mill-owned rental units located near the mills provided them with cramped but fairly comfortable

quarters. Industrial life was not considered to be degrading, nor unrewarding, but was providing the means for them to advance to what they believed were the "higher callings." They were convinced that they were moving upward from the lower strata of society to a better standard of living; not being forced downward.

But industrial life in the factory districts was not utopian by any means. New complex problems appeared. First, the sheer numbers of workers in each mill increased to such an extent that there was a breakdown in the personal relationships between owners, managers, superintendents and operatives, causing an increasing distance in the interactions between capitalists and laborers and, correspondingly, a decline in mutual respect toward each other.

Second, the laborers failed to obtain full employment for a year round basis, creating serious immediate emergencies for their families and preventing long-range collective gains. Factories periodically shut down in order to repair old machines to prime condition, install new equipment or to expand plant operations. Shutdowns also occurred when shortages of cotton supplies developed, or when the prices of cotton increased to higher levels than the owners were willing to pay. In such cases plant "supers" simply informed shophands that they were laid off.

Throughout the duration of "temporary idleness," workers were still confronted with the inevitable problem of continuing to make ends meet. Very few had sufficient savings to tide them over; and what little capital assets they had acquired were rapidly depleted as they awaited the starting up of the mills, making it most difficult for them to save portions of their earnings for future emergencies. Idle periods, furthermore, were to the acute long-range disadvantage of workers. Workers perceived that men, women and children who had been idle for several weeks were keen for re-employment, and, under such conditions, owners could, if they desired, offer the same wages or even slightly lower wages, but still be stampeded by people who were anxious to get pay checks.²

Third, industrial wages were not increasing but steadily declining. In the King mill, for example, average annual wages dropped from \$216 in 1880 to \$181 in 1898. Mill operatives of the Sibley Manufacturing Company experienced the same consistent reduction in average annual wages, dropping from \$242 to \$225. City-wide industrial wages of textile workers failed to show any increase from 1880-1900, falling off from a yearly average income of \$267 to \$255. Overall wage scales in the city were considerably less than the average yearly income of \$452 for other south-

ern laborers and the \$518 average annual income of northern industrial workers. Nineteenth century Augusta management, interested only in greater profits, increased production and lower costs, and convinced that these goals were partially achieved by "freezing" wages, adamantly resisted all efforts by employees to boost salaries.³

As rural farmers, the rising cost of living was partially defrayed by the fact that a great part of the necessities of life were produced on the farm. Country life was far less complex, significantly simpler and cheaper. In the city, the urban laborers not only had to purchase everything they consumed, but their wants multiplied. Looking at the better way of life of their employers, they soon desired to acquire a home and furniture of their own and other signs of material success. Their wives and children, through window shopping and gazing at newspaper advertisements, developed an acquisitive taste for better clothes and finer life styles. Everything the urban workers bought was subject to the advance in prices with the inevitable result that the higher cost of living was most acutely felt. Wage workers, whose salaries were limited to begin with, and whose annual salaries failed to advance in proportion to the rise in prices, drastically felt the jump in prices of everything. Declining wages and rising prices were not conditions that

applied to all classes of people, but had especially disastrous effects upon the urban dwellers in the factory districts.

Fourth, they had migrated to the city and hired on at the factories to better their station in life; but even those who had worked hard, acquired skills and employed their wives and children in the mills had not improved their lot in life. They simply endured a miserable, wretched existence of long hours, low pay, poor working conditions, and recognized the little hopes for social advancement for their offspring. They clearly recognized that mill operatives were regarded as "inferior people" who lacked property, education and social grace. "The factory operative[s] work eleven hours a day and are almost respected as much as a common dog," The Wool Hat noted. Public sentiment, in their opinion, was prejudiced against operatives who employed their families in the mills, dressed in shabby, smelly, dirty and ragged clothes, neglected to attend midweek and Sunday church services, sinned too frequently in the various "houses of mystery"; who, in general, failed to "get ahead" in life by saving money, buying a home, acquiring property, getting an education and adopting the middle class values of thrift, sobriety, frugality and temperance. They recognized the prejudices against them as social inferiors and they

realized that their wages, work and living conditions were basic factors which did not permit them vertical social mobility. Factory employment was clearly no longer perceived to be a means of increasing their standard of living to a higher plane and improving their lot in life.⁴

Fifth, chronic complaints were registered about human living conditions in the factory district. Sickness, hunger, poverty and suffering were very pervasive in the West End. "The misery and poverty which find lodgement within those bare walls cannot be described," a Chronicle reporter noted. Aged grandparents, parents and numerous children lived crowded together into two and three room apartments, furnished with cheap, sparse belongings. "Little ragged urchins and poorly clad girls of tender age" played in the narrow, dirty streets, lanes and alleys. No hydrants, nor sewers nor even garbage collection were provided for most of the families. Occupants were frequently ill with typhoid fever and chicken pox. "Sore eyes," caused by tiny gnats which persistently swarmed around the stagnant ponds of water and the polluted public wells, were another chronic complaint. Some parents objected to their minor children working eight to ten hours for 25¢ a day. "You ought to see that boy," one mother lamented. "His face ain't as big as my hand, he is so poor and thin. And yet that boy works all day in the

mill. I would not be surprised to see them bringing him home dead any day."⁵

While labor-management relations were becoming strained, there was a greater amount of cohesion developing among the mill operatives as they became collectively and increasingly disillusioned with their salaries, working conditions and housing accommodations. There was a growing militant determination to force the mill owners to raise wages, reduce the number of hours in the work week, improve the environment in the factories, provide Sundays and holidays off and, simultaneously, transform the drab appearance and unsanitary living conditions in the factory district. The chief methods of coercion, it was believed, were through union combination and the introduction of city-wide textile strikes. If management refused to initiate changes, then industrial wars would erupt.

The Beginnings of Industrial Wars:
Augusta, The Storm Center of the New South

The Knights of Labor strike of 1886 was the first big confrontation between capitalists and lintheads in Augusta. In an attempt to win support in the new southern mill towns, the Knights "called" a strike in Augusta; thus representing the first phase of national labor organizations to unionize the South. The textile workers of Augusta, affiliated with

the Knights, rendered a demand upon the Augusta Factory for a 15 per cent increase in wages. The president of the mill adamantly asserted that, owing to financial difficulties, the corporation was incapable of paying the proposed scale of wages. The mill, according to the president, was "losing money."⁶

When the pay advance was refused, Reverend J. S. Meynardie, the master workman, ordered a strike and the Augusta Factory was shut down on July 10, 1886. For several weeks the conflict was restricted to one mill, but in August, notice was posted that all mills in the "Augusta district" would be closed down unless the workers returned to their jobs in the Augusta Factory. Local manufacturers had effectively staged a counter move with a company lock-out, forcing several thousand mill hands off their jobs.

The Chronicle stated, "While our sympathies are with the toiling families in any just movement for their elevation, we cannot encourage a strike which demands wages that the business will not justify. It is not reasonable to expect an advance in wages when the business is losing money. Our factory people have been badly advised, and the sooner they return to work, the better it will be for themselves. The strike is a calamity to this community. Three thousand hands are out of employment, and at least six

thousand people are without visible means of support. It is a deplorable state of affairs. Every sufficient interest suffers, and will continue to suffer until the strike is at an end."

The Knights proposed that an "endurance plan" would bring about victory for the strikers, stating that the workers could outlast the employers. But almost a month later it was obvious that the union leaders had erred. There were not sufficient funds available for the strikers to endure a protracted struggle against capital. "The endurance plan is working serious injury to both parties, and to the community generally," the Chronicle informed its readers.

Company eviction notices were posted and circulated in the factory district announcing to the occupants of the factory-owned houses that "those now occupying them are not, and have not been for more than two months, in the employment of the company." Those who refused to return to work at the old rates would be evicted as of the 17th of September. Evictions were served. Stunned, shocked and bewildered strikers were moved out to stand in the streets observing new mill hands and their families moving into their former quarters.

After the announcements of company evictions, hundreds

of strikers drifted back to work. The strike was clearly breaking up and the Knights of Labor recognized that fact. Grandmaster Meynardie was voted out of office and M. M. Connor was elected as the new master workman to reconcile differences with management. James A. Wright, the representative of the general executive board of the Knights, arrived in Augusta to "patch up matters and end the strike." Several conferences were held in the Augusta Opera House with Patrick A. Walsh, chairman, representing the mill owners. After several months receiving no pay and little aid from the Knights, the Augusta textile strike of 1886 ended and the mills resumed their operations. No major concessions had been won by labor.

The Knights of Labor, although it had lost its Augusta campaign, nevertheless continued its efforts at organizing textile workers in the southern states. From 1886 to 1890 they founded over two hundred active assemblies in the larger, industrial southern cities in seven states. Labor disturbances continued to erupt at Cottondale, Alabama, Greenville, South Carolina, Maryville, Tennessee and Roswell, Georgia. But by 1890 the Knights had disappeared and the first phase of national labor unions to penetrate the South had failed.⁷

The American Federation of Labor and the
Augusta Textile Strike of 1898-1899

In the 1890's the American Federation of Labor began a "Southern Campaign" to unionize the mill hands in the textile factories of the New South, representing a second phase in the conflicts between capitalists and workers. From 1898 to 1902 a new era of crisis and conflict erupted from Georgia to Virginia and back again. Prince W. Greene of Columbus, Georgia, was chosen by Samuel Gompers to direct the efforts of the A. F. of L. to crack the southland. The major target city of the Southern Campaign was Augusta, Georgia. Learning that Augusta lintheads had again strongly resisted an announced wage cut, Greene hurried to the city and assisted in the affiliation of the local union with the National Union of Textile Workers.⁸

The textile crisis had not been forced by the actions of "outside agitators," but precipitated by a declaration by management that it intended to cut wages of all mill operatives in Augusta and vicinity. The President of the King Mill and the Southern Manufacturer's Association, eighty-nine-year-old Charles Estes officially announced in mid-October that all textile mills in the Augusta district--the John P. King, Sibley Manufacturing Company, Enterprise Mill, Augusta Factory, Sutherland Mill, Isaetta Mill and the

Langley and Aiken mills--would cut the wages of the cotton workers by an estimated 8 to 10 per cent, effective November 21. A stern, self-assured, dogmatic Augustan of Yankee-Prussian derivations, Estes commanded great respect by virtue of being former mayor during the critical period 1870-1876 and his close identity with most of the private enterprises in the city.⁹

One of the justifications for the reduction in salaries was that average wages for textile workers in Augusta were higher than in any of the cotton manufacturing states of the New South. After a careful investigation of the salaries paid to local mill hands, the presidents of the major corporations in Augusta--Charles Estes, Thomas Barrett, Jr. and John W. Chafee--were convinced that the laborers were being overpaid. By reducing the wages the Augusta wage earners would be on par with mill operatives in the Carolinas and Alabama. Indeed, it was believed by the mill presidents that even with the reduction of the wages some employees would be paid about 6 per cent higher than the average paid to other southern mill hands.

A second explanation was the lack of significant annual dividends paid to the stockholders. The president of the Association stated that the mills were not making enough profits. Estes explained that the low profits were related

to the "severe competition" from mills in the area which were paying lower wages and thereby receiving greater annual profits. "It is a matter of compulsion on our part," he explained, "and not one of choice. If present conditions were to continue the mills would be compelled to close." Mill owners needed to show a greater return upon the capital invested or they would have to shut down. Hence, the reduction in wages was deemed crucial in order to make greater and more sizable dividends for the stockholders. As much as the mill presidents personally regretted such actions, these were the harsh economic circumstances which necessitated a lower scale of wages. Estes advised that all employees who intended to resign were expected to tender two weeks' notice.¹⁰

The announced cut in wages prompted considerable discussions among the workers of the factory settlement. Small crowds of men gathered in the general stores, bars and on street corners in the fifth ward and debated the grave crisis which confronted them. Many, when approached by newspaper reporters, spoke freely and gave frank comments about their grievances against the mills. "Year by year," a mill hand explained, "they've been adding new machinery and making one man gradually increase his work until he was doing that of two. When I started a man worked 16 cards at

75 cents per day, now he runs 32 for 80 and 90 cents. We've been cut right along." Another mill worker explained that "the ones hit hardest are those who don't rent from the mill. I suppose there are perhaps one-third who can't find room in the company's houses and so have to rent elsewhere." The money lost in the pay reduction, he explained, would have to be appropriated from sums set aside for food, shoes, wood and clothes. "We have so little of the comforts of life now, that our conditions when we will make less money is not pleasant to think of," a third disgruntled worker stated. "The lower wages mean for us more pinching and scraping to make both ends meet." "If the mills haven't been making money lately, why have they been putting up additions, new machinery and water wheels?" another perceptive observer queried. "No, the whole thing is nothing but this: these improvements cost money and as somebody had to pay it, they make the hands, not the stockholders do it."¹¹

Many of the dissatisfied laborers pointed to the numerous signs of prosperity for management. They observed that each year new and improved industrial machinery was purchased and installed and new buildings were erected. Industrial output increased and in some instances doubled and quadrupled. They realized that these improvements alone reflected the annual profits which were made by the owners of

the textile corporations. Furthermore, they knew that stocks were quoted as high and learned about the liberal dividends that were being paid to stockholders. They were also very much aware of the high salaries drawn by presidents, junior executives, supervisors and others in the upper levels of employment at the mills and they were incensed that those who were living well-off were to be unaffected by the cut in pay. "Suppose some of the mill authorities try to live on 60 and 80 cents a day--buy grub, pay house rent, wash bill, clothes bill, wood bill--how do you suppose they would stand at the end of the month?" a dissatisfied laborer asked. They looked at their own meager existence--scanty clothing, sparse meals, poor lodgings--and they realized that their long hours with low pay kept them at a bare subsistence level. They were convinced that they were the ones least able to afford a drastic reduction in salary, yet they realized that it most likely would transpire. They were alarmed, felt exploited and were determined to protest against this new threat to their existence.¹²

Much to their dismay, when the new scale of wages went into effect it proved to be a greater reduction in their salaries than the proposed maximum reduction of 10 per cent. For the vast majority of workers the actual wage cuts were

far worse than they had initially feared. Cloth room hands were reduced in pay from \$1.25 to 75 cents per day. All workers getting 60 cents a day were cut to 50 cents a day. Some were cut back from a dollar per eleven hour work day to 75 cents. Wages were slashed from 90 cents to 80 cents for spinners; speeder hands were cut from 86 cents to 80 cents; wrappers from \$1.50 to \$1.35; draw frame hands from 80 cents to 75 cents. Even those hands who knew only the rudiments of mathematics saw at once that the actual wage cut was far greater than the proposed maximum of 10 per cent. Slasher hands, for example, were reduced in daily salary by 15 per cent; spoolers by 18 per cent; sweepers by 20 per cent; doffers by 20 per cent and weavers' wages were reduced by up to 15 per cent. The Augusta Herald estimated that the gross reduction in salary received by the mill workers would amount to a loss of between \$75,000 to \$100,000 annually.¹³

"There is a general feeling of dissatisfaction among the operatives effected by the cut," the Daily Tribune informed its readers, "and it is quite probable many of them will refuse to work for the lower wages." The Chronicle, however, while deeply sympathizing with the recent misfortunes of the millworkers, advised that "if the reduction cannot be averted, then it will be the part of wisdom for

the operatives to accept it in good spirit and work for the day when more prosperous conditions may bring about better wages."¹⁴

A series of labor meetings "shrouded in ominous mystery" were held in the West End. No public announcements were made, but it was common knowledge that the meetings were laying the groundwork for a united stand against the mill presidents. The mill workers were quietly organizing before the actual reduction in salaries went into effect. They methodically went about soliciting support from the skilled workers in the various departments and encouraged them to bind together in common defense against management. Concurrently, the disgruntled workers drafted a letter of explanation as to why the reduction in salary was not acceptable. They presented a petition with the signatures of over three hundred well-known citizens of the fifth ward to the management of the John P. King enterprises requesting them to reconsider the reduction in wages. The petition explained that the cost of living in the city was far greater than residing in the rural countryside. Their incomes could not be supplemented by growing vegetables and raising livestock; city ordinances prohibited it. Some workers, it further explained, found it extremely difficult to exist on the current wages they were receiving and if

their incomes dropped appreciably, then they would not be able to buy the absolute necessities to sustain family life. Many workers, in utter desperation, would be forced to put their youngest children to work in the mills, thereby depriving them of an education. Furthermore, the petition also explained that the reduction in wages would greatly discourage the industrious, thrifty and more skilled artisans, who were "now struggling under the cares and burdens of life," to seek employment elsewhere and thereby encourage "unreliable help," who care for nothing "but live today," to migrate to Augusta. Last of all, the petition pointed out that the reduction in wages would profoundly affect the commercial prosperity of the city. It meant that the thousands of dollars that were paid in wages and spent in the city would be lost. The retail economy would be seriously disrupted as grocery stores, department stores and other firms experienced a sharp decline in the volume of sales. The petition, however, was to no avail. Neither petitions, nor protests, nor even the labor meetings would avert the inevitable reduction of wages.¹⁵

Concurrently, while some endeavored in vain to reach an understanding with management, other labor leaders called textile workers to convene at various halls in the West End. The meetings, which were held every night during the first

three weeks of November, were not open to the general public and the proceedings were not made available to the press. But it was apparent to the perceptive observer that the overall objectives were to get the mill hands of Augusta to join the National Union of the Textile Workers of America, which was affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, and then negotiate with management so that disagreeable matters would be adjusted amicably. A strike, it was emphasized, would be the last resort when all efforts at reconciliation had failed. The loom fixers, then the weavers and then other workers too began to unite together in common defense against management. Day by day the meetings resulted in the textile workers being organized along craft lines until most laborers were banded together.¹⁶

The actual cut in wages went into effect the twenty-first of November. That morning at the usual hour all the Augusta mill bells rang and the hands answered the call. They quietly shuffled along in the brisk morning air to their jobs. The water was turned on the wheels and the whir and clatter of machinery was plainly audible in the factory district of the city. But in the mills there was considerable dissension among the workers. Short conferences were held by the weavers in the Sibley factory, and presently some of them began to walk out. They were quickly joined

by workers from the other departments of the mill. Together they marched over to the King mill, shouting and cheering for other workers to come out and join them in a protest strike. The King mill employees promptly struck and the strikers marched en masse over to the Enterprise mill. The actions of the strikers were contagious; by 7:30 A.M. most of the textile mills in the West End--The King, Sibley, Isaetta, Warwick, Augusta Factory and Enterprise--were forced to close down their operations as a result of the city-wide strike. The water was ordered shut off by the supervisors, the blinds were drawn and the gates were locked. The strikers, realizing their immediate victory, then paraded in full strength down Broad Street, the main thoroughfare of the city. A sympathetic crowd of 1,500 men, women and children, despite the early hour, lined both sides of the street waving wildly and cheering loudly. In bold, black headlines the Daily Tribune proclaimed that "FOUR THOUSAND MILL OPERATIVES REFUSE TO WORK UNDER THE CUT." When an ambitious, brash young Chronicle reporter queried Estes as to how long the mills would remain closed, Estes barked back "only God and the Chief of the Federation of Labor know."¹⁷

As they paraded down Broad Street, the strikers waved placards and shouted out inviting all interested citizens to

attend their massive afternoon labor rally on lower Broad Street. During the day circulars, handbills and other tracts were distributed. Phone calls and word-of-mouth campaigns also were responsible for a large orderly crowd of several thousand people arriving to listen attentively to Marion Ivey and Evans L. Cranfill. Ivey, an A. F. of L. union representative, reminded the audience that the strikers were not a reckless mob, inflamed by radical literature, that sought to destroy the foundations of the capitalist enterprises, but that their sole reason was to oppose an unreasonable cut in wages and to compel the mill presidents to rescind their noxious decision. "We are here against the cut and we do not intend to go until we get our wages or a little more. If we can not get a living in the mill we will get one outside it." Another experienced labor leader who had attended the Haymarket Riot in Chicago, Cranfill, addressed the crowd stating, "Everybody must unite. The capitalists are united. You must be or be crushed." Shouts of "Hurrah for Patrick Walsh," however, interrupted him as the mayor and several other dignitaries pushed their way forward through the crowd toward the platform.¹⁸

The union leaders cheerfully acknowledged him and permitted him to step up and address the audience. In a

serious, sober tone of voice, Walsh began. "This is a very unfortunate condition that confronts the laboring people of this city. Strikes are always attended with ill effects to capital as well as labor. They are not conducive to the interests of any community, and should always be avoided when possible. Of course, you have the right to quit work whenever you see fit to do so to secure better wages and better conditions." "I shall be frank and honest with you," he continued. "I think this strike has been prematurely called. I do not think you have exhausted every effort. I think it ill advised. I speak to you frankly." In conclusion he offered his services as an arbitrator: "If there is anything that I can do to bring about an amicable adjustment of these differences, I will serve you. I am entirely at your service." "I believe that the mill presidents should agree to confer with a committee appointed by this meeting. I believe that a settlement honorable and just to operatives and officials can be reached. Anything in the world that I can do to bring about a harmonious and satisfactory termination of this difficulty I will do."¹⁹

Confident in the justice of their claims and certain that Mayor Walsh would intercede in their behalf, they acquiesced to the proposal that a committee headed by Walsh and consisting of Forest Gray, Marion Ivey, W. H. Carter,

William Keel and Evan L. Cranfill would confer with the mill presidents.

The Walsh-Labor Committee met with John W. Chafee, James P. Verdery and Thomas Barrett, Jr., at the office of Charles Estes. The mill presidents received the deputations in good spirits and very cordially discussed their decision to reduce wages. President Estes assumed leadership in the discussions. He was frank with them. Once again he reiterated that the Augusta mills could not compete with the other mills with lower wages and greater profits. The only recourse was to reduce wages and thereby increase profits to stockholders. As much as he disliked it, there was nothing else that could be done. The only concessions that he could offer were twofold. He assured the workers that they would not be discharged because of their participation in the walkout or their affiliation with the labor union. Second of all, he agreed to pay a 6 per cent higher wage than the mills in South Carolina were paying to their employees. He admitted that the Augusta laborers would still be receiving a considerable reduction in salary, but advised that it was one of the unfortunate ills they had to bear. The labor leaders protested, but their pleas were ineffectual. When the conference adjourned, Walsh regretted that it had not accomplished more. He advised the committee members to

return to work, organize their unions and wait for a more opportune time. "Accept the inevitable, for the present," were his parting comments to the disgruntled labor leaders.²⁰

But the Augusta labor leaders did not heed Walsh. Aroused by the reduction in wages, encouraged by the massive support from most of the textile workers, they refused to capitulate so readily. Instead they took the offensive. They encouraged textile workers in the Augusta circuit to join them in a general strike against the reduction in wages. The Langley and Bath mills in South Carolina were forced to shut down when their employees walked off the job. President Thomas Barrett, Jr., confessed that he did not know when the two enterprises would resume operations. The news was not so encouraging for the mill owners. Within a few days the strike had spread throughout the city, closed down all the textile mills--except the Enterprise and Augusta factory--and stopped industrial production in most of the Augusta-owned cotton mills across the Savannah River. Furthermore, several weeks after the strike had been called, little had changed. All of the mills which had been initially shut down by the strike remained closed. On several occasions the factory bells rang out at six in the morning calling the laborers back to work. When the bells

rang, a few workers came out of their homes and apartments in the West End. They gathered on the Harrisburg bridge in front of the Sibley and King mills, watched the supervisors open the front gates and silently stared at the company officials who beckoned them to return to work. Few chose to go back to their jobs; those who did were jeered and taunted as being cowards, traitors and scabs. Although many of the presidents of the mills honestly expected the hands to return to work and accept the lower wages, they were surprised to discover that the strikers militantly refused to yield. In an effort to bring the strike to an early conclusion, the mill presidents "locked-out" the workers in the Enterprise and Augusta Factory, but to no avail.²¹

Stillness reigned in the city. Industrial production stopped. The mills were silent, dark and deserted. The dense volumes of grey smoke which usually poured from the chimneys of the factories ceased to billow upwards. It was quite apparent that the mills could not operate without a labor force and it was also apparent that the strikers were resolved to see it through to the end.

The strikers were not docile, nor tractable, but stubbornly united and adamantly determined not to go back to work for cut wages. The grim determination to continue the strike led them to organize a central committee board to

supervise the acquisition and distribution of food supplies, clothing and other necessities to sustain "The Great Labor Strike" of 1898-1899. A receiving and distributing commissary was established in Robert's Hall on the Corner of Ellis Street and Crawford Avenue. The large upstairs room in the hall was used as a meeting place to discuss their strategy against management. Supplies and provisions were stockpiled downstairs. Two downtown warehouses were also rented and stocked with provisions. Several grocery store merchants were encouraged to extend credit to the strikers and the union leaders were permitted to haul away wagonloads of flour, bacon, grits, meal, sugar and other foods, to be stored up as part of the reserve supplies to feed the families of the strikers. Butchers, bakers and other members of the retail associations were encouraged to make contributions to assist their fellow laborers. By mid-December barrels of syrup, several hundred pounds of flour, hundreds of bushels of wheat and a couple hundred pounds of salted meat packed in huge barrels were stored up to sustain the strike.

The Augusta strikers also received numerous food supplies and economic aid from the soldiers stationed at nearby Camp McKenzie in the Hill District. Troops from the various regiments contributed sizable quantities of food to

the Augusta millworkers. The First Maryland Division sent a wagonload of 540 loaves of bread to the central committee for distribution. Brigadier General J. P. S. Gobin donated an additional 600 loaves of bread to the unemployed strikers in the West End. The soldiers voluntarily organized a campaign drive to raise general funds to assist the strikers. A list of donors was posted in the first sergeant's tent of every company on post. On pay day, and for several days thereafter, strikers were permitted to canvas the camp soliciting additional donations for their cause. The Hospital Corps sponsored a benefit dance at Red Man's Hall in the fifth ward and the proceeds were donated to the strikers.

As supplies were acquired, the central committee board dispatched "runners" to survey the families in the fifth ward to discover which of them were in dire need of food or other supplies. The runners reported back to the committee which, after confirming the minimum actual needs, provided the family with food, clothing, wood, coal, and in some instances, small allotments of money.

The central committee board also endeavored to sustain the revolutionary strike fervor. It realized that the longer the strike wore on, the greater the possibility that the zeal of the strikers would become dissipated. Repeated union meetings and demonstrations were held in an effort to

maintain cohesiveness. At each meeting speakers extolled the workers for their strong spirit of resistance, emphasized that the mill presidents would ultimately capitulate and concluded the sessions with a vote taken as to whether the strike should continue or whether they should truckle and admit defeat. Each time the vote was a unanimous resounding shout: "No!" Strike parades and other public demonstrations were also staged in an endeavor to maintain an esprit de corps. Every possible effort of the labor leaders was directed toward preventing the morale of the strikers from declining.²²

Despite the fact that the strikers were fired with a zealous determination to see it through, regardless of their successful committee which acquired supplies and money to sustain the strike, the time for their prolonged strike against capital proved to be inopportune. The strike, which lasted from November through January, occurred at a slack time in cotton manufacturing activities. The mill presidents, in all likelihood, would have been forced to curtail production and reduce the number of workers on the job. The workers possibly would have been more successful in preventing a cut in wages and even gaining an increase in their salaries had management announced the wage cuts during the peak cotton months of July, August and September.

A second factor which played a crucial role in breaking up the strike was the daily exodus of the more skilled laborers to other milltowns in Georgia, Alabama and especially South Carolina. During the early days of the Augusta strike, representatives from other mills arrived in the city to interview, recruit and hire the more skilled and efficient laborers. Within the first week of the strike an estimated 200 mill hands and their families left after gaining employment elsewhere. "Our operatives are leaving by the dozen," a mill supervisor observed. "There is a good demand for practical mill hands all over Carolina, and, as these offer work at once, while there is enforced idleness here, many who would really prefer to stay in Augusta, are forced by the pressing need of money to get any price they can." Some left after already finding a job in another milltown; others left with nothing but hope that their experience would enable them to procure work. The exodus grew greater day by day as the prospects of a long, bitter winter strike became more apparent.

An official notice posted on the door of Robert's Hall informed the strikers that "outside hands" would be imported into the city and employed in the mills in order to resume industrial production. "Some anxiety is being manifested at the appearance of strangers desiring to get work in the

factories," an unemployed striker commented. "It is stated that large numbers are coming into Augusta from various parts of Georgia and even adjacent states." The steady importation of "scabs" from Macon, Columbus, Cordele, Atlanta and other towns in the region was a third critical turning point in the strike. Throughout December and January several railroad carloads of "imported laborers"--carders, spinners, weavers, loom fixers---arrived in the city; their household effects were unloaded and moved into the company-owned cottages and apartments; the men, women and children were put to work in the mills. Many country folk, who found life on the farm too hard, also eagerly migrated to take advantage of the strike. Some were even willing to work for a short while without pay until they learned how to operate the machinery, because, in the long run, they expected to raise substantially their material way of life.

"Many of the present employees have signified their intention to sever their connection with the Company and have declined to work at the scale of wages offered," the notice began. "We have cheerfully allowed the operatives to remain in the dwellings during the strike, and while we do not desire to occasion them any more inconvenience than is necessary, having waited more than six weeks for them to return to work and being desirous to afford the opportunity

to do so to those who desire to resume work, we will need the houses on and after January 9th, 1899, for occupancy by those who wish to work, and for whom the houses were built." "We give this notice in advance," John W. Chafee, President of the Sibley Manufacturing Company stated, "so that those who do not intend to remain and work for the Company, may have an opportunity to make other arrangements."

The King, Enterprise, Augusta Factory and other mills simultaneously notified the strikers that they had been "cheerfully allowed" the use of their company-owned dwellings, but now it was necessary to evict them in order to accommodate the new workers who had migrated into Augusta to accept positions in the factories. Those laborers, however, who responded to the ringing of the factory bells would not have to vacate their apartments and cottages. But those strikers who continued to refuse to acquiesce and accept the scale of wages offered would be duly evicted by the constituted authorities. "We are not in the bluffing business," President Estes stated bluntly. "The notice is only a communication advising the operatives of the mills' intentions. If they do not go to work," he continued, "we will go about the matter legally. It is work or move."

Constables Columbus Barnes and Arthur Glover, on the appointed day, performed their "disagreeable duty as civilly

as possible." Tenants of the mills who refused to return to work were vacated. Their household goods were hauled out, loaded upon drays and wagons and carted away. In some instances, the furniture and meagre belongings were left standing on the sidewalks. Large crowds of men, women and children stood in silence, stunned by the wholesale moving of families from the West End. They stared in disbelief at the spectacle which was unfolding before them. Many had been convinced that the company would not actually evict them.

The physical eviction of the strikers and their families was a fourth decisive factor in breaking up the Augusta Textile Strike. When company officials took legal action and served notices of eviction upon the strikers, they caused a serious split within the working community. One faction favored a return to work with the hopes that at a later date salaries would be restored to their previous levels. They realized that their limited personal funds were depleted and that the strike committee's funds were exhausted. The retail merchants and wholesale grocers, moreover, had ceased to credit those out of employment and hence there was no plentiful supply of food to sustain the strike.

Only a few diehards were militantly determined not to

capitulate, but instead chose to set up "Camp Eviction" behind the Fifth Ward Grammar School. The militant faction within the strike community drove their tent pins into the hard ground, pegged the tent flaps down and encamped on the vacant lot behind the public school grounds. "The mill authorities do not realize, perhaps, that we are making a fight for our children, and our children's children," a resident of Camp Eviction stated.²³

But for most workers the strike was coming to an end. Three days after the beginning of the evictions of tenants, the King, Sibley, Isaetta and Langley mills resumed their operations. Workers gathered at the front entrance gates of the mills and swarmed around. When the factory superintendents opened the gates they walked quietly and quickly inside and into the buildings. There were no disturbances. Not the slightest attempts at interference were made by the diehard strikers. Each day the number of workers who gathered at the gates grew. Each day more mills were in operation with more hands on the job than they had the previous day. Strike leaders, in desperation, protested and maintained that the vast majority of the workers were determined to stick it out, but visits to any of the mills and a head count at the factory gates furnished indisputable proof that the strike was rapidly coming to an end.

Confronted with the fact that more laborers were returning to work, the union leaders were forced to capitulate. President Prince W. Greene of the United Textile Workers of America, P. J. Sullivan, William H. Winn, John T. Pugh and other local labor leaders held an hour long meeting with the representatives of the mills in the office of President Thomas Barrett, Jr. A reconciliation was effected. The "Articles of Peace" included: (1) the new scale of wages offered to textile workers in Augusta would average 6 per cent higher than competitive mills in the Carolinas; (2) in the future all coal sold to the employees of the mills for private use would be sold to them at wholesale costs; (3) all workers who had participated in the strike would not be discharged because of their strike activities; and (4) all textile workers had the right to join the National Union of Textile Workers. After the conference the labor leaders advised the remaining strikers to return to work as satisfactory conditions had been met by management. Subsequently the remaining mill hands returned in full force to the King, Sibley, Enterprise, Augusta Factory and Isaetta mills. The Great Labor Strike of 1898-1899 had ended.²⁴

Defeated in Augusta the A. F. of L. carried its battle against southern textile corporations into the neighboring

Carolina milltowns of Greenwood, Abbeville, Bath, Durham, Greensboro and Fayetteville. But, upon the outbreak of a new textile strike in the mills of "Greater Augusta" in 1902, the union leaders, experiencing setbacks in the Carolinas, returned to their "Augusta stronghold."

NOTES

1. Thomas D. Clark and Albert D. Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 60-62; John S. Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 137-138; Fred A. Shannon, The Farmers' Last Frontier (New York: Harper and Row, 1945), 78-80; E. Merton Coulter, Georgia: A Short History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 348-349; Willard Range, A Century of Georgia Agriculture, 1850-1950 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1954), 136-140, 149-150; Theodore Saloutos, "The Agricultural Problem and Nineteenth-Century Industrialism," Agricultural History, XXII (July, 1948), 156-174. Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1941), 212, stresses that the mill workers had gained jobs which at least helped to dispell the "terror of starvation." Edward C. Kirkland, A History of American Economic Life (New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1969), 245-249, emphasizes that chief among the social aspirations of the industrial workers was the "struggle for status."

2. The Wool Hat, July 15, 1893; Augusta Chronicle, September 2, 1900.

3. Augusta Chronicle, November 14, 1898, December 6, 1905; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 318-319. See appendix: Table I, "Declining Wages of Textile Workers in the King and Sibley Mills: 1880-1898," Table II, "Declining Wages of Textile Workers in Augusta, Georgia: 1880-1900," Table III, "Wages of the Textile Labor Force by Sex and Age Groups in 1900."

4. The Wool Hat, July 15, 1893; Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964). Thernstrom's study emphasizes that there was little social mobility in an industrial city as class lines were made more

rigid and all too frequently, instead of the wage-earners moving upward in society, they moved downward. In Augusta the lintheads soon recognized that they had failed to advance upward, but remained trapped in the lower strata.

5. Augusta Chronicle, September 2, 1900.

6. Ibid., July 10, 1886; Ezell, The South Since 1865, 203-204; George S. Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1931), 22. Earlier strikes in the mills were apparent but most failed within a very brief time. Nearly all job vacancies were quickly filled, work resumed and laborers remained on their jobs almost as though nothing had ever happened. See, for example, the following editions of the Augusta Daily Constitutionalist and Sentinel, January 23, 1870, August 12, 15, 16, 24, 1873.

7. Augusta Chronicle, August 7, 10, September 5, 15, October 16, 20, 31, November 9, 1886; Mitchell, Textile Unionism, 23-25.

8. Mitchell, Textile Unionism, 23-30; Ezell, The South Since 1865, 204-205; F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 81-83.

9. Augusta Chronicle, October 16, November 21, 1898, February 2, 1913, January 30, 1916, March 26, 27, 1917; Augusta Herald, March 26, 27, 28, 1917; Charles C. Jones, Jr., and Salem M. Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, Georgia (Syracuse: D. Mason and Company, 1890), 1-3.

10. Augusta Chronicle, October 16, November 21, 1898; Augusta Herald, October 30, December 21, 1898; Augusta Daily Tribune, November 21, 1898.

11. Augusta Chronicle, October 17, 24, 1898.

12. Augusta Herald, November 13, December 11, 17, 1898; Augusta Daily Tribune, January 3, 1899.

13. Augusta Chronicle, January 9, 1899; Augusta Daily Tribune, November 21, 1898; Augusta Herald, October 30, November 13, December 30, 1898.

14. Augusta Daily Tribune, November 7, 1898; Augusta Chronicle, November 9, 1898.

15. Augusta Chronicle, November 9, 1898.
16. Ibid., November 11, 12, 13, 1898.
17. Augusta Daily Tribune, November 21, 1898; Augusta Herald, November 21, 1898; Augusta Chronicle, November 22, 1898.
18. Augusta Chronicle, November 22, 1898.
19. Ibid.; Augusta Herald, November 22, 1898.
20. Augusta Chronicle, November 23, 1898; Augusta Herald, November 23, 1898.
21. Augusta Chronicle, November 25, December 26, 1898.
22. Ibid., November 30, December 4, 16, 29, 1898, January 1, 18, 22, 1899; Augusta Herald, November 29, December 24, 1898.
23. Augusta Chronicle, November 27, December 1, 3, 1898, January 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 15, 18, 19, 20, 1899; Augusta Herald, November 24, 25, December 17, 1898; Augusta Daily Tribune, January 17, 24, 1899.
24. Augusta Chronicle, January 10, 12, 15, 18, 26, 27, 28, 1899; Augusta Daily Tribune, January 24, 1899; Ezell, The South Since 1865, 205; Mitchell, Textile Unionism, 27-30; Woodward, Origins of the New South, 421-423.

CHAPTER IV
CHALLENGES TO THE REFORM COALITION

The Death of Mayor Patrick Walsh

City Attorney William A. Garrett advised council members in December, 1898, that Mayor Patrick Walsh was gravely ill. Since the early Christmas season, he explained that Walsh had felt the effects of an attack of "nervous prostration." His physicians advised him that he was "breaking himself down" and that he needed an extended period of rest. But instead of heeding their advice, Walsh had journeyed to Washington, D.C., to invite President William McKinley to visit Augusta. Afterwards the mayor had unwisely traveled to New York to attend a business meeting of the directors of the Associated Press, but was forced to cancel his engagement and return hastily home. During the following weeks his physical well being continued to deteriorate rapidly. Even his physicians ceased to hold out much hope for his recovery, but shook their heads gloomily when they spoke of the future. They did not desire to buoy him up with false hopes. Recognizing that he was dying,

Walsh acknowledged that he was incapable of exercising the duties of his public office. Given these adverse circumstances, he requested that William Garrett advise the City Council that a mayor pro tempore be appointed, expressing his preference that Jacob Phinizy be appointed acting mayor. After a brief discussion, a motion was made, seconded and carried unanimously.¹

Patrick Walsh never did rally. His health continued to fail. On March 19th, after several months of prolonged illness, he died. The news was received with genuine regret. Because Walsh was mayor of the city and the leader of the Reform Movement which had made every public effort to improve the city, acting mayor Phinizy ordered that all public offices be closed, all public officials attend the funeral services and participate in the funeral procession. Phinizy also expressed the wish that all Richmond County offices be closed and all business matters of the various departments be suspended until after the funeral. Furthermore, he politely asked that all places of business in the city and county be closed and that the employers permit their employees to pay their last respects. Prominent merchants, industrialists and other entrepreneurs, for sentimental reasons, immediately indicated that they intended to comply with the request.

Augusta became a city of mourning. The sad, tragic news of the death of Walsh spread rapidly. Symbols of sorrow were to be seen everywhere. The windows of the Chronicle Building, City Court House, Richmond County Building and the Medical College were festooned in somber black drapes. Flags all over town flew at half mast. Black crepe paper bordered the windows of stores and private homes. Large wreaths were fixed on doors. Long borders of black cloth fringed the roofs of many homes. Blinds, sashes and curtains were drawn tightly together to darken out the sunlight. People walked along quietly, their blank faces bearing the signs of personal grief and sadness. Black arm bands were tied on their sleeves. When people spoke, their muffled, subdued and sobbing voices were barely audible. Everywhere in the city were signs which revealed the enormous anguish.

A simple family requiem mass took place at Sacred Heart Church. A hymn was sung and prayers were offered. "Nearer My God to Thee" floated through the air. Only the immediate family, a few close acquaintances and the top political leaders of the community were present. Then the bier was transported to St. Patrick's Church where the remains lay in state affording the people of Augusta the opportunity to pay a last tribute to his memory. From the instant that it

was placed in the church aisle in front of the chancel rail there was a steady stream of mourners. With choking throats and brimming eyes they bowed their heads in a final gesture of respect to their beloved mayor. "Decrepit age tottered along with youth; Catholic and Protestant, Jew and Gentile, white and black, bowed with a common grief, came and went. Some," a grief-stricken observer recorded, "passed with a single painful glance at the marble features of the dead; some, kneeling at the casket, prayed."²

Long before the time set for the funeral procession, friends began to gather in front of St. Patrick's. Hundreds flocked to the Church, but failing to gain entrance into the packed assembly, they stood in silent mourning in the courtyard awaiting the funeral dirge. A crowd soon congregated all along both sides of Greene Street, covered the sidewalks and lawns and blocked the intersections. Within a very short time, thousands of people were massed hundreds deep. Many, eager to catch a glimpse of the cortege, climbed the trees in "The Greene"; some indiscriminately climbed up on the roofs of nearby buildings, house tops and the verandas of the resplendent homes that lined the broad thoroughfare.

The tear-stained faces and sobbing voices of the relatives and close personal friends of the deceased brought absolute silence among the swarms of people when they

observed that the funeral services were over. Many men and women turned away to hide their emotions, their bodies wracked with convulsive sobs, when the pallbearers filed past carrying the heavy oak casket with its silver filigree moldings out to the huge black hearse. They watched in stunned disbelief as one of the largest funeral processions in the history of the city took shape before their very eyes.

A long row of over eighty fine carriages stretched forward and backward along Greene. Every available carriage in the city was hired to accommodate the family, public officials, honorary escorts and pallbearers. Among the dignitaries who came to honor the deceased were Governor Allen D. Candler, ex-Mayors Robert H. May, Charles Estes, William B. Young and James H. Alexander. The assemblage of community influentials included Mayor Pro Tem Jacob Phinizy and all of the members of the City Council. Many judges and practicing attorneys in Augusta and Richmond County were also among the elite groups who were honored guests in the funeral procession. The Sacred Heart Cadets, Richmond County Cadets, Grand Order of the Elks, Knights of St. Patrick and a plethora of other community organizations lined up in formation to do honor to the late mayor. Several carriages draped in black carried the grief-stricken

relatives and immediate members of the Walsh family. After them came carriages bearing the entire officials of city and county government who were so closely identified with the Walsh Reform Movement. Behind them came a heavy black hearse, laden with flowers, bearing the closed casket. A long line of carriages occupied by the other community influentials, who acutely felt the loss of Pat Walsh, trailed behind. Only the clatter of the horses' hoofs, ringing sharply upon the cobblestone pavement and the tolling of church bells shattered the awesome silence.

City Politics in the Post-Walsh Era

The tragic and untimely death of Walsh confronted the decision makers with the problem of a "legitimate" successor. To many, the rightful heir was Phinizy. The day after the solemn high requiem mass, the Chronicle stated that there was no need for alarm because "really no vacancy exists in the mayor's chair." Phinizy had been appointed acting mayor by the City Council, and this made him the legal and just heir to the city's highest political office. The organ of the late mayor further explained that Phinizy was completely devoted to the Walsh crusade for "Good Government." His political experiences as chairman of the finance committee, member of the waterworks commission and three-month service as acting mayor were also cited as being

of immense value in providing him with the necessary knowledge to assume the position. Moreover, his sizable business interests and large property holdings indicated that he was a solid citizen dedicated to the growth and material prosperity of Augusta. Last of all in defending Phinizy, the Chronicle expressed the faith that recognition of the legitimacy of Phinizy as mayor in fact would prevent another angry, contentious and emotion-packed election such as that of 1897. Bitter, acrimonious disputes would not only re-awaken political antagonisms at a time in which the city needed to reunite community feelings after a prolonged labor strike, but it was feared that partisan strife might serve to challenge the emerging reform domination of public government offices.³

For various reasons, Phinizy, however, chose not to fulfill the unexpired term and politely refused to become the "accidental" successor to Walsh. His decision resulted in three rival candidates, all eager and ambitious, coveting the mayoralty of Augusta. William Dunbar, Major James Conquest Cross Black and Charles A. Robbe announced their candidacy. Judge Dunbar, the first native son to throw his hat into the ring, maintained that his previous political services eminently qualified him. Major Black proclaimed that he was the "new candidate of all the people." But both

publicly withdrew from the mayoralty race, endorsing Charles A. Robbe. Dunbar explained that his decision was based upon his conviction that there was a "universal desire throughout the community to avoid at this time a wrangle at the polls." Major Black "out of respect to the memory of Mayor Walsh and for the good of the community" also decided to cancel his plans for an active campaign. Their withdrawal, they said, was a definite movement on behalf of harmony and peace. Both expressed hope that the people of Augusta would unite together and support Charles A. Robbe in a peaceful election free from any disturbances.⁴

Dunbar and Black firmly believed that the people wanted to be spared the excitement and divisions of another mayoralty contest. They realized that the election of 1897 had engendered strong feelings and was bitterly fought, leaving the community divided into various factions. They further believed that another election campaign with mass demonstrations, parades and meetings, in the wake of the textile strike, would reopen the unhappy divisions with the community. But they also recognized that the basic problem was how to attain a peaceful election free of any "irregularities."

Black, Dunbar, Robbe and others were convinced that Augustans had not forgotten that the Walsh "Campaign for

Good Government" in 1897-1898 had been based on the determination that all elections should be "fair and clean." They were also certain that the general attitude prevalent was that as long as the Negro participated in the city elections, the community would witness intense election campaigns that would divide the city into hostile and warring camps as candidates, party managers and wardheelers sought to influence the black voters at the polls. Prevailing sentiment, in their opinion, revolted against the shameless election methods of the past. Many ardently believed that the "good people" should pledge themselves to a continuation of reform politics in honor of the late mayor, shunning past corrupt election procedures.

The effort to eliminate the reckless, disgraceful and irregular methods employed by machine candidates and to end "vote-buying" had first been manifested in the Walsh campaign. The "best elements" had risen up against the machine candidate, Daniel Kerr, in a determination to make city elections fair and above reproach. Since the Walsh victory there had been a lively coverage in the columns of the city newspapers about questionable election procedures. The reading public learned the plain truth that votes were bought in order to gain victory at the polls. It became common knowledge that in every previous contest large cam-

paign funds, reportedly running into five figures, were necessary to gain public office. City elections were usually a battle of dollars, not ballots; the candidate with the biggest, fattest purse who used his "spendin' money" wisely bought the "purchaseable [black] vote." These pernicious and lamentable practices had been endured for years but the newspapers had greatly exposed and stimulated public awareness of the need to end machine politics and do-nothing government. Most citizens were disgusted with the open purchase of the "Negro vote" and were convinced that by denying the franchise to blacks that elections would be based on "fine, clean politics." Furthermore, not only had a rising strong-community-wide revulsion contributed to the desire to disfranchise the Negro, but in state politics the introduction of white primary system had been the basis for recent elections of the governor, state house officers and Supreme Court justices. By 1899 there was an undeniable shift toward a white primary as the means of depriving the Negro of the right to vote.⁵

Several mass meetings were held to consider the question of a white primary in city elections. All interested people in the city were called to attend the meetings. "It behooves every man who favors clean elections and good government to attend," the Chronicle advised. Large mass meetings

were held in the court house and sundry other halls to prepare the way for the introduction of conservative political reforms. Each meeting was heavily attended. Every seat in the halls was taken and the aisles, lobbys and entrance ways were filled with concerned citizens. These were some of the largest political meetings in the memory of the oldest citizens of the city. Representatives from all parts of the city and people from all classes flocked to them except, of course, Negroes. From Summerville, Monte Sano, Harrisburg, Pinchgut and Dublin came merchants, bankers, contractors, carpenters, cotton factors, attorneys, teachers and white wage-earners. When the gavels were rapped sharply on the podiums and the meetings were called to order, the proponents of the white primary stood dramatically, surveyed the assembled groups and addressed them, requesting that they unite together to make city politics a "white man's business." As the various speakers praised the primary and the secret ballot as a means of "purifying" city politics, loud applause and cheers of "Right! Right!" echoed from every quarter of the halls.

All present listened in silence as the speakers emphasized that one factor was central in every corrupt political contest: the black man. They also listened attentively as the speakers emphasized that they were certain that there

was only one solution to resolve dishonest elections: deprive the Negro of his right to vote. To further assure honesty in elections, the secret ballot was endorsed as an additional step toward "decency." When it was known that the unscrupulous voter could take a candidate's money and yet vote independently and perhaps against that man without anyone being the wiser, it was believed that the wardheelers would be less prone to turn loose the cash. The speakers repeatedly stated that once the so-called Progressive reforms were implemented, all elections would be free of fraud, corruption, bitterness and bad feelings.

Those attending the meetings were further morally outraged when past political chicanery was vividly described. During heated elections some of the wards frequently became actual battle grounds as pistols, knives, sticks, bricks and fists figured as prominently as ballots in the polling booths as scrappy, ill-tempered and often inebriated voters battled it out for supremacy and victory of their candidate. Total strangers, they further learned, voted in elections, coming to Augusta from both sides of the Savannah River. Money was freely used to influence the results in elections. Such dishonest practices were no longer tolerable.

A new era had emerged which demanded that the Negro cease to corrupt city government by participating in

elections--a new era which would permit a "better quality" of people to seek political office and to administer the affairs of city government. Men particularly experienced in business affairs, who were well suited to deal in an intelligent and practical way with economic problems, would replace corrupt politicians and then honestly, faithfully and efficiently evaluate the complex problems of raising funds, floating bonds, borrowing monies and initiating new policies for the public good.

Although there was some chafing, ribbing and jostling, no bitter debates split up the meetings. No zealous opposition appeared. No internal divisions disrupted the community consensus about eliminating the Negro. All the people attending the meetings were unanimous in support of these objectives. At the close of each meeting, those who attended pledged themselves to support a white primary system and to implement any other policies necessary to sustain the "Good Government" movement originally initiated by Mayor Patrick Walsh. Simultaneously, it was agreed that all future candidates for public office, regardless of their party affiliations, would pledge themselves to such objectives and, in all elections, report any infraction of the rules and regulations by voters, candidates, managers or clerks. The meetings adjourned in triumph.

The people of the community were thoroughly stirred up on the question of good government. It was the most active topic of discussion. White men were seriously aroused on the subject and were anxious to reach some practical solutions. It was widely discussed and commented upon. Seldom had there been such excitement in the streets, shops, stores and parlors. Articles were written and read. Type-written notices of the resolutions of the meetings were handed from friend to friend. In the clubs, on the streets, in the stores and offices and in the drawing rooms it was the topic of daily discussion. The more it was discussed the more determined the friends of the white primary and the secret ballot became. Gradually arrangements were made for the implementation of a white primary, and ultimately, a secret ballot. Further meetings were held and rules which would govern the elections were discussed, formulated, drafted, revised, completed and enacted. Special committees were elected to create a "private club."⁶

The white movement to settle the political fate of the Negro was greeted with a howl of protest from the black community. Candor compelled them to demand that they be permitted their freedom to participate in all elections and have a say in city politics. They pointed out that many blacks did not sell their votes, but were well informed and

interested citizens. Some of the leaders of the black community clearly recognized that these policies were setting dangerous precedents which would not only curtail black participation in elections but destroy their influence upon municipal policies and programs. Instead of endeavoring to deprive them of their civil rights, many urged that if genuine political reform was the objective, then the reformers should seek to eliminate the politicians who bought the black vote. Some even predicted that when it was introduced, vote-buying would simply involve purchasing white votes for white candidates; hence, no elimination of corruption.

Black protest meetings were held. Representatives from the colored community strongly opposed the blatant ways in which the Negro was being deprived of his right to participate in elections. H. M. Porter, a well-known colored attorney, spoke out against the disfranchisement of half the voters of the city, stating that "once it was thrust upon the negro it would be impossible for him to get from under it." Negroes were not seeking to dominate the elections, he explained, nor were they coveting offices as aldermen or mayor, but they believed that they had the "right to express the privilege due them as American citizens." Professor Thomas Cotton, another respectable middle class

member of colored society, stated that "the colored man wanted nothing more than his rights. He didn't want to be mayor, but he did want a voice in the selection of one." The pastor of the Tabernacle Church, Reverend C. T. Walker, also spoke out against it stating that the late Mayor Walsh had endorsed Negro participation in city elections. A. W. Wimberly likewise emphasized that "it was not the desire of the negro to control; all he wanted was his rights." Wimberly furthermore stated that he clearly recognized that once it was introduced in city elections it would be extended to county elections and eventually the blacks would be totally disfranchised. Even if it was introduced, he pointed out, it would not prevent the "buying, selling, repeating, nor fraudulent counting of votes." The true remedy, in his opinion, was that "hereafter there be no buyers and we guarantee that there will be no sellers." "If bribery and vote selling have too often made popular elections in Georgia a farce, then proscribe bribery and vote selling; and not colors," was a theme emphasized by W. T. Prichett, John Hughes, Evans Nobles, D. L. Klugh, J. H. Roundfield, H. L. Walker and A. Pless. It was also pointed out that many Negroes steadfastly refused to sell their votes, yet if the primary were adopted they would be denied the right to participate in all elections simply

because of their skin color. The plain, unvarnished truth was also that the "black vote" was very much responsible for electing to political office some of the "best white officials that have ever ruled the state."⁷

But their protests were to no avail.

Charles A. Robbe and the Special Mayoralty
Election of 1899

The special election of Charles A. Robbe in 1899 was a quiet, peaceful and orderly affair. Election day was so calm that many were unaware of the fact that an election was in progress. "It was gratifying to see the voting booths free from noisy crowds, and to witness the solemn faces with which notorious ward heelers looked on at the polls and realized that their occupation was gone," one observer remarked. The total vote cast for Charles Robbe was 1,894. The next highest was 364 for "Blank, residence not knowd," the protest candidate of the colored voters. At a plain inaugural ceremony Mayor Robbe stated, "I feel assured that the name of our city shall continue to be synonymous with good government."⁸

The new mayor of the city was not a native Georgian. Born in Hancock, New Hampshire, in 1833, Charles A. Robbe, when he was twenty years old, decided to move to the Empire State of the South. Initially locating in Savannah, he

subsequently decided to permanently settle in Augusta. In 1857 he established himself as the sole proprietor and manufacturer of a plumbing company located at Eighth and Ellis streets. When the Civil War erupted between the North and the South, Robbe enlisted as a private in Company C, Forty-eighth Georgia Infantry regiment. Within three years he rose from the enlisted ranks to first lieutenant. When the war ended, Captain Robbe returned to Augusta and resumed his activities in the plumbing and heating business.

Robbe described himself as being a "practical plumber, steam and gas fitter" and a "manufacturer and dealer" in boilers, water tanks, and steam engines. His firm carried a complete stock of engines, steam pumps, lead pipes and water and drainage supplies. By the Gilded Age he had emerged as one of the major plumbing contractors who supplied the city with its water mains and installed the steam heating and plumbing systems for nearly all of the mills in Augusta and vicinity. His business firm had also secured several contracts from the state, installing heating units in the Georgia State Asylum, Georgia State Normal and Industrial Schools, Aiken Institute in South Carolina and the Chatham County Jail in Savannah.

Robbe's secondary interests were in the realm of politics. From 1876-1884 he served the city as chief of the

volunteer fire department, only retiring from that position when he broke his ankle and was incapable of continuing the strenuous activities of a fireman. After his retirement most of his friends preferred to call him "Chief." In 1882 he was elected to the lower house of the state legislature. During his second term of office, he was chairman of the committee on manufacture and a member of the committee on finance. In 1892 he was elected to represent the eighteenth district in the Georgia Senate and served as the chairman of the committees on public schools, sanitation and hygiene. He was also a member of several important committees including military affairs, corporations, finance, state asylum and the academy for the blind. It was firmly believed that his practical business experiences combined with his political services in all levels of government made him well qualified to be mayor of Augusta.⁹

But his term in office was cut short by death. When elected mayor he was sixty-six years old and not in the best of health. A citizen was startled to find Mayor Robbe lying unconscious on the sidewalk at the corner of Ellis and Sibley streets in July, 1900. An ambulance rushed him to his home, where his condition was reported to be "alarmingly critical." Dr. Eugene Foster explained that the mayor had been ill for quite a while. In the early spring Robbe had

had a "very bad spell" and he had advised him to take a lengthy rest at Indian Springs. Unfortunately, after taking a week vacation he had decided to return to Augusta and resume his responsibilities as mayor. His health had continued to deteriorate. In the opinion of Foster, the mayor was a "very, very desperately ill man" and "the chances of recovery are very much against him." Robbe never gained consciousness. Sixteen hours after he had been taken home he died.¹⁰

For the second time the "Angel of Death" had "visited" the chief executive of the city. Once again city hall was draped in mourning and business firms dressed their display windows in the traditional somber black festoons and garlands. Sunday afternoon an "imposing pageant" unfolded at Saint Paul's Episcopal church. After the choir sung appropriate hymns, the reverend paid a brief tribute to the life and character of the deceased who had been so prominently identified with the city. A large silent crowd of people prominent in all the commercial and political affairs of the city and many from the humbler walks of life, with bowed heads and hearts filled with deep grief, solemnly walked from the church yard to the cemetery.

Alfred M. Martin, Jr., Jacob Phinizy and
Continuation of Reform Politics

After the Robbe funeral a special City Council meeting

convened with Thomas Barrett, Jr. presiding as acting mayor. In the discussions which ensued arrangements were made to preserve the existing power coalition of the reformers. Phinizy politely requested that the members of the council, especially the City Attorney, indicate their learned opinions as to the legality of the council selecting a qualified person to complete the remainder of the unexpired term of office from July to December, 1900. Based on the assumption that elections frequently injured business relations, promoted partisan strike and disturbed community relations it was generally conceded that a regular election was not necessary, but that the council was empowered to elect a mayor to fill the interim. Even though everyone present acknowledged the fact that popular sentiment again favored Phinizy for mayor, Phinizy politely declined, recommending for the interim period of office his close personal friend, business associate, fellow alderman and chairman of the fire department committee, Alfred M. Martin, Jr. After additional deliberation the council elected Martin mayor.¹¹

Thirty-eight-year-old Martin was regarded as one of the newer generation of dynamic politicians in the community. As a graduate of the University of Virginia and the University of Heidelberg, Germany, he was highly respected as one of the best educated young attorneys in the city. It

was also a well-known fact that his political career had begun during the Walsh-Kerr contest, when he unsuccessfully ran for council. Defeated by a narrow margin of fifteen votes, he chose to run again for representative of the first ward supporting the cause of municipal reform. Upon victory in January, 1899, he assumed a leading role, becoming chairman of the fire department committee as well as a member of several other important committees. For two years he rendered service to his constituents and to the city at large. Many believed that Martin had been elected interim mayor as a shrewd political move by Phinizy. And many others were absolutely certain that he would ultimately succeed Phinizy to office in 1904; assuming, of course, that nothing went awry.¹²

Despite the best plans of the reform coalition to prevent factionalism, however, city politics were far from pacific as rival groups endorsed two potential Democratic successors to Martin for the full mayoralty term, 1901-1904. One group within the party supported Linwood C. Hayne; another group were advocates of Jacob Phinizy. Both groups claimed that their candidates were the rightful heirs to the mayor's office. And both sides claimed that their leaders represented the true champions of progressive reforms.

The supporters of Linwood C. Hayne claimed that he was the real choice of the people and that he would be a "Business Mayor" for Augusta. They pointed with pride that Hayne, born in Burke County in April of 1859, had come to Augusta and through hard work, thrift and sobriety, had gone from "plow handles to the presidency of two banks." As President of the Planters' Loan and Savings Bank and President of the National Bank of Augusta, he had earned the respect of businessmen and laborers. He was a "man of the people" with great administrative abilities as proven by his successful management of two banks. It was firmly believed that he would provide a "broad, safe and progressive administration." Hayne based his candidacy upon the grounds that "thousands" of citizens had signed petitions urging him to run for public office.¹³

Phinizy accepted the endorsement of a committee of twenty-five headed by Martin, representing all wards and the most prominent business and political leaders. Many of the original Walsh boosters--Henry C. Rooney, W. D. A. Walker, John J. Cohen, William A. Garrett--and others enthusiastically supported him as the rightful heir. Councilman Richard Eve Allen pointed out Phinizy's fine accomplishments in the council and emphasized his sensitive awareness of the labor problems in an industrial city.

Thomas Barrett, Jr. praised his splendid business abilities and other eminent qualifications for the position to which he aspired. Charles A. Picquett spoke of the enviable record as a public servant and his financial skills as the president of the most prominent financial corporation in the city.¹⁴

But the Hayne bid for the nomination of the party failed. Each day that the primary campaign drew nearer its conclusion, it became correspondingly more clear that his supporters had failed to prove reasons for voting against Phinizy. Moreover, the Hayne strategy failed to compare with the superb, smooth political campaign of "Uncle Jake" Phinizy. Daily coverage of the Phinizy campaign was most thorough. Chronicle reporters were dispatched at all meetings in each ward where numerous speakers eulogized Phinizy as being the best candidate for the office, praising his political services as chairman of the finance committee, stressing how he had filled the "mayor's chair ably and with dignity" during the illness of Walsh and pointing out how through brains, integrity and industry Phinizy had risen to become the "Dean of the Georgia Bankers." Involved in a multiplicity of business matters, as one of the youngest presidents of the largest banking corporations in the city dating back to the prewar era, he was regarded as a finan-

cial genius who possessed some of the rarest administrative qualities. He was, in the opinion of his backers, just the man to manage city government, collecting monies from its people, providing certain valuable public services, determining the proper utilization of public funds, property assessments, tax rates, municipal bonds and laying the foundations for the future expansion and growth of the city.

Phinizy was overwhelmingly victorious, sweeping all wards and receiving a total vote of 3,028 against 1,468 ballots for Hayne. Moreover, every alderman on the Phinizy ticket won the nomination, thereby obviating the possibility that the future mayor and city councilmen would be in opposition to each other. "Mr. Hayne's defeat," it was explained, "does not imply that the people regard him as not a suitable man for office, but simply that public sentiment demanded the election of Mr. Phinizy in order that he might round out and complete the work projected in the Walsh administration in which he held so important and responsible place."¹⁵

But if the intention of the primary system was to eliminate vote-buying, that goal was certainly not attained. No one could deny the fact that money was freely used to purchase votes. "Money has been used all during the campaign and was also used yesterday at the polls until one

side ran out of coin and the other side found it unnecessary to spend further," the Chronicle reported. "The Hayne people used money everywhere they could--just as the Phinizy people did." The elimination of the black vote placed a premium value upon the white vote. In some wards, especially the fifth ward, the prices of votes reached an early mid-morning high of fifteen dollars per vote, but by early afternoon the "market prices" dropped to five dollars. Before the polls finally closed the wardheelers were offering a dollar a vote with no takers.¹⁶

Having secured the nomination in the primary, Phinizy, of course, won in the subsequent city election. The introduction of the primary system had replaced the importance of regular elections and made them prosaic affairs. Election day was unusually quiet. If it had not been for newspaper notices that an election was in progress and public announcements indicating that all bars were supposed to be closed, very few people would have realized that Augustans were exercising the inalienable right of suffrage. The old-time blare and noise which traditionally accompanied elections no longer took place. All the hoop-de-la of brass bands marching down the streets enroute to the polling booths and parades of citizens demonstrating for the candidates did not occur. Indeed, there was very little interest

displayed in the election per se. Election day voters quietly assembled at the polls, lined themselves up in front of the booths and waited patiently for the chairmen, managers, clerks and other officials to open the booths. When the polls were opened, the ballots were cast in an orderly fashion. The voting was much more rapid and lighter than anticipated. When the polls closed, within a few hours the managers compiled the totals and posted them on the boards. The next day the election returns were announced in the papers. The consolidated votes cast for Phinizy numbered 1,240. The newly elected Mayor of Augusta thanked the people for the honor that had been conferred upon him. He expressed pride in his victory and hoped that Augusta could look forward to brighter new experiences.¹⁷

NOTES

1. Augusta Chronicle, December 28, 1898, January 20, 1899; Augusta Herald, December 23, 1898; "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 187-188.
2. Augusta Chronicle, March 20, 21, 1899.
3. Ibid., December 28, 1898.
4. Ibid., March 22, 31, April 1, 11, 1899.
5. Ibid., October 12, December 4, 1898; Cullen B. Gosnell and C. David Anderson, The Government and Administration of Georgia (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), 39-42. Gosnell and Anderson point out that the primary system originated in Georgia around 1880 and that by 1898 it had become the state-wide method employed by the Democratic party in securing the nomination of all its candidates to office. The Code of Georgia of 1933 (Atlanta: The Harrison Company, 1935), 1032-1033, contains the rules and regulations of the Neill Primary Act of 1917.
6. Augusta Chronicle, October 19, 1899; John S. Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 177-183; Thomas D. Clark and Albert D. Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 108-112.
7. Augusta Chronicle, April 4, November 26, 1899.
8. Ibid., April 18, 1899; "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 279.
9. Augusta Chronicle, July 8, 1900; The Industrial Advantages of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Akehurst Publishing Company, 1893), 102-103; Joel Candler Harris, Memoirs of Georgia (Atlanta: Southern Historical Association, 1895), II, 807-808.

10. Augusta Chronicle, July 7, 8, 1900.
11. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 481-485; Augusta Chronicle, July 10, 11, 1900.
12. Augusta Chronicle, February 23, 24, 25, March 3, 14, October 10, December 1, 1901, January 5, 1902. Martin's probable succession to office after Phinizy was ended by his untimely death.
13. Ibid., August 12, 19, September 1, 1900.
14. Ibid., June 15, 17, September 6, 21, 1900.
15. Ibid., June 17, November 21, 1900; "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 525.
16. Augusta Chronicle, November 21, 1900.
17. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 523-525; Augusta Chronicle, December 6, 1900.

CHAPTER V

RETURN TO REFORM

Limits of Victory

"Vote buying was practiced to a greater extent in the recent primary and city election than possibly ever before," the Chronicle declared. Collection agents, in the days before the elections, were seen hustling around town raising campaign contributions. Large amounts of money were displayed at the different polling places by the intimate friends of some of the candidates. When wardheelers arrived in front of the polling booths they were cheered enthusiastically as they waved hands full of money above their heads, boldly declaring that the "long green" was what counted. No secrets were made of the fact that votes were bought and in large numbers. The use of money was open in most instances, much to the dismay of the good government reformers. "Many white men who would not sell their votes under the old regime along with the negroes, now barter them in the most brazen manner," the Chronicle reported.¹

The white primary system which had been instituted to

lessen, if not absolutely abolish vote buying, had seriously failed. It was quite clear that new actions had to be taken. Mayor Phinizy, city councilmen, newspaper journalists, businessmen and concerned citizens called for a series of conferences for the purpose of discussing what new means could be implemented to better guarantee elimination of vote buying.

New mass meetings were held. Amidst the applause of the assembled crowds, the chairmen rose, rapped their gavels sharply on the rostrums and called the meetings to order, stating that the business of the meetings was to freely discuss proposals on purifying future elections. Everybody was invited to express their opinions, whether relevant, irrelevant or ludicrous; irrespective of parliamentary procedures. Some addressed the chair; others addressed each other; a few spoke at the same time, wrangling with each other over the proper methods to employ. There was little hesitation to speak out forwardly and plainly. A multiplicity of speeches, motions, resolutions and counter-resolutions were made, but gradually several firm beliefs prevailed.

Both the white primary and the secret ballot system met with the general approbation of the whites. They were convinced that only white people should vote and that a secret

ballot was essential to progressive democracy. However, since present laws against vote buying were not applicable to the primary, it was recommended that voter registration laws be made applicable to the primary, particularly since under the new system the primary was the real election. Secondly, it was recommended that, if possible, preferably only one candidate should run for election. Instead of rival candidates--all reputable men, well established in the community and identified with the cause of reform politics--clashing and spending large sums of money to defeat each other, it would be far wiser for them to agree to a single, uncontested candidate for office. All candidates, third of all, would be required to take an oath before a notary public swearing that he would not use money or any other valuables to influence votes. Not only would they commit themselves to use no money, but they promised to prevent, if possible, their friends from doing so. Furthermore, they would pledge themselves to assist in the prevention of vote buying by reporting any candidates resorting to the use of money. Lastly, they called to attention the fact that according to Georgia law, in order to vote in a primary one must have paid all taxes owed the state, as well as a poll tax. Although these laws had not been generally recognized, nevertheless, the laws existed

and demanded enforcement, especially as a means of reducing the size of the electorate.²

Return to Municipal Reforms

The first business taken up by the Phinizy administration was a return to what they conceived to be municipal reform, mainly materialistic changes beneficial to the business community. The pressing needs of the city, as Phinizy saw them, were significant improvements in the waterworks department, fire department and police force. The new waterworks program had been initiated by the late Patrick Walsh a few years ago but was uncompleted. The extension of such vital services meant ripping up the streets, laying more durable water mains, installing hydrants and spending large sums of money. The police force was not in as good shape and condition as a city the size of Augusta warranted. The equipment, personnel and services of the fire department were far from adequate for a growing city. The city greatly needed to build new fire companies in the southern and western sections of the town with modern up-to-date hose wagons and additional men to staff and protect the suburbs.

Broad new boulevards and parks for beautifying the city were also desirable. Other cities had them and Augusta should not lag behind. These improvements were necessary to make Augusta the "Garden City of the South." Older

cemeteries, rank with weeds, dead bushes, decayed leaves and other unsightly accumulations of decades of neglect needed to be cleared of the thick undergrowth and the debris removed and burned. New cemeteries had to be planned, particularly for the west end.

Mayor Phinizy saw Augusta sadly lacking in new public buildings. Nearly every city in the South had impressive-looking city halls, libraries, hospitals and auditoriums, he believed. A progressive community imbued with a strong public spirit must work toward the building of a large central public building for city offices. A new city hall, centrally located in the central business district, would be in keeping with the progress of the city and would be an indication that Augusta was forsaking the provincialism of a small town for the larger ways of real city life.

He indicated that Augusta must decide whether it would initiate these new policies or whether it would choose to take no action and retreat from the responsibilities that were demanded of a modern city. He stated that he had well defined and progressive ideas as to what new policies were necessary and what should be done to further promote the growth of a Greater Augusta. Some of these matters had come up before in council and had confronted other administrations, but no action had been taken; they would continue to

reappear unless action was initiated. In his opinion, many of these programs had been delayed for too long a time--these were public matters in which the people at large would be the gainers or losers--hence, councilmen, as holders of elective offices, were urged to reflect upon the interests and needs of their constituencies and not to hesitate in supporting these municipal reforms. These reforms dictated immediate action for the benefit of the people, government and business community. Phinizy contended. They were not only necessary, but could be introduced efficiently and economically. "Augusta is no longer a country town, but a progressive city, and having taken such a position requires the expenditure of large amounts of money," he added.³

Great interest was expressed by the members of the city council. Newspaper editorials also acclaimed the wisdom of such urban planning to meet contemporary needs as well as the future needs of a larger city. Official endorsement and support of the Phinizy program was received and actions to implement the city-wide improvements were initiated.

A city ordinance passed in 1898 had created a Commissioner of Public Works and provided that the commissioner would be responsible for the construction of a new water-works system. Mr. Nisbet Wingfield, a civil engineer from Tennessee, was appointed to work out the plans, specifica-

tions and estimates. He and other members of the commission intelligently planned the building of a vast series of water mains, sewers, drains, gutters, catch basins and hydrants for the city, clearly recognizing that the old wooden drains and hollowed-out logs were no longer providing adequate services. Water pumping stations were planned and a large reservoir basin was designed to furnish water to the series of mains and pipes installed underground throughout the city providing pure, sanitary water suitable for drinking, bathing and other purposes.⁴

The plans were discussed, criticized, revised, endorsed and finally approved. Bids were let and the most reliable local contractors were awarded contracts for the new public waterworks. Construction began. Excavation for the public reservoir was completed, and filter plants and drain basins were laid out, technical machinery and equipment for the pumping stations were purchased, a new municipal main pipe line system was laid down connecting up with the stations and reservoir and intermediate underground pipes were linked up with the large mains to insure a full supply of water and high water pressure in the hydrants.

Mayor Phinizy, Commissioner Wingfield, city councilmen, members of the public works department and citizens were well pleased with the completed system. The entire cost had

only amounted to \$351,480.68. Samples of filtered water were found, after chemical analysis, to be "not only satisfactory, but remarkably pure" and well suited for domestic purposes. Water service in the city and suburbs had materially improved. New applications for connecting up private pipes to the public mains steadily increased. Furthermore, tests of the fire hydrants for water pressure proved to be satisfactory. There was no doubt that the danger of conflagrations in the central business district and the growing suburbs was considerably reduced since dozens of fire plugs had been installed at crucial intervals throughout the town.

5

To the Augusta Fire Department the commercial-financial section of the city from Greene Street to Bay Street between Fifth and Thirteenth streets was the "congested district." In the central business district buildings were jammed next to each other, few fire escapes existed in the multi-story structures and even fewer had indoor fire sprinklers and fire alarm systems. Overhead high-tension wires threatened fire fighters when hooks and ladders were erected. Intermittently, several major fires threatened entire city blocks as combustible cotton bales in storage warehouses ignited or stocks in retail stores exploded. Undetected minor blazes soon became major conflagrations as strong winds, blowing

in just the right direction, rapidly spread the flames to the adjacent buildings. The fires often burned freely until they had ravaged the entire buildings. Left were charred, blackened walls and burned, warped and disfigured tin roofs on top of the hollowed skeletal remains of buildings. Many stores contiguous to the scene of disaster were badly scorched and smoke damaged. The loss of buildings, machinery and stock frequently amounted to several thousands of dollars. Dozens of small retail and wholesale establishments were destroyed. Some major warehouses, hotels and a few smaller factories were also destroyed, the losses running into four figures.

Fires had also frequently swept through the southern and western portions of the city, damaging private homes and in some cases destroying entire dwellings and partially ruining adjacent cottages. Fire Chief Frank J. Roulett pointed out that the "long run" from headquarters on Broad to the scene of the fires in the new residential sections frequently permitted fires to spread before hose wagons and men arrived. The rapid growth of the city, both in the south and the west, dictated the need for new fire stations in order to give those sections better fire protection. Furthermore, in the chief's opinion, the old engines, wagons and equipment purchased in the 1870's were no longer serviceable nor

dependable, frequently breaking down at the critical moment of need. Even some of the newer engines acquired in the early 1890's were giving way under the severe strain of annual service and needed either overhauling or replacing. For several consecutive years he had called attention to the urgent needs of his department, but many mayors had only issued public notices deploring recurrent fires, but expressing thankfulness that few lives had been sacrificed, commenting upon the fortunate small number of persons who had been slightly injured and lamenting the destruction of property. Public opinion of many officials seemed to reflect the attitude that private citizens were largely responsible for their own fire protection. Mayor Phinizy concurred with Chief Roulett that adequate fire protection was a matter for civil government, explaining that if fires in the downtown, factory or residential districts were to ever get out of control they could easily threaten the destruction of an entire section, if not the city.

Securing cooperation from the council, Mayor Phinizy authorized the construction of a new, modern, uniform fire department. The old style "Sylvester Hydrants" were replaced with standard size fire hydrants throughout the city as part of the central planning of the waterworks department. Faster response of fire fighters was achieved by the

installation of almost 200 cast iron fire alarm boxes in all parts of the city, expediting the report of fires, eliminating a great deal of confusion at central headquarters and providing a more uniform, centralized fire alarm system. New fire engines, hose wagons, trusses of ladders and reels were purchased. Old cumbersome rubber hoses, brittle in the winter and soft in the summer, were replaced with lighter, more durable and flexible fabric hoses. New life lines, belts, nets and ladders were bought. Furthermore, the removal of empty barrels, boxes and other debris from the rear of buildings, alleys, streets and lots was encouraged by periodic inspections by fire department officials. Additional men were recruited and trained. And, above all, new fire companies were built, equipped, manned and in operation providing greater protection in the southern and western sections of the city.⁶

Modern Augusta, in the mayor's opinion, also needed a new central police station. Accommodations for the detention of prisoners were inadequate. There were too few cells, often causing overcrowding and locking up of whites, blacks, males and females together. Occasionally, on a particularly wild weekend, lawbreakers were forced to loiter in the hallways and even sleep in them. There was no interrogation room for prisoners when they were brought in. Facilities

for the officers of the law were equally amiss. No adequate offices were available for the chief of police, sergeants, lieutenants and patrolmen. There was no drill room, no gymnasium and no adequate sleeping quarters for officers on the early morning shift.

Police officials also acknowledged the new social problems of a growing city. Certain "suspicious houses" in the Shake Rag district were operating strictly for "immoral purposes." "Strumpets, plying their vocation upon the public thoroughfares in a most shameful manner," embarrassed, annoyed and alarmed the good citizens of the community. "Notorious women violators of the law" were arrested, prosecuted and fined, but for inexplicable reasons they returned to their old habits, displaying their wares and offering their services. There were widespread complaints that the police department was shirking its duties in this respect of law enforcement. Bums, beggars, loafers, thugs, rogues and gamblers frequented the city. "Gaming establishments," complete with cards, chips, tables and wheels were known to exist and it was common gossip that many "well-known" people frequented the establishments. On certain streets and alleys were bars well known for their weekend brawls and general knock-down-drag-out fights.

Mayor Phinizy believed that some of the social problems

of a growing community could be resolved. The downtown and outlying districts could be policed more effectually by the construction of a new police alarm system which would be hooked up with the fire department system. Police on duty could be more readily dispatched to break up disturbances. To assist the patrolling of the business and residential areas, he recommended the purchase of several bicycles and the training of "Bike Cops" to patrol these beats. "Wheelmen," rather than foot patrolmen, would afford better protection. The desperate need to build a new police headquarters was discussed by the mayor, chief of police, members of the police commission and city councilmen, but nothing apparently materialized. Action transpired in the realm of hiring more officers to patrol the city and enforce city ordinances more rigidly.⁷

"Beautify the City" was the slogan of the progressive-minded reformers and citizens. Many were certain that the time would come when the city would be more congested and densely populated than at present. It was exceedingly important to plan for the future in the realm of public parks. It was believed to be conducive to the health, happiness and beauty of the city to improve May Park, create a "long" park on Greenc, convert the old settling basin on Fifteenth Street into an interior park in the central city and build

a new Lake View Park near the Augusta Country Club, Bon Air Hotel region of western Augusta. The supporters of a city-wide park program were convinced that immediate and future benefits would be provided for the majority of the people in the city.

The Chronicle had for several years advocated that the city build public parks. Patrick Walsh had gone before the City Council and requested that the city utilize certain properties to improve the appearance of the city. Many city councilmen and influential citizens had worked faithfully, energetically and wholeheartedly, enlisting the cooperation of women's and social clubs and drumming up public enthusiasm for park projects. Many prominent, wealthy and influential civic leaders crusaded for public parks. For several years the matter was fully discussed in the papers of the city, debated by members of the City Council and commended by Augustans. Finally, after the civic leaders and reading public had fully evaluated the proposition, the city government began to implement a program of action.

The beautification of Greene Street came first in order of importance in the city-wide park program since it was a notable residential boulevard with many fine stately homes and a cluster of some of the most important institutions in the city, if not the state. The Richmond Academy, public

library and county courthouse were on Greene. Nearly all the major religious denominations--Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Catholics--had their churches built along this broad avenue. The Medical College of Georgia was located just one block off Greene. But much to the dismay of residents, politicians, ministers, doctors, professors and visitors, an unsightly, smelly, open drainage ditch ran down the middle of the street. Most of the homes and buildings dumped their raw sewage materials into the culvert. Mayor Phinizy, Councilman Richard E. Allen, Commissioner Nisbet Wingfield and others suggested that the city officials and property owners cooperate in converting the street into a "long" park as each block was filled, leveled and sodded by the city. Women's clubs, church groups and civic organizations could help in the conversion of the area through the early stages by planting grass, shrubs, flowers and trees. Memorial fountains could be placed in the park, appropriately named for the persons in whose memory they were given. The city, in return, would see to it that underground utility pipes were laid and that the park would be kept up. Benches would be installed, walkways paved and "The Greene" would be furnished with free water and maintained with perpetual care. Thus, to the delight of residents, citizens, civic leaders and out-of-town visitors, an unsightly gutter

fringed with straggling weeds was converted into a beautiful park some two and a half miles in length.⁸

All of the reform attention, however, was not directed toward just that part of the town. There was need for a "central interior park" on the corner of Fifteenth and Walton Way, especially because of its particular locality in the midst of the heavily populated, tenement factory district. "These people who are shut up in the walls of a factory all day long and who during the hot summer months must remain cooped up in tenement houses," the Chronicle informed its readers, "would find an attractive park in this locality, provided with shaded walks, cooling fountains, and comfortable benches, a God-send in the long summer evenings, and for their children during the day. These people cannot afford to get on the street cars and avail themselves of the woods or even the parks on the outer limits of the city and suburbs, but would delight in a park in five minutes walk of their homes. Such a park is needed now, and will be needed more and more with the growth of the city and the progress of the years."⁹

Councilmen Richard E. Allen and Irving Alexander and Commissioner Nisbet Wingfield appealed to the council in behalf of the working class families not to sell the old water basin area but to convert it into a public park. In

a utilitarian age, they admitted, it was exceedingly difficult for the average politician and businessman to comprehend that public parks were far more valuable to the life, health and happiness of the city than the sale of the property so that homes and buildings could be erected. But, they reasoned, in the very near future the city would be solidly built from the East Boundary to Summerville in the western section of the town. It would be far easier to set aside available land for a city park while it was still unimproved property than it would be in the future to condemn occupied blocks or attempt to buy up acreage at inflated prices.

The old basin property was advantageously situated in the midst of modest home dwellers and down the hill from Summerville and Monte Sano. There was no recreational area in that section of the town. A public park replete with sandpiles, swings, benches, tables, fountains, trees, shrubs and thick grass would provide working parents and children with a wholesome recreational area, an ideal country spot for relaxation in the midst of their busy, hectic work-a-day life. Their cramped, barren and sordid way of life could find momentary escape from the drudgery of the factory and their limited living quarters. Some pointed out that since the working class people were too far away from Greene

Street and May Park, they could not afford to have a nurse or attendant walk their children to those areas and watch over them while they played. They emphasized that it would be a "poor man's earthly paradise", a "haven" for the factory workers and their families making them better employees and citizens.

Rich silt deposits were dredged from the Augusta Canal and dumped into the central park in order to fill some of the depressions. The area was then graded, leveled and turfed. Willow and ginko trees were planted. Benches were placed at various scenic spots overlooking the basin and canal so that ladies, children, gentlemen and visitors could rest. A baseball diamond and tennis courts were added to the playground area. As part of the beautification program of the new Allen Park, as it became known, a white masonry arch driveway was constructed over the canal causeway. Thus the old settling basin was converted into a park area for the benefit of the "manufacturing people."¹⁰

One of the first city parks had seen better days as a recreation site. May Park, neglected by both city and citizens, had steadily deteriorated. "The park itself is walled in waste, almost impenetrable, ugly to the eye and is no good to either city, man or beast," a Tribune reporter noted. "The place is an eye sore to the city." A map in

the City Council showed that it consisted of "beautiful avenues, handsome driveways, excellent reposing places, cool springs and refreshingly green plazas," but that was a distortion of reality. Like the old settling basin area, some advocated the sale of the property for the express purpose of constructing new homes in that area. Others strongly resisted such a policy, reasoning that once the old park was leveled and sold off in lots, the city and citizens would lose a valuable recreation site that could be restored. Instead of such an action, leading councilmen recommended rejuvenation of the park by government and civic organizations. May Park was saved. Dead branches were cut off the trees. Decayed, rotten trees were chopped down and young nursery-grown trees--maples, oaks, elms, ashes--were planted. A number of drives and graveled walks were laid out. Grass seeds were sown and fertilized.¹¹

In addition to The Greene, Allen and May Parks, many people suggested that a new park be planned in the extreme western region of the city near the Country Club. A public-minded city government and patriotic politicians, it was believed, should initiate actions to construct grassy slopes and driveways through the woods surrounding Lake Olmstead, thereby not only creating a grand Lake View Park as a show-piece to impress out-of-town guests and daily visitors, but

increasing the value of property and encouraging the development of a new residential suburban area for the growing metropolis.

One More Time

After the conclusion of the "Great Textile Strike of 1898-1899," an uneasy peace emerged in the mills of "Greater Augusta." Discouraged by their failure to force management to raise wages, many operatives capitulated in sullen acquiescence, perceiving that reconciliation with management was essential to their daily subsistence. From 1899-1902 there was a lull in the conflicts between local textile capitalism and the national unions' "Southern Campaign," roughly corresponding with the American Federation of Labor's drive into the neighboring Carolina milltowns of Greenwood, Abbeville, Bath, Durham, Greensboro and Fayetteville.¹²

A series of "mini-strikes," however, revealed the continuation of tensions with the new industrial city. President Dennis P. O'Connell of the Machinists and Boilermaker's union attempted to effect a complete organization of all machinists, iron makers, blacksmiths, boilermakers, copper-smiths, steam pipe fitters, tanners, cornice workers and plumbers into one union for the purpose of increasing Augusta wages in proportion to salaries paid to machinists

in Atlanta, Macon and Savannah. William G. Gredig, President of the Georgia Federation of Labor, arrived in the city, attended O'Connell's meetings and talked about the great advantages of organized labor, emphasizing reduction in hours and increase in pay for all union workers. Encouraged by such statements and convinced of the imperative need to raise wages in proportion to salaries paid in other Georgia cities, Augusta labor leaders called a city-wide strike in the machine shops. But in subsequent labor-management conferences so many concessions were demanded of the union leaders that, as one observer said, "the nine-hour day was practically the only thing left." And even it was disputed, the owners arguing that a nine-hour day would be granted only when it became an accepted nation-wide policy. Meetings were brief; owners listened attentively, refused to make any concessions and politely departed. Nothing was accomplished. The strike which had begun with such high hopes ended in complete failure shortly after it began and labor leaders, reluctantly, albeit necessarily, were again forced to capitulate.¹³

A second "mini-strike" occurred at the Sibley Mill on the eve of the Christmas holidays. The precipitating factor was again the announcement that there would be a cut in pay. President John W. Chafee announced that the new reduction in

wages was necessary because the plant was producing a narrower piece of cloth which took less time to weave, hence, wages for weavers were dropped accordingly. A special committee of weavers protested the reduction in wages and demanded restoration of the original scale of pay, but to no avail. A brief strike ensued, but was resolved quickly to the disadvantage of the employees. "Go back to your looms weavers," the leading newspaper advised, "and let us all be ready to welcome with joy in our hearts the anniversary of the coming of Him who is the Prince of Peace."¹⁴

The prelude to the Augusta textile strike of 1902 was the arrival of "labor agents" from the Carolinas and Massachusetts and the setbacks of the American Federation of Labor's "Southern Campaign" in other southeastern states. Efforts were again being redirected back to the "Augusta stronghold" in 1902. The owners of the Augusta textile mills pointed out that "emigrant agents" from Columbia had arrived seeking support for strikers and attempting to stir up dissension in their cotton factories. They viewed with alarm that dodgers were being freely distributed and posted in public places, telling their mill operatives of the raging conflicts. Such literature, they predicted, was a prelude to an attack.¹⁵

Assembling in Red Men's Hall at the corner of Broad Street and Crawford Avenue, mill operatives listened attentively to Albert Hibbert, General Secretary of the United Textile Union. Hibbert, a resident of Fall River, Massachusetts, told them that after canvassing the factory district he was genuinely alarmed at the conditions he observed. Textile workers were working longer hours and receiving far less pay than New England operatives. Even in other Georgia cities, he claimed, wages were far better. Furthermore, he was appalled at the number of little children, aged ten to twelve years and older, working for mere pittance. Such situations--long hours, low pay, child labor--were intolerable. He advocated that local textile workers unite solidly, gradually build up a large treasury with which to fight organized capital, dogmatically demand that these adverse conditions be changed, and, if no responses came from the owners of the mills, shut them down by walking off their jobs. If they were solidly organized and had substantial treasury, they could render to the mill owners an ultimatum: "Come to it, or shut down your mill."¹⁶

Hibbert, according to the local newspaper, was a "typical labor agitator" whose speech was decidedly "rabid"; in general parlance, "hot stuff," and infected with a great

deal of "bitterness"; "offensively so." Not only was he a resident of Massachusetts--not Georgia--but his accent, "with its silent and accentuated h's stamp him as English-born to the core," the Chronicle informed its readers.¹⁷

Other "outside agitators" from Fall River "drifted" into town. "The individual operatives in Augusta were content until local and foreign agitators began work here," the Chronicle stated. It further expressed faith that the most mill operatives would remain "sensible people," recognizing that owners were not making sufficient profits, hence, could not afford higher salaries.¹⁸

Augusta mill workers presented their demand to the John P. King mill for a 10 per cent across-the-board increase in wages, fixing March 17 as the ultimate date on which they would wait for compliance. On that date, if no conciliations were made, they announced that the textile workers would stage a "walk-out." They also indicated that once the walk-out was effected in the King mill, all of the other mills in the Augusta district would be forced to close down as their employees joined in sympathy.

The management of King mill, however, maintained that for the past year, and longer, it had not paid out sufficient dividends. Higher pay to the workers would mean depriving owners of their rightful earnings. King mill

authorities also informed the would-be strikers that all the mills in the Augusta district belonged to the Manufacturer's Association, and all were in accordance that no pay raise was justifiable when owners were being deprived of just rewards. If the mill workers united in a "conspiracy" against the mills, the mills in turn would unite in a "lock out" until all workers came to their senses.

The Chronicle advised the workers to realize that a general strike would ensue, seriously jeopardizing their economic livelihood and rendering a grievous "blow to the business of the city." "Not only will all the operatives suffer, but all the merchants with whom they do business will lose the revenue which heretofore they have regularly received from the wages of these operatives." Such losses in wages and revenues, it estimated, would be in excess of \$50,000 per month; most of which went directly into the channels of local trade. To stop this flow of cash would seriously cripple the business prosperity of merchants, bankers, financiers and industrialists not to mention create tremendous hardships for laborers. The Chronicle further advised that a special commission of representatives "from their own number" ought to confer with officials from the Manufacturer's Association and request positive proof that the mills in the Association were not in a financial

position to afford the increase in wages that was being demanded. Provided with such proof, they should then recognize the futility of their demands.¹⁹

But neither local labor officials, national union organizers nor the representatives of the Association sought to enter into negotiations. Both sides were content to wait quietly for the seventeenth of March to arrive, neither side making any overtures to avert the impending clash. "The operatives seem to have no just appreciation of the seriousness of the situation which they are about to precipitate themselves into. They are entering upon this strike as though it were a lark, and they expect the small help they are to get from the National Textile Union to support them in idleness, pay house rent, and take the place of their earnings in the mills." Such actions were "sheer folly."²⁰

The impending mill strike scheduled for March 17, however, was postponed owing to a Fall River strike which temporarily diverted the attention of the national labor organizers. Local union officials, owing to this changed situation, hesitated to take the decisive step which would initiate a strike-lockout. Many moderate business leaders hoped that the Fall River trouble would avert a strike in Augusta. But their hopes were unrealistic.

It was reported that in Massachusetts, the United

Textile Workers of America were successful in winning their request for a 10 per cent advance in wages. The various textile mills granted the increase in salaries and the mills resumed their production. Encouraged by the relatively easy victory and "dizzy with success," the members of the national executive organization returned certain that they would triumph in the South.²¹

A meeting was held in Red Men's Hall and a select committee was appointed to call on the directors of the King mill and representatives of the Manufacturer's Association, requesting them to capitulate and accept their demands for a pay raise. At a joint meeting directors and representatives of the mills were informed that unless the mills increased their wages by 10 per cent effective April 7, the workers would walk off their jobs, forcing the plants to suspend their operations. Union officials acknowledged that they hoped that such action would be unnecessary.

President Landon A. Thomas of the King mill presided in a series of labor-management conferences, speaking for the other mill presidents and defending the Association's position. First, he reiterated that the mills were not making sufficient profits for their owners; that, while they deplored the possibility of a general strike, under the circumstances they had no alternative but to refuse the

unreasonable demands. If necessary, the Association was willing to submit the business records for examination by a committee to verify this fact. Second, he believed that current wages paid were "substantially higher" than salaries paid outside of the immediate Augusta district, estimating that mill hands received 6 per cent higher wages in the Augusta region. Third, he stressed that certain other factors--lower cost of living, better climatic conditions, "congenial" relations with supervisors, inexpensive company-owned rentals--justified local textile workers receiving lower wages than those being paid in New England. Fourth, he reminded the workers of the enormous suffering--all needless, in his opinion--which would of necessity accompany the strike. A prolonged strike would mean the complete loss of wages during the duration of the conflict; money which would never be regained. Even after a protracted struggle, they could conceivably fail to secure their desired increase in wages. Their families would be subjected to a period of extreme hardship, deprived of even the most basic needs to sustain their existence. Fifth, he observed that a strike could seriously weaken, not strengthen the union; possibly destroying it. Lastly, he warned that if the union stubbornly persisted in calling a united strike, then the attack upon one mill justified the counteraction of closing down all the mills.

The members of the District Council of Textile Workers affiliated with the United Textile Workers, however, stated that they recognized the gravity of the situation and realized the high risks involved, but situations had "gone too far" to postpone the strike. "We have put the strike off once," Secretary P. M. Daniel stated, and "we cannot put this off again."²²

A Conciliation Committee of Ten, composed of representatives from the Chamber of Commerce, interceded hoping to avert the impending clash and to achieve some compromise and arrange a special meeting with the executive committee of the United Textile Union. Assuring the labor leaders that they were motivated "simply by a sense of public duty, and the desire to avert a conflict" they pledged to exert as much influence as possible to determine whether or not wages could be increased. They also pleaded with the union representatives to clearly recognize the immense problems that would accompany the strike, especially emphasizing that a prolonged strike would sharply reduce sales, seriously affect the general prosperity and effect all of society.²³

But no reconciliations, compromises nor further negotiations were achieved. The Manufacturer's Association was in session the entire day preceding the announced day of the strike. The labor union district council was in conference that evening.

On April 7 the workers assembled quietly before the two main gates of the King mill. When the last bell rang they crowded into the buildings, walking swiftly to their looms and taking their assigned positions before their machines; but the day's work did not begin. The union leaders with their badges boldly displayed on their jackets quietly walked down the aisles. The operatives fell in behind and en mass they quickly walked together out the central door of the main building, crossed the factory yard, walked through the front gates and crossed the street where they gathered in the vacant lot near the canal. "There was no confusion, no fuss, no disorder and not a harsh word or action. They did not linger in the yard or in front of the mill property, and few spoke until the bridge had been reached. There they were not boisterous. Everything was subdued." Two police patrol wagons and a squad of ten officers stood by. A few officers patrolled the two gates and the remainder of the detachment strolled over to the nearby bridge which spanned the canal, preventing idlers from blocking traffic.

From the Fifteenth Street bridge the strikers marched to Red Man's Hall, where a strike committee registered them. Union officials addressed the assembled strikers urging moderation, recommending no violence, cautioning them to stay off the streets, stay away from the mills, go home and keep a "stiff upper lip."

The Aiken Manufacturing Company, Warrenville, Graniteville and Langley mills were also shut down in a general company lock-out, throwing some 7,000 hands out of work and effecting approximately 20,000 people.²⁴

In an effort to bring the strike to an early conclusion a conference between an executive committee of strikers and the Manufacturer's Association convened. It was finally agreed that the strikers must formulate their grievances and submit them to the managers of the King mill with proof to sustain their claims. Subsequently, the complaints were drafted, enumerated and officially presented to the Manufacturer's Association. The presidents, directors, executive officers and superintendents evaluated the complaints, but concluded that the strikers had no just complaints. The existing scale of wages was not lower than salaries being paid to employees in the region, but, indeed, 6 per cent higher. Management had not resorted to lowering wages; therefore it was not to blame for precipitating the strike. Furthermore, after an investigation of the financial records of the corporations, proof existed that stockholders were not receiving adequate returns on their investment. The unanimous verdict was that the union had failed to make a case against King mill and all the mills in the district.

In accordance with these findings, President Landon A.

Thomas wrote a letter to the union officials informing them that under no circumstances was it possible for the King mill--nor for that matter, any of the mills in the Association--to pay the 10 per cent increase. An investigation of their complaints had not sustained their contentions. The strike had been "ill-advised and ill-timed." It "did not originate from any real dissatisfaction among the King mill operatives, but was the result of outside interference and the advice of unwise leaders." "The strikers have made a mistake," he concluded. "Let them concede it and go back to work."²⁵

A special South Carolina Labor Delegation, hand picked by the Manufacturer's Association, was invited to investigate the King mill's books to discern whether the report was accurate and if it was paying comparable wages to all mills in the Augusta district. After examining the pay roll records, they concluded that the strikers were unjustified in their demands for an increase and publicly stated that the strike should end. In speaking to assembled crowds of strikers, the members of the special delegation told them that they could find no cause for grievance about the pay scale of the King mill, nor any of the other mills. Their investigation had revealed no discrepancies between pay rates for workers in any of the mills. They affirmed

that President Thomas had assured them if, in the future, any discrepancies were proven to exist, he would personally investigate the matter and correct it. President Thomas had even beneficently promised to "give the strikers the opportunity to go to work if they will." In their opinion there existed no grievances, real or imaginary, for calling the strike or continuing it. They advised the strikers to return to work.²⁶

The investigations, reports and recommendations of the Special South Carolina Labor Delegation committee created a serious internal clash between the union and non-union workers. Non-union forces maintained that they had been coerced into joining the walk-out at the instigation of the labor leaders. Furthermore, they had been forced to join the union even though they did not believe in it, nor support its cause. To compound their grievances, they had not received any assistance from the established union commissaries. Moreover, no funds had been dispatched from the United Textile Workers. They further believed that with the evidence reported the strike must end.

The Textile Strike of 1902 was rapidly coming to an end. At first, only small groups of hands returned to work at the King mill, but within a few days large numbers reported to work at the other mills. "If the strike leaders

do not fall in line and declare the strike off they will find themselves deserted by the operatives. They are tired of the strike and want to go to work."²⁷

The bells of every mill in the Augusta district rang out at six o'clock in the morning, May 28, 1902. "It will be a joyous peal that these long silent bells will send forth this morning. Even the citizen whose early morning nap is disturbed by the clanging of the bells will hail it as music to his ears. The whole town wouldn't mind being aroused by their noise, and to the idle and discontented operatives their peal will send a welcome summons. It means an end to the idleness and non-productiveness. It means an end to short rations from an inadequate commissary. It means an end to waiting for remittances from the East that were to give \$2 a week to each operator, but which never came. It means receiving full pay on a regular pay day. It means an end to eating the bread of charity, and the renewal of that independence which every breadwinner feels who earns his own living and charity of no man."²⁸

The Augusta Textile strike of 1902 had failed partially because the united mills of the Manufacturer's Association were too powerful, but largely due to disruptive internal forces within the United Textile Workers Union of America. The split between union members and non-union sympathizers

insured success for management and prevented the attainment of union victory. National labor representatives sent an estimated \$10,000 in relief funds, but it was not sufficient to sustain the strike effort for a prolonged period. The confrontation between labor and management in 1902 terminated the conflicts between lintheads and capitalists, except for brief sporadic strikes on the eve of World War I. "Textile unionism took its last big chance in Augusta, Georgia, in 1902 and lost," John S. Ezell observed in The South Since 1865. "After fifteen weeks, the union conceded defeat, and, having lost virtually all of its strikes, the United Textile Workers temporarily withdrew from the South."²⁹

NOTES

1. Augusta Chronicle, October 13, 1901.
2. Ibid., June 22, August 23, December 21, 1902, June 16, 1903; Thomas D. Clark and Albert D. Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 79-80; John S. Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 180-182.
3. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 570-571; Augusta Chronicle, January 8, 1901.
4. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 22.
5. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 570-571; The Mayor's Messages, Department Reports and Accompanying Documents for the Year 1899 (Augusta: The Chronicle Job Printing Company, 1900), 38.
6. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 29-33; The Mayor's Message, Department Reports and Accompanying Documents for the Year 1899 (Augusta: The Chronicle Job Printing Company, 1900), 71-72; The Mayor's Message and Official Reports of the Departments of the City of Augusta for the Year 1900 (Augusta: Chronicle Printing Company, 1901), 59, 110-111; The Mayor's Message and Official Documents of the Departments of the City of Augusta for the Year 1901 (Augusta: Phoenix Printing Company, 1902), 132-133; Augusta Chronicle, March 26, April 17, May 1, 1898, February 8, 1900, March 6, May 9, August 18, September 11, 1901, January 7, 1902.
7. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 349-350, 434; "Minutes of the City Council, January 6, 1902-December 29, 1909," 37, 46; Augusta Chronicle, April 28, 1897, January 19, February 8, 1902.

8. Augusta Chronicle, February 22, 1901.
9. Ibid., April 3, 1903.
10. The City Council of Augusta, Georgia Year Book for 1905 (Augusta: Augusta Chronicle Job Office, 1906), 69; The City Council of Augusta, Georgia Year Book for 1906 (Augusta: Phoenix Printing Company, 1907), 142; Augusta Chronicle, January 25, 1900, February 2, November 8, 1902, April 3, 1903.
11. Augusta Daily Tribune, February 21, 1904.
12. George S. Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1931), 29-30; Ezell, The South Since 1865, 204-205.
13. Augusta Chronicle, June 1, 5, 11, 12, July 10, August 1, 1901.
14. Ibid., December 10, 11, 1901.
15. Ibid., September 3, 1901.
16. Ibid., February 26, 1902.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., February 23, 1902.
19. Ibid., March 9, 13, 1902.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., March 16, 18, 1902.
22. Ibid., March 29, April 3, 4, 6, 1902.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., April 8, 9, 1902.
25. Ibid., April 26, May 2, 1902.
26. Ibid., April 22, 1902.
27. Ibid., April 23, 1902.

28. Ibid., May 28, 1902.

29. Mitchell, Textile Unionism and the South, 22, 30, 34-38; Ezell, The South Since 1865, 205. Mitchell's study of southern textile unionism emphasizes that from 1902-1913 a "period of silence" ensued, but in 1913 a strike in Atlanta triggered off a series of local disturbances throughout the state, spreading into Alabama, South Carolina, and eastern Tennessee and lasting through till 1918. He further stresses that Augusta was once again the focal point of conflict, but municipal newspaper files fail to substantiate his thesis. A strike did erupt in January, 1913, but arbitration quickly terminated the conflict before it became a major battle between local capitalists versus national labor leaders. There were no significant textile strikes in the war years because labor unions had been successfully defeated and industrial wages had been finally increased. The outbreak of World War I apparently created an inflationary price-wage spiral. Mill owners, in an effort to retain employees and prevent them from securing higher-paying jobs elsewhere, were pressured into raising wages of lintheads in all Augusta-owned mills. The main center of union activism, strikes and labor disputes, moreover, had clearly shifted from the textile industries to the inter-urban trolley lines and the railroad transportation system in the period, 1911-1914. Augusta Chronicle, January 13, 17, 1913, November 10, 21, 28, 29, December 3, 1916, January 22, 1917.

CHAPTER VI

THE TRIUMPH OF THE REFORM SPIRIT

Like Father, Like Son

During the Phinizy Administration there was considerable talk about his successor. Several well-known citizens were prominently mentioned to be the next chief magistrate of the city. William A. Latimer, chairman of the powerful finance committee, was regarded as the logical candidate for the mayor. He had often been asked to run for mayor and more than once his "lawn had been trampled down" by enthusiastic supporters who wanted him to declare his candidacy. Latimer, however, declined. "Cap" William B. Young was also regarded as "strong before the people." Many were impressed by his distinguished business career and his previous term as mayor of the city was regarded as one of the most successful administrations since the Civil War. Captain Young in 1903, however, was of the opinion that a younger generation of leaders should assume the responsibilities of a growing city. Both men, along with a host of others, were champions of Richard E. Allen as a solid

citizen, safe in counsel, progressive in administration and careful and thorough in all matters he undertook.¹

Richard E. Allen was a native Augustan. Indeed he was from one of the most prominent, established "pioneer families" of the city. His maternal grandfather was Dr. Joseph A. Eve, an influential physician instrumental in founding the Medical College of Georgia. His great grandfather, Joseph Eve, was also a distinguished doctor. Joseph V. H. Allen, his father, had been a prominent businessman, founding J. V. H. Allen and Company at 737 Broad Street. Allen Insurance Company was acknowledged to be one of the "strongest and staunchest" insurance firms in the city. Though he was exempt from military service, at the outbreak of the Civil War, Joseph Allen had joined Company A, Oglethorpe Infantry Division, and was commissioned as a first-lieutenant. By the close of the war he had attained the rank of major. The Major in the postwar city resumed his personal business activities and also assisted in the founding of other enterprises.

He had become a director of the Commercial Bank of Augusta, the Augusta and Knoxville Railroad Company, the Augusta, Chicago and Elberton Railroad Company and a trustee of the Augusta Free School and Augusta Orphan Asylum. Several different times he served with honor on the City

Council. In 1870 he had been elected mayor guiding "the destinies of the city during the trying Reconstruction days." His administration was "distinguished by conservatism, ability, and faithfulness." Mayor Allen, in his inaugural address, had strongly recommended improvement and enlargement of the canal, maintaining that the "first" canal was no longer providing sufficient water power for existing mills, much less for new cotton factories. In national politics he was a member of the Democratic National Convention that nominated Samuel J. Tilden for the Presidency of the United States. At the Georgia State Democratic convention he was also a member who had fought, with Patrick Walsh, for the nomination of Governor Colquitt.

Richard E. Allen and his brother, George Henry Allen, assumed management of their father's insurance agency when he died in 1883. Two years later his brother died and "Dick" Allen became the sole owner and manager of the firm. Like his father, Dick Allen continued to show promise in business and political affairs, becoming prominent in real estate, banking and city politics. He was considered to be one of the largest holders of real estate in the city and especially in the suburbs. From 1892-1896 he was a principal member of the board of tax assessors of the city. In 1893 he was elected President of the Augusta Real Estate and

Building Association. He was a director on the board of two banks and several of the leading cotton mills in the city. Like Patrick Walsh and Jacob Phinizy, he had served on various important committees after being elected to the city council to represent the second ward. He succeeded Alfred M. Martin, Jr. to the chairmanship of the fire department committee upon Martin's death. Mayor Phinizy expressed confidence in Allen's ability to assume the responsibility of one of the major committees of city government. As a youthful forty-year-old city councilman, he was identified as being "progressive and public spirited," championing continued commercial and industrial growth as well as sponsoring many of Mayor Phinizy's municipal reform projects.

From all over the city came support from influential citizens requesting Allen to make the race. Many believed that it was extraordinarily fitting and proper that the son of a former mayor who had "guided the destinies of the city during the trying Reconstruction days" follow in the footsteps of his father, representing two successive generations of influence in municipal politics. In their opinion, Allen displayed the "innate kindness, courtesy and gentleness" of a "perfect Chesterfield in his manners," retaining many of the qualities and traditions of the "Cavalier days." His supporters pointed out that he was not only from the "best

stock," but he was a man of great business abilities and was extremely well informed on public affairs. They pointed with pride to his achievements in the council and stressed that he was a man who seldom failed in any of his endeavors.²

Yielding to the broad popular demand, Allen stated that he had never asked for such a high office before, nor would he do so now were it not for the request of his friends to honor the city by carrying on in the reform tradition. Accordingly, he announced his candidacy in the summer of 1903. "Everyone in this city," the Chronicle observed, "has known that his friends have not only had him in the race, but in it so actively as to preclude the possibility of any serious opposition to his candidacy."³

After officially announcing his intentions to run for mayor, the Chronicle extolled his qualifications for office, emphasizing his personal abilities, business experiences, political activities and family connections. First, it noted that Allen had "great popularity and accessibility to all classes of citizens. . . . His manner is amiable and it is seldom if ever that he gets ruffled for any cause whatever. There is no time that he cannot spare a few minutes to the most humble of citizens and the fact that he displayed this same amiable temperament long before he ever sought public honor evidences its genuineness. There is no

man in the city who has animosity or objection to Dick Allen personally nor has there been one argument advanced against his candidacy on account of any act of his in the past. He is a hale fellow, well met with everyone and is at the same time one of the most successful business men of city."

Second, "he has by his own efforts built up a handsome fortune and he is a liberal giver to any movement that has for its object the material advancement of Augusta or the well being of the people. During the great mill strike of a year ago he remitted the rent of every one of his many houses in the west end that were tenanted by mill operatives." Third, "he is well fitted for mayor from the standpoint of experience as average man in the city. He served three years in the city council, and has been a member of all the prominent committees. He has served on the finance, fire department and other committees where the real workings of the city government are learned and was a valued member of each whose advice was always considered sound. During his service in council he was a strong advocate of parks to be put in the populous settlements of the city, and especially in those places where the residents cannot afford to take summer vacations during the heated term." Fourth, he was the sole proprietor of one of the oldest and most reliable business firms in the city. "The firm name is J. V. H. Allen and

Company, the name under which his father started the business a half a century ago, and which has never changed in respect to the memory of his father, who has gone down in history as one of the most aggressive and business-like mayors Augusta ever had." Fifth, "he puts his surplus earnings into more real estate and bids fair to become the largest holder in the entire city. A man whose all is invested in Augusta can safely be relied on to look after the interests of the municipality very thoroughly." Lastly, the Chronicle noted with pride that Allen promised a "safe and progressive administration," eschewing political corruption, defending "pure elections" and promising a continuation of municipal reforms.⁴

It was at first hoped that Allen's candidacy would not be contested, but it was soon evident that one person had no intention of permitting him to run unopposed for the most important political office in the city. John Allen Mette, the editor of the Voice of Labor, declared in numerous public addresses and editorials that he represented a new combination of voters that "hell itself cannot beat." But Mette was wrong. He did not stand a chance.⁵

Allen conducted a very quiet campaign. He made no lengthy speeches, stumped no wards of the city, nor engaged in any gusty debates with his rival. Nor was there any of

the traditional hoop-la of election campaigns. No fireworks exploded, no brass bands boom-de-ayed and no kegs were tapped and no money was exchanged in public. Election day found Mette visiting polling booths, greeting voters, smiling and shaking hands, trying to influence the voters. Allen, in contrast, quietly walked to the second ward polling booth, cast his ballot and left quickly. He refused to make any appearances or to resort to "hustling."

In the white primary election of July, 1903, Allen was overwhelmingly victorious, receiving a total of 2,419 votes against Mette's 606 ballots. Allen's nomination for mayor was formally ratified at the polls in the regular election held in December, 1903. No opponent ran against him and Allen won a grand total of 746 votes.⁶

Resurgence of the Reform Spirit

Much to the chagrin of the good government reformers, vote-buying and vote-selling continued to prevail. Reliable citizens publicly recognized and commented freely upon the commonly practiced process of influencing the voters. Some candidates for council and their lieutenants bragged openly how they had "all the money that is necessary to carry the day," displaying their bank books showing deposits of thousands of dollars to be used in the election. It was widely known that the "market price" of votes in certain wards

ranged from ten to twenty dollars. "At certain precincts more purchasable votes were for sale and were bid for and paid for than ever before. In some instances as high as half the entire registry lists," the Chronicle estimated, "received money for their votes for one candidate or the other." "The use of money in this ward was plainly in evidence, and was not denied by either side," it commented on election strategy in the third ward. "Boodle and Booze" were given out in great quantities throughout the day. Within a few feet of the voting booth, what was known in common parlance as "banks" were in operation. "Into these voters were led by the workers, and after being gone three or four minutes, were led out and conducted to the polls. It was not denied that these were the paying off places." In the fourth ward "money was used lavishly, but not publicly. . . . Both sides had barrels and bought floaters like sheep. Each side also conducted a business office with cashiers, bookkeepers, etc." Little or no effort was made to conceal the fact that the primary election had been a "battle of dollars," not a "battle of ballots."⁷

"Common sense tells us this is a menace to good government, to law and order," the Chronicle stated. "Political corruption must, AND WILL BE, exposed in this community to put an end to it," the city's leading and oldest daily

newspaper emphatically pledged. The Chronicle, Herald, Tribune and other newspapers joined in unison in calling for an end to corrupt election methods. The editors, owners and staffs believed that concerted action of the dailies would effectively revive public opinion. With the principal newspapers fighting against corrupt elections the "more reputable" people of the community would recognize the imperative need to participate in the crusade for good government reform. Their editorials and columns steadily and persistently revealed a new resurgence of the fight for "pure elections." They were convinced that reform had to be achieved or the city would cease to achieve material progress. And they were certain that publicity through constant exposure of those who were guilty of vote-buying would ultimately stop such practices. The Chronicle, especially, served notice that in future elections members of its staff would be stationed at the polling booths "GIVING FACTS AND NAMES, IF POSSIBLE," of all persons involved in illicit procedures. Such miscreants, furthermore, were not only guilty of political corruption, but they were a "disgrace to the white race."⁸

Daily editorials and exposes of the frauds perpetrated at the recent election were not without effect. Scores of "good citizens" telephoned, mailed letters, telegraphed

messages and dropped by the newspaper offices to congratulate the editors and journalists for their stand, announce that they heartily endorsed the new crusade against corrupt elections and pledge themselves to stand with the reformers in their battles. All the "decent people," the Chronicle stated, were aroused and determined to break up the corrupt practices in municipal politics. Merchants, bankers, doctors, teachers, preachers, workers and even incumbent politicians responded endorsing the crusade to "purify" or "cleanse" city elections.

Judge William T. Gary impanelled a Grand Jury and charged the jurors to direct their attention to the issue of vote-buying and vote-selling, stating that "If our people continue to prostitute the ballot, freedom will be but a name and liberty but a delusion. No republic, the foundation of which is manhood suffrage, can long endure when a corrupt electorate [sic] is permitted to decide elections. In the election of our officers merit should not come in competition with money." The judge urged all members of the jury, without regard to their personal opinions, to carefully inspect and examine the newspapers, books and official records of previous elections to determine to what extent, if any, political corruption had transpired. They were also invited to summon reputable witnesses from the community-at-

large to testify regarding any alleged misconduct at the polls. After deliberating, they were charged with the responsibility of presenting their findings and making specific recommendations as to how to best improve election methods in Augusta.

After diligently inquiring into the matter of the "traffic in votes," the Grand Jury presented its findings and enumerated its suggestions for reform. It vigorously deplored and condemned the "open and flagrant prostitution of the elective franchise." It heartily commended, however, the white primary system in its attempts to eliminate these "evils." Realizing, however, that the primary had not "fully met the requirements of the situation," the jury recommended that "stronger and more stringent rules" were obviously needed before purification of elections could be achieved. Accordingly, it recommended that all existing laws governing, controlling or in any way pertaining to general elections be made applicable to the primaries by the white primary committees. Secondly, all candidates henceforth would be required to take an oath obligating themselves not to "use money in any unlawful manner, either directly or indirectly, personally or otherwise." Nor should they resort to any "device or subterfuge in order to evade any of the election laws of the state or any of the

rules and regulations prescribed to by the proper authorities." Furthermore, each candidate must file with the secretary of the primary committee prior to elections a sworn statement of "every item of expense incurred by him and of every expenditure or contribution of every kind and character made by him." The making of contributions for other than "legitimate campaign expenses" was to be discontinued. Any acceptance of unnecessary campaign funds by a candidate would be regarded as prima facie evidence of corruption. Thirdly, if, prior to any election, it were ascertained that any candidate had violated the laws governing elections, that candidate would be excluded from the contest. Furthermore, if, after an election, a successful candidate were proven guilty of violating the laws, then the election should be voided and another election held. Fourth, the jury urged that all "good citizens," in sympathy with the cause of genuine reform, should unite together and pledge themselves to cooperate and form a permanent, private executive "club" or committee to carry out these suggestions. Lastly, it recommended that all clergymen, judges, politicians, proprietors and editors of the daily newspapers, business leaders, officers of the existing white primary system and all persons interested in "pure elections" and "clean politics" convene at the city court-

house for the purpose of ratifying their recommendations.

"With the best people of the community united; with leading citizens firm in declaration that vote-buying shall cease; with officers of the law positive in determination to correct the existing franchise evil; with all persons put fairly and squarely on notice that a 'halt' has been called, there will have arrived the time when purer politics and cleaner methods are assured."⁹

At the courthouse meeting, several thousand voters assembled carrying and waving transparencies bearing such mottoes as "Pure Elections," "Clean Government" and "Keep the Good Work Going." The meeting was said to be one of the largest political gatherings in the city since the initial Walsh campaign for good government. The appearance of the principal speakers making their way from the door to the center of the room was the signal for wild, enthusiastic cheering. A deafening roar, lasting several minutes, echoed throughout the hall. Chairman Daniel B. Dyer, the foreman of the Grand Jury, stepped up to the rostrum and, with a sharp rap of the gavel, brought the meeting to order. "The object of this meeting was fully set forth in the presentment of the Grand Jury and the sentiments expressed in that presentment have earned the most cordial support of the press, the pulpit and the prompt and generous approval

of the best people in our community. To this meeting has fallen the task of perfecting a plan for purifying the ballot, and this agitation will be fruitless until some practical plan is adopted to cure the evil." When Dyer paused, the audience roared themselves hoarse. It was several moments before he could resume his comments.

It was his opinion, as well as that of his fellow comrades, that by adopting "purely business methods," a plan for purifying the ballot could be effected. Mayor Richard E. Allen, Linwood C. Hayne, Chairman of the White Primary Committee and numerous other important personalities enumerated their suggestions on how to perfect the existing primary system. First of all, the "good people" had to bind together and denounce illegal practices. Secondly, they needed to collectively and individually pledge themselves not to use or contribute money, either directly or indirectly, to purchase votes in any elections--municipal, county, state or national. Every voter, as well as every candidate and politician, must become a stalwart supporter of fair methods. Third, they suggested that the people pledge that any and all infractions of laws governing elections would be reported to the proper authorities and that those individuals involved should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. Fourth, all candidates for

public office were required to subscribe to an oath obligating themselves to conduct their campaigns in a fair, honest and efficient manner devoid of public corruption. Fifth, all candidates prior to elections had to file with the white primary committee a sworn statement of all expenses and every contribution received for their campaigns. Sixth, all candidates were obligated to pledge themselves to report any violations of the laws and regulations governing the primaries and elections. Seventh, a successful candidate who might be found guilty of any infractions of the law would be denied the fruits of his illegal victory. Not only would his victory be voided but another election would be ordered and more closely supervised. White people were to stand in common unity as members of their exclusive political club.

The sundry speakers spoke deliberately and coolly on the issues of the day, commenting that they favored these new rules and regulations with the objective of achieving clean, clear-cut elections for reform candidates. On numerous occasions as they spelled out their recommendations they were interrupted and drowned out by loud applause, shouts and whistles. Motions were made, promptly seconded and carried amid renewed cheering. "It seems to be the unanimous opinion among all classes and conditions of men that

the flagrant use of money and other methods of corruption that have so long obtained at elections in Augusta must stop at once and for all time."

The responsibility for implementing the desired objectives expressed by the Grand Jury and confirmed by those attending the public meeting in the city courthouse was turned over to the city and county white primary executive committees. In subsequent meetings the officials of those committees studied the resolutions, section by section, and discussed the rules and regulations that were deemed necessary to govern the primary. They recognized that the reform movement in championing the primary system had given it the same force as regular elections, perceiving that nomination made the actual election a mere matter of form. But they were surprised to discover that there were no laws governing the primary making vote-buying and vote-selling a misdemeanor. The results were that vote-buyers and vote-sellers conducted their transactions in public with no fear of retribution while the "good people" looked on in impotent disgust. Since the primary had become the decisive factor in elections, they reasoned, obviously it had to be protected against corruption. All laws which governed the regular elections therefore ought to be made applicable, they believed. Furthermore, additional stringent rules and

regulations similar to the recommendations made by the Grand Jury and the courthouse speakers needed to be formulated and implemented.

The fact that the primary had not prevented corruption was not disputed, but it was argued that in time, through consistent enforcement of the "laws," it would be the genuine remedy for corrupt elections. No one advocated taking a "backward step," believing that it would be worse than folly to reintroduce the Negro voters into elections again because they alone had been allegedly responsible for corrupt politics in the first place. What was believed necessary was to continue the "cleansing" process until all whites who sold their votes and purchasers who bought votes were eliminated, even if such actions minimized democratic participation in elections.¹⁰

The Reform Spirit Triumphant

It was unanimously agreed that the mayor and city councilmen appoint the members of the white primary executive committee who would adopt the rules to govern all candidates seeking public office. Numerous rules and regulations were initiated. All candidates were required to take oaths pledging not to "use money in any unlawful manner, either directly or indirectly, personally or otherwise, in the promotion of their campaigns." Sworn statements

containing all items of expense incurred and every expenditure and contribution of every type were required. As respectable candidates for an office of "public trust" they were pledged not to resort to any "device or subterfuge" in order to evade the laws of the state and the rules and regulations established by the white primary. According to these recommendations, if it were ascertained that any candidate was guilty of violating the rules of the game, then his election would be invalidated and another election ordered; providing, of course, that it was proven he was guilty of election fraud. Candidates and their promotion managers were expected to plan their campaigns according to the goals of the good government cause, standing out squarely and boldly for pure elections. They also had to submit a written agreement to abide by the results of the primary elections.

Unopposed candidates, it was announced, were in a unique position. Any candidate without an opponent was automatically declared the official nominee by the committee, eliminating the necessity of having to submit his name to the voters in either the primary or general election. Chairman and directors, of course, hastened to assure the public that all such candidates would be carefully evaluated and above reproach. They also stressed that such elections

saved the necessity of constructing polling booths, naming managers and incurring other expenses incidental to holding a primary and an election.

In order to prevent false registration the committee unanimously ruled that a special voter registration book would be kept by the registry clerk of the city and county wherein all voters would sign their own names and indicate their age and residence. In every way possible they endeavored to compile an accurate, legal list of properly registered voters, qualified under city ordinances to exercise their franchise. Registration lists were to be carefully scrutinized and compared with the city's tax records so that only the properly qualified taxpayers were permitted to vote. Prior to all elections there were great numbers of names stricken from the lists because it was impossible to locate them. Registration board officials assumed that this was prima facie evidence that they were non-residents. Voter registration lists were publicly printed in the Chronicle and members of the primary committee and registry board invited the challenging of any names on the lists thought to be illegally registered. Whenever official complaints were made, they were thoroughly investigated. Shortly before elections the purged lists were again published and the public was again invited to double-

check them for any unqualified registrants. In addition, during all elections, the approved voter registration lists were used as reference works with clerks carefully checking the signatures, addresses and identities of the voters as a deterrent against illegal persons voting in the elections.

During all elections the "jostling of voters in line, shoving or pushing while in line, the use of profane language, hollowing, yelling, loud talking . . . betting or offering to bet on the election" were ruled as a "nuisance and in interference with the committee in the conduct of the election." Elections were supposed to be quiet, orderly affairs with a steady procession of voters standing in line, casting their ballots, departing the polls and peacefully awaiting the outcome of the returns.

On election days plain clothes detectives were stationed at the various polling places. It was their sworn duty to see to it that any persons engaged in vote-buying and vote-selling would be reported to the committees. Upon receiving tangible evidence on which a conviction could be had, they were charged with the responsibility of informing the primary committees of their findings.

Also on election days no ballots were accepted by managers except the official ballot. If, perchance, anything other than the official ballot were found in the box,

it was cast out and not counted. All ballot boxes were sealed under the observation of key officers. After the election returns were in, the ballot boxes were opened, ballots counted, the returns tallied and recorded in the presence of duly qualified persons and the results of the elections published. Special forms were then properly filled out, the managers signed the list of voters and ward returns, placed all the ballots and other papers connected with the election in a special sealed envelope and signed and deposited the packet in the courthouse.¹¹

The campaign for pure elections was again in full swing. Mayor Richard E. Allen proclaimed that "A new era has dawned, looking to a purification of the ballot and a betterment of the political methods in our community." Judges, lawyers, bankers, doctors, merchants, clerks, politicians and industrialists joined together in the struggle against corruption at the polls with a renewed determination to end it once and for all. Editors issued almost daily warnings to the "good people" to do battle against the corrupting "evil" forces which still continued to be a factor in elections. Ministers affiliated with the Evangelical Ministerial Alliance, an interdenominational association representing the majority of the Protestant churches in the city, preached fiery sermons stressing the

wrath of a vindictive, vengeful God upon a wicked, wayward and immoral city. Sermons preached on good citizenship extolled the virtues of honesty at the polls. "God made the country and the Devil made the towns," some ministers of the Gospel proclaimed, maintaining that it was high time for the moral, God-fearing Christians to exorcise the "Devil" from the "political hell-hole" known as Augusta. "God Almighty hates a quitter," they reminded their congregations. Reform candidates appealed strongly to all the voters interested in honesty in politics. They were strikingly consistent, emphasizing "pure elections" and standing out squarely and boldly for reform of the electoral process. They also busily conducted hand-shaking, back-slapping and speech-making tours of the city visiting all wards, displaying their forensic powers and soliciting the votes of their fellow citizens for the reform cause.¹²

In the reformed primaries and elections of 1904-1906 the new policies adopted by the white primary executive committees were implemented. Chairman Linwood C. Hayne announced that everything was in readiness for the elections. An absolutely secret ballot would be enforced and the executive committees stood prepared to see that everything would be fair and above board. It was dramatically announced that officials intended to proceed against all candidates who

attempted to buy votes and all those persons selling their votes. Judge E. H. Callaway stated that, in his opinion, any person attempting to buy or sell, or even offer to buy or sell votes, was guilty of a misdemeanor and liable for prosecution. The leading newspapers in their consistent efforts at obtaining purer election methods dispatched several reporters to observe election procedures and discern if there were any evidences of corruption. Numerous plain clothes detectives were stationed at the polls to oversee elections and to determine if any voters were being illegally adduced to vote for a special candidate.

After heated campaigns of several weeks in duration, the elections arrived. Public excitement was at fever pitch. There was considerable talk as to whether those candidates who championed pure elections would be victorious. There was also an abundance of rumors that hundreds of "drunken floaters," "idlers," and transients were being rounded up at "certain doggeries and other dens and dives" to be marched en masse to the polling booths to cast their paid ballots and continue the spectacle of corrupt election procedures.

But, the Chronicle reported with pride that the elections were some of the "quietest, most orderly and most excellently conducted ever had." There were no disorders of

any kind; simply a grim determination that the reformers would be triumphant. Hundreds of voters, each proudly displaying their candidates' badges, thronged to the booths, quietly stood in lines and in a lively, but good-natured way, cast their ballots. Occasionally some voters in "paroxysms of enthusiasm" engaged in a friendly bantering back and forth, but no longer was there loud shouting of profanities and terms of derision at the other faction and the rival candidates. Police officers, stationed at the booths, were successful in discouraging rowdiness and preventing any election irregularities.

The adoption of the white primary system as the basis for Augusta politics in the Age of Reform was of monumental importance. Viewing the elections impartially, the triumph of the reformers had hardly ended vote-buying and vote-selling but forced transactions to occur behind "closed doors" and pushed city politics "underground." "Instead of the wardheelers flaunting their money and displaying the bartering of votes in public," the Chronicle reported, "buying and selling of votes was done more or less under cover." "It was quite a change from the old method of boldly flaunting the purchase money and pinning it to the label of the floater's coat to show other miscreants where the money was," an Augustan remarked. "There was none of

the flagrant flaunting of greenbacks that used to be so common, and what was done was accomplished in such a way that no investigating committee on earth will be able to prove it. It is doubtful if anybody but the giver and the recipient knows of any money transaction that was made during the day." "Notorious loafers" suddenly appeared at the tax collector's office and paid up their delinquent poll taxes; it was obvious to many that "someone" had "anted up." According to those who claimed to have "inside information," "hacks" were retained on the "payrolls" of aspiring politicians to solicit votes for the "right" candidates, wearing badges, advising their co-workers and friends to cast their ballots wisely. To be certain election methods were not the same open, brazen affairs of the past but had shifted to far more subtle, concealed tactics.

Secondly, the new, reformed elections served as "object-lessons" to the whites that the elimination of the Negro from politics was totally justifiable. Despite evidence to the contrary, the victories were regarded as a triumph of the reform spirit, sustaining the wisdom and justice of their contentions that blacks alone were responsible for corruption and indicating that the continuation of reform politics was to a great extent dependent upon the future absence of the Negro at the polls. Advocates of the primary had

skillfully arranged, patently calculated and deliberately contrived to thwart black participation through careful manipulation of racial and class-conscious antagonisms for their own political gains.

Thirdly, the primary was in fact no real democratic nominating process at all, but was the means for various individuals to secure support from the key oligarchic directors of the system and to announce their candidacies, representing therefore a cohesive, reform coalition that skillfully transferred political power from the old-line factional system of wardheelers to the business leaders who dominated the new primary committees. Colorful, dramatic and bold reformers shrewdly perceived that by playing upon the emotional feelings of their listeners, they could obscure the fundamental fact that political power had been centralized into the hands of a few select men, thereby abnegating genuine political democracy.

Fourthly, the introduction of the primary made it virtually unnecessary for candidates to vigorously stump for political office. They merely had to secure the support of the select members of the city and county primary committees, acknowledge the rules and regulations governing the "private club" and relax, realizing that once having been nominated they were largely assured of victory in the

general election and perceiving that no-opposition races were emerging as the significant pattern in "progressive" municipal politics. Official nominees further realized that potential contenders were exceedingly reluctant to oppose them, fearing that it would preclude their future entry into politics or lead to terse accusations that they were "nigger lovers." Even when rivals were permitted to develop as "serious contenders" in the primary elections, they usually represented the same strata of society and conducted peaceful, orderly "business-like" campaigns "creditably free from the political ward harangues, brass bands and loud talking."

Lastly, the primary had been the means of assuring their true, limited constituents--industrialists, bankers, merchants, corporation executives, lawyers--of the continuation of the material progress of the city through responsible public urban planning.¹³

NOTES

1. Augusta Chronicle, January 30, 1903.

2. Ibid., March 24, April 19, 1901, September 8, 9, 1937; Joel Candler Harris, Memoirs of Georgia (Atlanta: Southern Historical Association, 1895), II, 771; Allen D. Candler, Georgia, Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1906), I, 45-48; The Industrial Advantages of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Akehurst Publishing Company, 1893), 128; Charles C. Jones and Salem Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, Georgia (Syracuse: D. Mason and Company, 1890), 413-414; Charles E. Jones, Georgia in the War, 1861-1865 (Atlanta: Foote and Davies Company, 1909), 33; Walter G. Cooper, The Story of Georgia (New York: The American Historical Society, Incorporated, 1938), IV, 672-673.

3. Augusta Chronicle, July 5, 1903.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., July 16, 1903.

6. "Minutes of the City Council, January 6, 1902-December 29, 1909," 160; Augusta Chronicle, July 16, 17, 1903.

7. Augusta Chronicle, July 16, 17, 30, 1903.

8. Ibid., July 16, 20, 1903; Augusta Herald, July 20, 1903; Augusta Daily Tribune, July 20, 1903.

9. Augusta Chronicle, July 17, 18, 22, 23, 27, 1903; "Minutes of the City Court, Richmond County, July 21, 1903-June 9, 1904," 8-11.

10. Augusta Chronicle, March 18, July 28, 1903, August 12, 1904.

11. Ibid., July 1, 23, 29, 1903, June 24, 26, 28, July 1, 3, 1904, April 29, 1906; Augusta Herald, July 8, 1906; Augusta Daily Tribune, July 5, 6, 7, 13, 20, 1904.

12. Augusta Chronicle, January 5, 24, April 2, 5, 22, May 1, 1904, February 25, 1905; Augusta Herald, February 5, 1905.

13. Augusta Chronicle, July 17, 1903, April 3, 4, 5, 6, 20, 21, July 1, 3, 14, 15, November 9, December 8, 1904, May 12, July 7, 12, 13, December 7, 11, 1905, January 1, 2, May 3, July 18, 1906; Augusta Daily Tribune, July 6, 14, 1904; "Minutes of the City Council, January 6, 1902-December 29, 1904," 160. 387; Thomas D. Clark and Albert Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 109-110, stresses that the white primary system was a democratic reform process that broadened the political base, making the choice of elected officials a matter of decision by the "mass of voters," necessitating lengthy oratorical appeals on important issues to the people at large and wresting control from a small, tight oligarchy that dominated southern politics. V. O. Key, Jr., however, in his classic study of Southern Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), 407-411, maintains that by no means was the primary system a democratic process since voters had no say in the selection of candidates, their nominations in the primary nor even mass participation in the general election. Essential to southern politics, in Key's opinion, was that all nominees enter the general election without any serious contenders or rivals; a factor hardly conducive to political democracy. Both C. Vann Woodward's, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 345-346, and John S. Ezell's, The South Since 1865 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), 183-185, however, disagree with the views of Clark and Kirwan. In Augusta the introduction of the primary system as the basis for city politics was clearly a means of perpetuating the conservative business power structure, assuring the continuation of desirable urban reforms and freeing the political economic elite from fear of mass interference with their plans. Nor can one deny the fact that voter participation sharply declined in the primary and general elections and that public apathy became more pervasive.

CHAPTER VII

AUGUSTA, SUMMERVILLE AND THE SAVANNAH

The Businessman's Campaign for Mayor

Captain William B. Young announced his candidacy for mayor of Augusta, stating that he was sure he could fulfill the duties of office, meet the demands of the growing city and serve its people. His friends pointed with pride to the fact that he was regarded as a "native Augustan," was known to be one of the city's wealthiest businessmen and was considered to be an experienced politician. Born in 1838 in Columbia County, Georgia, to Allen C. and Elizabeth Dye Young, the boy had emigrated to Augusta with his parents in 1846. Reared and educated in the city, the enterprising young man embarked upon a business career after he completed his education at the Augusta Free School. During the Civil War, Young enlisted as a corporal in the Richmond County Hussars, rising through the ranks to captain in the Confederate army. After the war, he resumed his business activities, becoming first cashier of the Augusta Savings Bank and later its president. Because of his financial

genius and administrative talents, Bill Young became not only the President of the Augusta Savings Bank but also the President of the National Exchange Bank, President of the Augusta Real Estate and Improvement Company, President of the Richmond Factory and Vice President of the Clark Milling Company. During those years he also was the secretary and treasurer of the Augusta, Gibson and Sandersville Railroad, a director of the Augusta and Knoxville Railroad and a director of the Augusta and Chattanooga Railroad. His rise to prominence in business affairs saw a corresponding rise to power in city politics. Since 1870 he had been intermittently elected to the City Council where he served on the major committees. In 1894 William B. Young was elected mayor of the city for a term of three years.¹

The second candidate for mayor in 1906 was also a prominent businessman, respected citizen, Confederate veteran and experienced politician. William M. Dunbar was born in 1846 on a plantation in Barnwell County, South Carolina. His father, Allen R. Dunbar, was regarded as a highly successful antebellum planter; his grandfather, George R. Dunbar, was a descendant of the "staunch patriot stock of the Revolutionary period." William Dunbar was educated in both the schools of his native county and private academies in Augusta. In April of 1864 the eighteen-year-

old impetuous lad enlisted as a private in Company A, Augusta Battalion, to fight for the Confederacy. At the battle of Griswoldville, Georgia, his right arm was shattered by a "minie ball," requiring amputation near the shoulder. During the course of the war he rose to the rank of major on the staff of General C. M. Willey, commander of the Georgia Division. After the war, he returned to Augusta where he engaged in business activities and city-county politics. In 1884 he was elected judge of the Police Court, retaining the position on the bench for four years. After stepping down from the bench "Judge" Dunbar resumed his mercantile interests in Dunbar and Company. In 1893, President Grover Cleveland appointed him postmaster of Augusta, in which capacity he served until March 10, 1898. In 1899 he became general manager and treasurer of the Clark Milling Company, a rather large industrial enterprise in the city. In 1903 Judge Dunbar was elected without opposition to the city council to represent the first ward. As chairman of the powerful finance committee of the city council, he was in touch with every department of municipal government during the administration of Mayor Richard E. Allen. According to the Augusta Herald, Dunbar's committee chairmanship meant that he was as well-informed in all government policies, programs, committees and leaders as the incumbent mayor.²

The victory of either candidate, however, was regarded as entirely satisfactory. Both were regarded as successful, enterprising, self-respecting, law-abiding citizens who were well-skilled in business matters and thoroughly experienced in public administration. Both were staunch Democrats. Both were Confederate veterans. Both were known to be "progressive" in their beliefs. "Indeed, it was frequently remarked during the campaign that Augusta could not be injured, no matter which of the two mayoralty candidates were elected," the Chronicle informed its readers. They were both "most admirably equipped," and men of "fair play" who were unselfishly devoted to the continued material progress of the city.³

William M. Dunbar won a "clear-cut tilt" in the primary, securing a majority vote in every ward except the second. Five months later on election day, December 5, 1906, Mayor-nominee Dunbar was formally declared the choice of the city. The chief executive of the incoming administration delivered a brief inaugural message wherein he summarized the accomplishments of his predecessor in the realm of municipal public services and outlined his own policies for the ensuing years. Political writers judged it certain that Mayor Dunbar would continue the same tradition of public reform, managing city government in an efficient,

laudable manner and striving toward the further general upbuilding of Augusta.⁴

The Battle for Annexation of Summerville

Summerville received Northern tourists each year in great numbers from early December until late April, when its streets and boulevards were thronged. Fashionable crowds traveled around on horseback, in shiny carriages and new automobiles. The sharp clank of horses' hoofs and the whirring of on-rushing automobiles echoed through the streets and thoroughfares of the residential district as the well-to-do drove their vehicles to the private cuisines, fashionable restaurants and other social clubs which were the centers of social activity. Resplendent parties were far from uncommon, as hosts and hostesses, blessed with wealth and social status, gave private garden parties and evening fetes. Fashionable men and women sauntered leisurely along the sidewalks with less fortunate on-lookers casting glances of admiration and envy. Walton Way was thronged with carriages, motor cars, Phaetons and Victorias.

Life styles in Summerville differed greatly from other sections of the city. Its streets were flanked by handsome multi-story cottages. Many of the fine, stately homes had beautiful, well-kept gardens with terraces, hedges, tall plants and shrubs. Shade trees abounded and flower gardens

perfumed the air. The homes of many of the well-to-do upper classes were largely located on "The Hill" in the village of Summerville. Here they lived in ease, prominence and affluency.

The annexation of Summerville was a recurrent issue in Augusta politics. For many years different administrative officials had discussed in a quiet way the incorporation of the "aristocratic suburb." Captain William M. Dunbar, however, was the first politician to publicly talk of the need to incorporate Summerville. "The next progressive step in the interest of Greater Augusta is the taking in of more territory in our corporate limits," Dunbar stated in an interview with a Chronicle reporter. "Other cities in the state have reached out and gathered into their corporate fold the thickly populated neighborhoods that are in fact parts of these cities. Augusta should do the same," he explained in 1904.⁵

Others openly spoke out favoring incorporation of the residential village. Tracy I. Hickman, president of the Graniteville Manufacturing Company and Mayor of the Village of Summerville, declared that in his opinion everyone living in Summerville would greatly benefit by annexation. Furthermore, as a result of frequent discussions with other residents, he believed that the vast majority of the prop-

erty-owners on "The Hill" were strongly in favor of such a proposition. Former Mayor Richard E. Allen; Nisbet Wingfield, Commissioner of Public Works; John M. Weigle, City Tax Collector and Lyon Martin, Clerk of the City Council, also endorsed annexation as a vital aspect of municipal government planning. Boykin Wright and Clem E. Dunbar also supported a plan for annexation of Summerville into Greater Augusta.⁶

Having achieved victory in 1906, Mayor-elect Dunbar announced "One of my first official acts when I take the seat of Mayor of Augusta will be to have a committee appointed to the city council to confer with the village of Summerville relative to annexation." Dunbar regarded such a move as justifiable and necessary. He was certain that the majority of his constituents favored such a move and that the residents of Summerville would not oppose annexation; providing, of course, that certain positive gains should be achieved.⁷

In Augusta, like most cities, the suburbs were so closely identified with the city proper that they virtually formed a part of the city. When Summerville was originally incorporated there was a large flat area of open country between it and Augusta. But as Augusta grew, its limits were naturally extended westward until they reached the

artificial boundary lines of the village. Augusta and Summerville were no longer separate towns. The open country between the city and the village had disappeared as city limits were gradually extended. Factories, businesses, homes and apartment complexes were built from the city below to the hilltop above in almost a uniform, uninterrupted pattern. Some of the streets running west, north and south cut through the imaginary boundary lines, tying the residential areas with the city. Trolley car lines began in the downtown business section and "looped" around the suburban residential areas, physically connecting the city with the suburbs. Merchants, bankers, clerks, industrialists and attorneys lived in those regions, either riding the trolley cars from "The Hill" through "The Flats" to the city or driving their vehicles to their places of employment. Members of the Chamber of Commerce, the Masons, Odd Fellows, Knights of Pythias and Knights of Columbus resided in all western areas of Greater Augusta. Furthermore, people living in the suburbs were enjoying many of the advantages and services of city government but were not sharing in the burdens of paying for them. Watermains, sewers, drains and streets were built and maintained by the City of Augusta, yet the majority of suburban residents did not pay municipal taxes for these services. The City Council of Augusta also

loaned fire trucks and other equipment for use in the village during emergency situations. It agreed to build fire alarm boxes on "The Hill," connecting them up with the central city fire and police alarm system. In short, the commercial, industrial, political and social lives of the two areas were so closely interwoven that they really constituted one municipality. The two communities had really lost their separate cultural identities.⁸

Summerville, however, was not annexed in 1909. Powerful opposition emerged which contested the fusion of the city with the village. Prominent residents of "The Hill" spearheaded a movement to thwart annexation by arousing public opinion. Intendant P. G. Burum, mayor of the village, opposed it, asserting that it would obviously eliminate all village political offices. Dr. James R. Littleton stated his position against annexation, maintaining that the citizens were opposed to it and that the will of the people ought to be respected. Prolonged applause and shouts of "Hurrah for Littleton" followed his brief testimony at the Schuetzen Platz. Eugene F. Verdery, a powerful industrialist, also spoke out against annexation. George R. Stearns of the Riverside Mills also stood out expressing disapproval of the annexation plan. Major Joseph B. Cumming denounced the matter of annexation as being a policy of "subjugation,"

and stated that it was one of the "greatest of all shams" perpetrated against the residents of the village. Judge Joseph Rucker Lamar, in expressing his views on the matter, asserted that incorporation would prove no significant advantage to the city or the village. Byran Cumming pointed out that Augusta's tax rate was 80 per cent assessment, or \$10 per \$1,000; whereas Summerville's tax was on a 60 per cent assessment, which was \$6 per \$1,000; thereby striking the "most sensitive pocket-book nerve." Petitions were circulated and signatures obtained and presented to the city. Letters expressing strong disfavor with annexation were written and mailed to the City Council. Numerous Northern tourists who owned winter vacation cottages wrote to aldermen, protesting the plan to extend the city limits. The annexation movement "died a'bornin'" when aldermen D. L. Kuhlke, J. M. Koon, Sandy Beaver, R. J. Bates and councilman-elect J. M. Caldwell formally and officially withdrew their support for annexation and signed the anti-annexation petition. Faced with such opposition in the village and in the city council, Mayor Dunbar was forced to concede defeat.⁹

The "Destructive Freshets" and the City

Periodic floods were a recurrent problem of the river city since its inception as a frontier outpost in northwest Georgia. The "Yazoo Freshet of 1796" was the first great

Savannah River flood recorded in the history of the city. Strong currents swept through the small town washing away fences, bridges and even homes--threatening to destroy the continued existence of Augusta. Forty-four years later the "Harrison flood of 1840" ravaged the entire city with the exception of the "high spots" in the western section. In 1852 for the third time in the history of antebellum Augusta, the city was seriously flooded by the rampaging muddy waters of the Savannah. The Confederate city was flooded twice--in 1864 and in 1865 while military officials and townspeople were apprehensively awaiting the coming of General William T. Sherman's army and the impending "Battle of Augusta." Since the Civil War there had been twenty-two floods which drowned many people, injured numerous others, damaged much property and temporarily disrupted the urban-industrial economy. In 1887 as a natural result of heavy, almost ceaseless rains for four days, the Savannah greatly overflowed its banks. Reynolds, Broad and Greene streets were transformed into "canals" as the turbulent waters swiftly flowed through--washing away fences, churning up yards, destroying streets, drains, sewers, dislodging trees, knocking down lamp-poles, toppling some of the smaller wooden frame houses, filling the cellars of homes and business firms with water, weakening foundations, tilting buildings

and carrying away furniture, consumer merchandise, clothes, bales of cotton, livestock and poultry. Twice in 1888 Augusta was flooded. In the spring and fall the main business thoroughfares were completely submerged from the west end to the east end as seething, hissing, rushing waters flowed treacherously through the central business district. From 1890 to 1908 six more times the commercial, industrial and residential sections were flooded and Augustans were subjected to the nightmare of sudden, unexpected recurrent floods.¹⁰

After each flood, especially the floods of 1887, 1888 and 1902, evidences of the terrible destruction were to be seen everywhere. Several blocks of the city appeared almost as though they never existed. Ramshackle wood and tin shanties were destroyed by the rushing torrents and the sparse furniture and meagre belongings had floated off in all directions, lost forever. Hundreds of families were made homeless. Most of the people were destitute and relief was badly needed. Some people who had survived were without food for several days. Capital losses to residential homes, commercial stores, industrial firms, railroad corporations and municipal utilities were staggering, often far exceeding \$1,000,000. Property damages for merchants, factors, industrialists and bankers were very heavy. Merchants in the

business section busily inspected the damaged goods, removing them from their basements, stores and warehouses, sadly lamenting the enormous financial losses of another "destructive freshet." When the flood waters subsided they left behind a thick, greasy, slick, reddish-brown scum several inches thick, requiring most industrial concerns to disassemble, clean and reassemble before production could be resumed. All factories were compelled to suspend operations, throwing thousands of laborers into temporary "idleness." Financial records of bankers, factors, attorneys and businessmen were often water-soaked, warped and mildewed forcing bookkeepers and accountants to work tediously to restore ledgers. Railroad officials announced that all passenger and freight traffic was at a standstill, the iron rails and cross-ties of the tracks being damaged for miles around and local trestles and bridges washed away. They hoped to have the tracks repaired, roadbeds restored and trestles rebuilt and in condition for traffic as soon as possible. Only gradually, despite around-the-clock schedules by section hands, were the lines able to resume their operations, restoring transportation services between local and distant cities. Damages to telephone and telegraph poles and lines along the roads and in the city were enormous and required several weeks of repair. Telephone

and telegraph systems were no longer operative. Those poles that were not knocked down by the swirling, rushing waters were blown over by gale-like winds. Electric wires were down and crossed in every direction, snapping, hissing and popping as blinding flashes of sparks shot out. Some poles were broken off at the top; other overhead wires sagged down into the streets. Streets were jammed with fallen trees, broken limbs and piles of debris, preventing a smooth flow of inter-city traffic. Firm roadbeds were kneaded into soft, deep mucky ooze and when dried, were made almost impassable due to the deep gullies, cracks and holes created by the eddying waters. City officials were confronted with the immediate urban crisis of removing decaying rubbish, restoring commercial and industrial prosperity, rebuilding the canal and other vital public utilities and assisting the people in recovering from the tragedy.

Extraordinarily heavy rainfalls prior to every major flood were, of course, the immediate reason for all floods, but there were certainly many other factors contributing to the recurrent flooding. The clearing of land, construction of roads and the building of several towns in the upper Savannah River area significantly contributed to the flood problems of Augusta. Accompanying social and industrial changes above Augusta meant that the deforestation of land

produced civilization, but it also created open land, barren gullies and treeless ridges along the five tributary river banks and twenty-eight creeks, thereby permitting greater soil erosion and quicker run-off of torrential rainwater. The general result was that the swollen tributaries, streams and creeks which spilled into the upper Savannah River were annually washing more silt deposits down river, depositing them largely in the Augusta area on the bend of the river. The yearly silt deposits muddied the branches, choked up the creeks and shoaled up the main river bed. The presence of large, visible sandbars and jetties in the main channel of the Savannah was indicative of the heavy suspended load being deposited near the city. Furthermore, municipal officials unwittingly contributed to Augusta's flood problem. The enlargement of the canal brought immense volumes of water into the interior city to provide industrial power for the textile plants and mills. Although gates and locks were part of the complex new canal system, during high flood times they were of little protective value as the rushing waters swiftly overflowed its banks, breaking down the retainer walls and spilling immense volumes of additional water into the factory, business and residential districts of the city. Also contributing to the flood problem was the traditional rectangular gridiron street pattern. The city

was built upon the immediate bank of the Savannah, with all major streets running parallel and perpendicular to the higher river bank. Once the river flowed over its banks, all the major parallel thoroughfares immediately became natural channels, carrying the rushing waters through the city.

"Frightful" heavy torrential downpours in the upper Georgia-Carolina region were responsible for the Tugaloo, Enoree, Toccoa, Broad, Rocky and Little rivers flooding, spilling tons of rushing water into the main channel of the Savannah River. An unprecedented amount of heavy rainfall--ranging from eight to ten inches in a single day--resulted in the record-breaking August flood of 1908.¹¹

Although Augustans heard of the heavy rains reported in the upper Savannah River valley, no one in the city anticipated a flood of major proportions. Even when the river began to rise swiftly from a height of nine feet to almost seventeen feet in three days, rivermen stated that there was nothing to fear. But they were wrong. Within two days the Savannah boomed from seventeen feet to over thirty-eight feet, overflowing its banks and pouring into the city. By that time, Augustans realized that they were threatened with a flood of epic proportions.¹²

As the Savannah spilled over its banks, small wooden

shanties and tin shacks in the narrow alleys and roadways along the riverfront were crushed together, overturned and washed away. Most occupants drowned. In the northwestern section where the city was flat and level, frightened families hastily climbed up on the roofs of their houses and apartments, hoping that the rampaging waters would not wash away the buildings. The main thoroughfares of the central business district were sheets of swift water rushing past in a deafening roar--carrying away bales of cotton, bundles of merchandise, buggies, wagons, horses and terror-stricken people. Waters swirled around street corners with an immense velocity, eroding the foundations of some buildings, picking them up and pushing them along for a considerable distance before fragmenting them into shattered parts. Trolley cars were swept off their tracks, turned awry and some toppled over completely. Merchants, in a last-minute desperate attempt to move their goods, were compelled to flee to the second story of their buildings, remaining trapped throughout the duration of the flood. Officials of the Charleston and Western Carolina railroad acknowledged that swift waters were racing over the C. & W. C. tracks. Once the Savannah had crested over the rails, they could not, of course, keep cars running. All trains were indefinitely delayed. Southern railway spokesmen also

reported serious transportation problems with large sections of track being badly damaged and bridges down with rails suspended in mid-air. The South Carolina and Georgia railroad bridge at Center Street snapped in two as a result of the massive pressures that developed as logs, trees and other debris jammed up at the massive stone pillars. Collapsing into the river, the shattered remains of the trestle were carried down river crashing into wharves and bridges, splintering and snapping the timbers and girders of piers. To compound the difficulties, of the flood-stricken city, the banks of the canal broke and great quantities of water rushed into the industrial-residential section, rolling in huge waves toward the commercial district. The night of August 26, 1908, Augustans, huddled on roof tops, watched in dazed amazement the tragic drama which was occurring before their confused eyes. "Great masses of flames" in western and southern portions illuminated the town, casting eerie shadows, silhouetting a city engulfed with disaster.

When the flood waters receded four days later, damages were extensive. Many streets were washed away to bedrock. Immense cave-ins and huge cracks had destroyed smooth paved surfaces. The majority of the bridges that crossed over the canal were entirely destroyed. Debris littered the streets and covered the porches, walls and rooms of the homes,

stores, banks and offices. Survivors complained of the sickening odors emitting from the decaying remains scattered throughout the city. In some sections entire buildings were ripped from their foundations and shattered into thousands of pieces. Others were so greatly undermined by soil erosion that they tilted at wild angles, teetering on the brink of ruin. Some remained standing with swollen, bulging walls threatening to crack and splinter apart. Most cellars were several feet deep in water. Industries were idle owing to the broken-down banks of the canal and the thick mud which clogged up machinery. Entire sections of the canal had to be patched up before water power could be provided for the textile mills. All railroads coming into and going out of the city were stopped. Six thousand people who lived in the factory district along the canal banks were homeless, unemployed and without any means of subsistence. Many had not eaten a meal for thirty-six to forty-eight hours. Parents and children were in a state of psychological confusion, grieving over the loss of loved ones, worrying about the locations of offspring and relatives and reflecting upon how they would eke out an existence with all their meagre belongings washed away and no immediate prospects of employment. Most were without clothes, save the miserable wet rags that were clinging to their bodies. To compound the

difficulties of Augustans, there were no public utilities nor municipal services. The waterworks was almost totally ruined, requiring a great deal of reconstruction before the people could receive fresh, pure water. No electricity was available. Sewers were uncovered and broken open, permitting their contents to spill out and smell up the city. No adequate fire protection existed for residential, industrial or commercial areas since water pressure was almost nil in hydrants.

Mayor Dunbar called an emergency "mass meeting" of citizens at the Chamber of Commerce for the purpose of raising a relief fund, appointing a special "Citizens' Relief and Advisory Committee" to cope with the post-flood crisis and coordinating the relief activities of that committee with a City Council Committee of Seven. Captain William B. Young, Jacob Phinizy, Richard E. Allen, Thomas Barrett, Jr., Fred B. Pope, Thomas Loyless and Bowdre Phinizy were appointed. Aldermen Edward G. Kalbfleisch, Robert J. Bates, Austin Branch, James E. Woodruff, Joseph P. Saxon, Edward B. Hook and C. B. Matheney, citizens-at-large, were appointed to the City Council Committee of Seven. "The suffering of a large class of people is very extensive," the mayor explained. "There are thousands who have lost everything. I went out in a hack this afternoon, loaded

with canned goods, and found many who were still unable to get out of their houses, and who were without provisions." "This is the worst freshet which Augusta has ever experienced," he commented to reporters several days later. "I saw those of '65 and '88, but they were in no manner equalled the one we are emerging from." Alleviation of the suffering of those made destitute by the flood was of primary consideration. All efforts to raise funds, procure supplies and expedite the distribution of monies and goods were coordinated to see that those who badly needed help received it immediately and equitably.¹³

Relief funds were quickly raised. Councilman James T. Bothwell motioned that a \$5,000 relief fund be provided by the city government. The Bothwell motion passed unanimously. Judge William F. Eve stated that the Richmond County Board of Charities had freed \$4,000 in funds for relief purposes. Moreover, Eve declared that he had authorized the turning over to the city a hundred convicts and twenty-five wagon teams to assist in the distribution of clothing, bedding and food supplies to all needy citizens. Mayor Dunbar proudly announced that several Atlanta corporations and private citizens had wired hundreds of dollars for relief purposes; furthermore, box car loads of supplies were enroute from Atlanta, Charleston, Savannah, Columbus and

other cities. Dunbar pointed out that countless well-to-do Augustans and local business firms had willingly "anteed-up" with thousands of dollars and contributed vast quantities of goods for distribution. Within a matter of a few days a general relief fund of over \$25,000 was created.¹⁴

Several trainload shipments arrived at the Walker Street Union Depot with bread, flour, meal, grits, canned goods, salted beef, butter, crackers, cookies, blankets, clothing, mattresses and bedding. The contents of the box cars were speedily unloaded, sorted, itemized, marked for distribution, hauled to wagon teams which were pulled up at the loading platforms and dispatched to the relief stations throughout the city. All relief applicants were speedily processed, provided with food supplies, rationed water for four days, issued blankets, mattresses and clothing and instructed to return to their dwellings and start cleaning up. Great care was exercised at the substations in the distribution of relief supplies to prevent any unscrupulous persons, not in genuine need of help, from obtaining assistance. To be certain that all those in dire need were assisted, a corps of assistants was dispatched to canvass the wards to obtain the names of all those in need of help but too proud to ask for it.

"Cheer Up and Clean Up!" placards posted all over the

city proclaimed. "Smile! D---- You! Smile!" other signs brazenly stated. For a period of almost two months Augustans labored, scraping away thick, dried mud; sweeping away sand, gravel and silt deposits; cleaning up their buildings and homes; reconstructing streets; repairing industrial machinery, rebuilding the canal, waterworks and sewer system; and hauling the accumulated debris to the dumps. Interiors of buildings were cleaned out, repainted and redecorated. Cellars were pumped and disinfected; counters, floors and walls scrubbed down. Stock was sorted out, inspected, evaluated, discarded and some of it placed on sale at greatly reduced prices. Construction crews worked steadily pulling down the bulging, warped walls of buildings whose foundations were so greatly damaged that they threatened to collapse. Burned buildings were condemned and razed. Piers, wharves, warehouses, bridges and trestles were rebuilt. Damaged pilings were inspected, repaired and new underpinnings secured. Entire sections of the canal bank were rebuilt and fortified with abutments. The deep gullies, ravines and fissures created by the flood were filled in. Sanitation crews and chain gangs worked relentlessly hauling away the bloated cadavers of animals to the dump to be destroyed. Lots, yards, streets and alleys were cleared of decaying rubbish. Uprooted trees were cut up and

logged away. Under the supervision of the public health inspectors drainage ditches were dug to let stagnant pools of thick, green water run off. Scavenger carts, heavily laden with refuse, traveled over the territorial limits of Greater Augusta, carrying away tons of water-soaked debris to the city dump to be saturated with kerosene and burned. Sewers and pipes which had been exposed were recovered; those that were burst apart by pressure as the water backed up into them were replaced. Restored city streets, drains and culverts were sprayed with oil and disinfectants to prevent a possible malaria epidemic. Health department officials inspected premises of private homes, hotels, factories and stores, advising people to whitewash cellars, sprinkle lime in yards, fill holes and gulleys with fresh dirt and pile any additional debris in the streets so that the scavenger carts could haul it away without delay. Medicines, drugs and other supplies were furnished all charity patients free of charge. A corps of district nurses provided medical assistance for all people in need. Private physicians also offered their professional services without regard to monetary compensation.

Fifty-four days later all industries were back in full operation, running on an overtime basis to make up for lost production. Within two months the public waterworks system

was rebuilt, thus ending the lengthy "water famine." Bridges, trestles and roadways were fully restored and the city resumed its normal commercial relations with other nearby towns and distant cities. Stores were filled with new merchandise, enticing shoppers to take advantage of the special discount prices. Businessmen ceased grumbling, recognizing that the worst was over and recovery had been achieved. Augusta had survived its twenty-fifth recorded flood since its founding in 1735, but many were uncertain as to whether the city might not lapse back into a state of lethargy, ignoring the need for permanent, protective flood control. It was apparent to many that after Augusta had repaired the damages of the flood, there was still before the city the crucial problem of devising some means of protecting it from future floods.¹⁵

The Building of the Augusta Levee

Immediately following the 1908 flood, community opinion was greatly aroused and demanded that the city devise a plan of protecting Augusta from future disasters of like character. Members of the Chamber of Commerce, Cotton Exchange and Augusta Retail Merchant's Association urged the city to appoint select representatives of the "ABLEST BUSINESSMEN" to make a preliminary investigation of the best ways in which the city could achieve full flood protection. Property

owners, residents, politicians, merchants, industrialists and lawyers asserted that the city must "do something" and immediately. Thoughtful discussions and considerable debates ensued in various public meetings. Local papers received and published countless articles, editorials and feature stories about how other river cities achieved flood protection. "Men of means" called upon the mayor, met with aldermen and discussed the pressing need to resolve the recurrent flood crisis, emphasizing that the floods demoralized residents, frightened women and children, disheartened merchants, industrialists, factors and businessmen and created an acute sense of disquietude, uncertainty, insecurity and extreme anxiety.

Mayor Dunbar initiated action. In September of 1903 "The Canal and River Commission for the Protection of the City of Augusta" was created, consisting of Charles Estes, William B. Young, Thomas Barrett, Jr., Thomas S. Gray and Frederick B. Pope, citizens-at-large; James T. Bothwell, Austin Branch and E. G. Kalbfleisch, aldermen; Mayor William M. Dunbar; C. Henry Cohen, City Attorney; and Nisbet Wingfield, Commissioner of Public Works. All citizens-at-large were carefully selected to represent various powerful businessmen's associations in the city. The members of the Augusta Flood Commission, as it was known, were charged with

the responsibility of investigating the causes of recurrent floods and to devise "as soon as practicable, suitable and appropriate measures for the protection of the city and county from floods and freshets." To achieve those objectives they were charged with procuring competent engineers to study and devise the best ways and means of protecting the city against floods.¹⁶

NOTES

1. Augusta Chronicle, February 23, 1906, November 13, 1916; Augusta Herald, November 13, 1913; Charles C. Jones, Jr. and Salem Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, Georgia (Syracuse: D. Mason and Company, 1890), 40-42; Augusta City Directory, 1895-1896 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1896), 17; Georgia Directory Company's Directory of Augusta, Georgia, 1898 (Richmond: J. L. Hill Printing Company, 1899), 42-43, 52; Walsh's Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1904 (Augusta: Press of the Augusta Chronicle, 1904), 776; The Mayor's Message, Department Reports, and Accompanying Documents for the Year 1894 (Augusta: Phoenix Printing Company, 1895), 31.

2. Joel Candler Harris, Memoirs of Georgia (Atlanta: Southern Historical Association, 1895), II, 782; Allen D. Candler, Georgia, Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1906), 633; The City Council of Augusta, Georgia Year Book for 1904 (Augusta: Chronicle Job Office, 1905), 45; The City Council of Augusta, Georgia Year Book for 1905 (Augusta: Augusta Chronicle Job Office, 1906), 34; Augusta Herald, July 19, 1906.

3. Augusta Chronicle, July 20, 1907; Augusta Herald, July 19, 1906.

4. "Minutes of the City Council, January 6, 1902-December 29, 1909," 386-387; Augusta Chronicle, July 19, December 6, 1906, January 8, 1907; Augusta Herald, July 19, 1906.

5. Augusta Chronicle, September 7, 1904.

6. Ibid., February 27, 1906, June 21, 1907, December 31, 1908, January 7, 1909.

7. Ibid., September 4, 1906.

8. "Minutes of the City Council, January 6, 1902-December 29, 1909," 389-390; "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 16; Augusta Herald, July 30, September 2, 1903, May 1, 4, 13, 19, 21, 26, July 25, 1909.

9. Augusta Chronicle, May 18, 23, June 4, 5, 19, 23, August 1, 1909; Augusta Herald, May 19, 28, June 5, 7, 1909.

10. The history of the "Yazoo Freshet of 1796" is very briefly discussed in Jones and Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, 160, 174. They also mention the flood of 1888, but there is no descriptive analysis of any of the recurrent floods. For information pertaining to the history of the recurrent freshets it is necessary to consult the following contemporary newspaper files: Augusta Daily Constitutionalist, August 28, 29, 31, September 31, 1852, January 3, 1864, January 4, 14, 18, 1865; Augusta Chronicle, July 30, 31, August 1, 10, 1887, March 30, 31, April 2, September 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 1888, March 11, 12, 14, 1891, January 21, 22, 24, 1892, February 15, 21, 1900. George R. Pater-son's, The Destructive Freshets and Floods of the Savannah River (Augusta: J. M. Richards, 1889) at the Augusta-Richmond County Library contains some very brief comments into the floods, though its scholarly value is most questionable. See appendix, Table IV, "A Statistical Record of the History of the Savannah River Floods and the City of Augusta."

11. Augusta Chronicle, August 26, 1903; Augusta Herald, August 25, September 30, 1903.

12. The City Council of Augusta, Georgia Year Book for 1908 (Augusta: Wolfe and Lombard Printers, 1909), 31; Thirty-first Annual Report of the Department of Public Health of Augusta, Georgia for the Year 1909 (Augusta: Wolfe and Lombard Printers, 1909) is replete with information regarding the destructive impact of the flood upon the city and the municipal actions initiated by all departments of city and county governments.

13. Augusta Chronicle, August 28, 29, 30, 1903.

14. Ibid., September 3, 1903.

15. Ibid., September 6, 1903, March 22, 1909.

16. "Minutes of the Augusta Flood Commission, September 28, 1903-April 29, 1919," 39-42; The City Council of Augusta,

Georgia Year Book for 1909 (Augusta: Chronicle Job Department, 1910), 39-42; Augusta Chronicle, September 6, 1908. The "Minutes of the Augusta Flood Commission" are in the private library of S. Herbert Elliott.

17. "Minutes of the Augusta Flood Commission," 5; Augusta Chronicle, September 1, 3, 4, December 1, 2, 3, 5, 1908.

18. "Minutes of the Augusta Flood Commission," 13, 44, 147; The City Council of Augusta, Georgia Year Book for 1909, 41-42; Augusta Chronicle, April 6, 1909, February 11, 1910.

19. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 141, 272-274, 292; "Minutes of the Augusta Flood Commission," 152; Nineteen Twelve Year Book of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Chronicle Job Print, 1913), 19; Nineteen Thirteen Year Book of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Williams Printing Company, 1914), 28.

CHAPTER VIII
SOME UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Thomas Barrett, Jr., and the Uncontested Mayoralty Race

Thomas Barrett, Jr., was descended from six generations of Augustans noted for their role in the development of the city. The Barretts of Georgia were one of the old, distinguished families whose ancestry dated back to the early 1800's when Augusta was but a small frontier village. Most of the pre-Civil War Barretts had been businessmen, bankers and respectable citizens of the community. Thomas Glascock Barrett, his father, had been President of the State Bank of Augusta and the City Bank of Augusta. During the Civil War he had served with honor in the Confederate army fighting at Shiloh, Chickamauga, Murfreesboro and several other campaigns. Grace Arrington (Ware) Barrett, his mother, was the daughter of Dr. Edwin R. Ware, an eminent surgeon in Athens. After mustering out, Captain Barrett had returned to his native town and reopened the retail-wholesale firm of Barrett, Carter and Company, dealers in grain, hay and produce. The elder Barrett was a devout Episcopalian who

firmly believed in the efficacy of hard work, thrift and sobriety. He had carefully invested his surplus wealth and eventually diversified his business interests becoming a broker of stocks, bonds and other securities.¹

His son, Thomas Barrett, Jr., received his education in the public schools of Georgia. Then he entered Washington and Lee University, graduating with a Bachelor of Law degree in 1882 at the age of nineteen. Returning to Augusta, he began a business career as a stockbroker. His brokerage firm at Number 6 Library Building on Eighth Street soon met with success. His interests steadily advanced and many of his contemporaries were astounded by his vigorous success. Some referred to Barrett's fine, discretionary powers. Other close friends and associates commented about his "keen ability and great administrative genius."²

By the Gilded Age, Thomas G. Barrett, Jr., was one of the commanding giants in the cotton mills, being president of some half dozen textile mills and allied organizations in the Greater Augusta area. Since 1878 he had served as President of the Langley Manufacturing Company and, under his able administrative leadership, it rose to prominence as one of the postwar cotton mills of the New South. Barrett also organized, directed and owned significant shares of other textile corporations. In the 1880's and 1890's he

played a crucial part in the planning and development of other Augusta-owned mills in Carolina, emerging as president of the new enterprises. As one of the original promoters, Barrett was elected President of the Aiken Manufacturing Company and the Clearwater Bleachery and Manufacturing Company. In 1912 when the Langley, Aiken and Seminole Manufacturing Companies in South Carolina were consolidated into the "Langley group" under one management, Barrett became president of all three companies while retaining the presidency of the Clearwater Bleachery and the Mantata Manufacturing Company of Montgomery, Alabama.³

In addition to being the executive head of several million-dollar corporations, Barrett was a member of the board of directors of other important industrial and financial enterprises. He had been a member of the board of directors of the John P. King mill since its inception and he was also one of the principal directors of the Commercial Bank of Augusta and of the Georgia Railroad and Banking Company. Such multiple roles in the economic life of the city reflected the fact that it was not uncommon for many of the same directors to serve on the boards of different corporations. Moreover, many of the same stockholders owned a large part of the securities of each company, thereby pyramiding their personal fortunes.⁴

Among other significant business accomplishments, Barrett's prominence in the city was manifested in his rise from being a director of the Augusta Exchange and Board of Trade, 1894-1895, to serving as president of that body of businessmen from 1896-1898. The organization of the Atlantic States Warehouse Company and the creation of the Augusta Fire Insurance Company were both partially the results of efforts put forth by Barrett. Accordingly, he was elected to the presidency of those companies. His remarkable talents as an administrator and his persistent conviction that all areas of the city's business activities should be coordinated lead to his election as President of the Augusta Chamber of Commerce in 1910.⁵

Preoccupied with making money and building new industries, Barrett had never really devoted much of his full attention to city politics. In 1897-1898, however, he had been a stalwart supporter of the Walsh crusade for good government. He had urged Augustans to ignore the religious affiliations of Patrick Walsh and concentrate upon the phenomenal success the young Irishman had achieved as a businessman, politician and editor of the Augusta Chronicle, the South's oldest newspaper. After the Walsh victory, Barrett was elected to the City Council in 1899 representing the third ward but thereafter his major interests were again directed towards personal and corporate financial success.⁶

During the administration of Mayor William M. Dunbar, close friends and associates, "inspired" by Barrett's administrative successes in managing the affairs of several corporations, simultaneously encouraged him to consider making the race for mayor of Augusta. They firmly believed that his varied business experiences suited him for being the chief municipal executive. The fact that he was associated with so many different corporations was regarded as a positive sign that city affairs would be directed toward further progress and prosperity. "His name is a guarantee of sound and aggressive business principles, as well as of good faith, and a square deal to all concerned," the Herald explained to its readers. Considered to be a man of great influence and tremendous business success in the community, Barrett was strongly urged to accept the mayoralty of the city by the majority of the key leaders of the Chamber of Commerce, the Augusta Exchange and Board of Trade, the Merchants and Manufacturers' Association and several other prominent social business clubs. Realizing that his personal business career had been an overwhelming success and that he had sufficiently acquired all the symbols of material wealth, forty-nine-year-old Barrett re-focused his attention upon municipal politics, announcing that he would seek the office.

As an official candidate for the city's highest office, Barrett pledged that he would endeavor to create another "progressive business administration." Moreover, he promised that the Barrett administration would be composed of some of the most influential businessmen in the city.⁷

No rival candidate emerged vying for the office of mayor. "With the closing of the entries for the coming municipal primary, and with no opposition of any kind, Hon. Thomas Barrett will be the unanimous choice of the white primary for Augusta's next mayor, and will in due course be elected at the regular election," the Herald announced. In July, 1909, after the ballots were counted, the city white primary executive committee declared Barrett the mayor. Other "good men" were elected to the city council because the "people desire a business administration and a Greater Augusta and feel confident that this is what the new administration will give."⁸

Five months later Barrett's victory in the primary was confirmed in the regular election. By that time, however, the general election had become so meaningless that the newspapers did not bother to make public announcements concerning the election or the results of the election.

In January of 1910 Barrett was formally inaugurated as the new mayor. Among those attending the ceremony were

former mayors Charles Estes, Richard E. Allen and Jacob Phinzy; all strong personal friends. In his address, Barrett pledged his administration to fulfilling the goal of a "Greater Augusta" by incorporating the village of Summerville, creating a new modern "progressive business-like government" for the city and completing the construction of the levee, affording maximum flood protection.⁹

The Annexation of Summerville and the
Battle for Commission Government

Mayor Barrett realized that several previous administrations had attempted to annex the village of Summerville in the hopes of creating a "Greater Augusta." But the question of incorporation had been temporarily settled when powerful opposition in the village and city had stopped it from succeeding. As a shrewd, hard-headed realist, he clearly recognized that recent events which had occurred in the community had greatly shocked citizens of Augusta, alarmed the residents of the village and, in general, created a new climate of opinion conducive to merging Summerville with Augusta.

The murder of Charles W. Hickman, a highly respected and admired physician, while walking from the trolley car way-station to his home in the village late one evening, seriously destroyed the self-contained certitude that life on "The Hill" was pleasant, affable and secure. The slaying

of Dr. Hickman dramatically renewed the subject of annexation and a new effort to incorporate the village into the city began as one of the first objectives of the Barrett administration.¹⁰

Officials of the village seriously criticized their government for no longer adequately meeting the needs and demands of the growing community. Marshall George Heckle, chief of police, acknowledged that a police force of three men was completely incapable of providing adequate protection for a community as large in territorial size as the City of Augusta and, simultaneously, maintain the waterworks department, superintend street repairs and keep the few night lamps burning. Intendant Alfred Cuthbert lamented that the village had attempted to provide a new waterworks system, sewage disposal, improved roads and better public services, however, the rapid expansion of the suburban community had "outstripped" the old village public utilities and rising construction costs along with shrinking government revenues, deterred the village from modernizing the public services in the Hill district. Some residents criticized the village, pointing out that since the barn of the intendant had burned completely to the ground--despite the fact that it was only a few feet from the Summerville fire department--residents could hardly hope to expect

adequate fire protection. Some pointed out that it was common knowledge that the village, particularly in the summertime, had barely "water enough to go around. . . . What we want is more lights and better lights, more police protection and better police protection, better water supply, better fire protection--or go into Augusta as we have been invited," one prominent, but irate Summerville property owner stated.¹¹

In 1910 Mayor Barrett and Intendant Alfred Cuthbert began to explore the possibility of merging the two areas under one common government. The Barrett-Cuthbert discussions were temporarily postponed, however, when the mayor became seriously ill and was forced to take an extended vacation. After recuperating, the mayor resumed his informal discussions with the intendant including certain leading citizens of the village and city. Representatives of the village officially conferred with Barrett, giving him legal notice that it was their express wish that immediate action be taken to incorporate Summerville as part of the City of Augusta. Agreeing that the proposition was desirable, a joint committee from the council and the city-at-large was created by the mayor to reach an understanding regarding the precise details of the annexation plan and the form and style of an annexation bill to be presented to

the voters and eventually to the State General Assembly for approval. Simultaneously, a special charter committee of "substantial" citizens was charged with the responsibility of composing a new charter for the government of a "Greater Augusta."

With mutual interest from the beginning on the part of municipal and village leaders, there was no political resistance to annexation. Annexation was confirmed by a special election held in the village on October 26, 1911. Once the polls closed, a meeting of the village council was called and the votes were tallied in an open meeting. The annexationists won by a majority of nearly two to one, receiving 233 votes against 131 votes cast against consolidation. Incorporation of Summerville as part of the City of Augusta was to be effective January 1, 1912, it was announced. Alfred Cuthbert, S. H. Myers and W. W. Martin, who had vigorously "pushed" the issue, were elected to the city council as representatives from the newly designated sixth ward.

On the first day of the New Year former Intendant Cuthbert and Mayor Barrett shook hands, exchanged cordial remarks and proclaimed that the dreams of the "more progressive citizens" for a Greater Augusta had finally become a reality. They proudly exclaimed, furthermore, that the

merger would safely secure Augusta third place in the cities in Georgia, second only to Atlanta and Savannah.¹²

Accompanying the push to annex Summerville with Augusta was a movement to change the form of city government to a commission basis. Many politicians, committee members and prominent citizens suggested that incorporation should rightfully be accompanied by the adoption of a new commission charter for a Greater Augusta. Some, while declining to make official comments, expressed the opinion that the proposed change was necessary and, indeed, would ultimately occur.

The special committees appointed by Mayor Barrett to achieve annexation were also charged with the responsibility of investigating the benefits of the commission form of government and drafting a tentative charter for a new Augusta under the commission plan. In order to expedite their planning, they wrote off letters of inquiry to the secretaries of state in Texas, Kansas, California, Iowa, Michigan, Illinois, South Carolina and other states where the general assemblies had enacted commission government bills and requested copies of the bills so that they could assiduously study them before drafting the proposed charter for Augusta.

After laboring for more than six months, the commission

government study committee completed a new charter and announced that it was ready for the consideration of the public. If ratified at a charter election set for February 21, 1912, the new commission charter would be presented at the next session of the General Assembly for state approval. Subsequently, the city would have a special election for the commissioners.¹³

Viewing city government exclusively from a business perspective, politicians and municipal operations were perceived to be like the figures and internal transactions of a bureaucratic corporation with an executive officer, board of directors and stockholders. The president (mayor) of an enterprise (city) was the sole executive head, elected to the position by the stockholders (citizens) because of his great managerial skills for the job. Directors (commissioners) of the board were also elected to positions of responsibility by the stockholders (citizens), who were then placed in control of certain special departments (municipal branches of city government) by the president (mayor) and responsible to the chief executive, consulting with him on all matters pertaining to his particular departmental duties and obligations. The president (mayor) retained absolute central power to charge the directors (commissioners) of the firm with their responsibilities of managing departmental

matters (municipal services) in a wise, efficient and economical matter. If, in the opinion of the president (mayor) or the stockholders (people), a director (commissioner) was incompetent or mismanaging or misusing the power of his office, he could be swiftly suspended, investigated and, ultimately, if the charges against him were sustained, summarily dismissed.

The adoption of a business form of operations for city government and elected officials, it was stated, would achieve decided beneficial results. Power would be centralized in the office of the mayor and the commissioners; thereby destroying the age-old problems of ward factionalism which had traditionally represented diffusion of authority and failure to initiate much needed city-wide public services.

The people, too, it was stated, would benefit from the proposed change. Voting for commissioners in city-wide elections, citizens would be forced to view Augusta as a whole, not from the provincial perspective of an isolated candidate for one ward seeking a single seat in the city council. Furthermore, under the commission plan, they exercised initiative, referendum and recall. Concerned citizens--if they wanted a public library, city hall, hospital or auditorium--could initiate legislation by

writing their own laws to be approved in a general election. They also retained the right to veto any action of the commission that they believed was prejudicial to their interests; hence they had the power of the referendum. Any incompetent commissioner grossly negligent in the fulfillment of his responsibilities, moreover, could be recalled at any time during his term of office by the people.

Because only the most competent business leaders would be charged with the responsibility of directing the affairs of city government, it was widely believed that they could manage public affairs, achieving the same high degree of success at minimal costs and maximum profits that were evident in their private corporations. Greater efficiency in government through business leadership meant elimination of costly mistakes and avoiding the duplication of efforts, assuring the fact that the city would be managed in an up-to-date, modern business-like fashion. With wise management of city funds, municipal authorities would spend less but provide more basic services. Significant public improvements would thus be accomplished, enhancing property values in the city and attesting to the sound business leadership of city government.

A "whirlwind campaign" for commission government ensued. A city-wide telephone campaign was conducted to

arouse public opinion, putting the newly installed Southern Bell system to its "supreme test." Circular letters were mailed out in great quantities to all registered voters apprising them of the forthcoming special election and urging them to cast their ballots in favor of the change. "Monster mass meetings" of all the "good citizens" were arranged at the county courthouse to discuss the alleged practical advantages of a commission form of government. "Forceful speeches" were made by a plethora of special visitors to the city. Mayor Wade Hampton Gibbes traveled from Columbia, South Carolina, to extoll the virtues of the new commission government adopted in his town. James R. Hornaday, associate editor of the Birmingham News, arrived in Augusta as a guest speaker, delivering a public testimony on the enormous accomplishments wrought by the commission governments in over 160 American cities. William Hale Barrett, presiding at one jam-packed courtroom meeting, stated that adoption of the proposed charter was not criticism of previous politicians, nor administrations, but reflected the general consensus that Augustans preferred that all future public affairs would be closely conducted on "straight business principles." Government, after all, he stated, was nothing but a "business corporation" and should be run accordingly. Henry J. Hardy, President of the Columbia Federation of

Labor, was invited to "give information" and "answer questions" of the working-class people in the fourth and fifth wards. Since Hardy was "one of their own number," the Chronicle explained, Augusta workers would be more receptive to the idea of adopting a new charter. Hardy stated that the change meant: "Better Government; Better Men; A Clean City; No Scandals; No Graft." H. H. Alexander, Jacob Phinizy, William S. Morris and scores of other "Good Men" proclaimed their support of the new charter. Chairman Howard H. Stafford of the white primary executive committee gave several short talks in favor of the change. Numerous other speakers testified to the virtues of the new form of government, reportedly being frequently interrupted with loud shouts and applause. Those who testified for the proposed charter repeatedly emphasized that it would change the form of municipal government from an "antiquated, more or less shiftless system" to a "purely business administration of the city's affairs."

Despite the determined efforts of influential politicians, eminent businessmen, powerful financiers and newspaper editors to create a favorable climate of opinion to achieve the passage of the proposed charter, the commission forces met with defeat by a narrow margin of fifty-one votes. Explanations given for the failure were twofold.

Election day was unbelievably miserable. Heavy driving sheets of rain began early in the morning. By the time the polls were opened it was falling in torrents. Throughout the day intermittent torrential showers discouraged an estimated 700 voters from turning out at the polls. High, strong, icy gusts of wind accompanied the downpours, further discouraging large voter turn-outs. Chance weather conditions, however, were not the only factor in the defeat of the charter. Resentment by the "masses" against the "classes" was cited as the second factor contributing to the defeat of the commission charter. Pointing to the sizable majority votes cast against the charter in the heavily populated fourth and fifth wards, one perceptive observer stated that the "masses" were opposed to having a "charter prepared by the classes and submitted to them for ratification when they are not even consulted about it. . . . Had the charter been framed properly and had the masses of the people been given a showing," he stated, "there is no doubt that it would have carried, but the great majority of the working people wanted representation in the preparation of the charter and they did not get it."¹⁴

The March Flood of 1912 and the
Completion of the Augusta Levee

In mid-March "high water" was reported in the Savannah,

but local "experts," who had the river down to a "science," assured Augustans that there was no danger of a flood. Maximum height, they speculated, would not exceed thirty feet. There was no reason for "extreme alarm," according to the so-called specialists.¹⁵

The Savannah crested over its banks at 3:00 A.M., March 17, 1912, at a height of over thirty-three feet and was still rapidly rising at an average rate of six inches per hour. Several thousands of dollars worth of cotton bales were washed off wharves, docks and loading platforms and carried downriver. The "remarkable sudden" swell of the Savannah created intense excitement and acute anxiety as merchants, businessmen, doctors, lawyers, factors, industrialists and residents hastened to either remove their merchandise, records, ledgers and personal belongings from their offices and homes to the second story levels or move them to safety in the higher, suburban areas of the city. Vans, trucks, autos, drays and wagons were speedily loaded up in a desperate attempt to shuttle people and their belongings out of the flooding downtown district. By seven o'clock the only way to cross Broad to Greene Street was in a bateau; even then it was considered to be a dangerous undertaking. At noon the swift flowing waters were racing through most of the other streets. In some places on the

fringe of the business-residential area, the depth of the water measured four to six feet.¹⁶

The city was seriously flooded in the downtown areas as the Savannah reached a height of over thirty-six feet. Business was almost completely paralyzed. Trains were unable to discharge their passengers and unload freight. No trains were operating east of Augusta. Street car traffic was completely tied up as the depth of the water was so great that in some areas water flowed through the window sills.

After the waters receded, municipal departments immediately concentrated their efforts on the restoration of the damaged public services. City fire engines busily pumped water from cellars. Medical teams toured the flooded areas, vaccinating persons, providing necessary emergency medical treatment, authorizing the spraying of oils and disinfectants on stagnant ponds and informing private residents to cleanse their homes, whitewashing walls and floors. Health officers caused a house-to-house canvass inspecting premises and warning occupants against re-occupying flooded buildings until they were thoroughly cleansed. Instructions were also issued that all water taken from wells in the flooded district must first be boiled. Simultaneously, it was advised that the thick, greasy red deposits of mud left behind were

to be scraped from the buildings and floors and walls were to be cleaned. Responsible municipal action was not limited to just immediate recovery. Long-range policies, Barrett announced, were crucial to achieve permanent flood protection.¹⁷

Mayor Barrett was immediately "on the job" inspecting the damages, touring the flooded districts, discussing the complexities of the river problem and urging that swift, new planning be initiated to complete the construction of the levee as quickly as possible. There must be no let-up in the project, but new means must be devised to acquire the necessary funds to complete it in the immediate future, he asserted. And, in his opinion, the best means of achieving such an objective was through the passage of a million-dollar issue bond.¹⁸

At a special City Council meeting, Mayor Barrett informed those present that a special million dollar bond election was imperative. If approved by the voters, the money would be used to hasten the completion of the levee, repair the city waterworks system and build a new city hospital. Barrett further explained that a "universal demand" had developed that municipal government expedite the completion of the levee. Various business associations had urged that the recurrent burdens of flood damages be

stopped by a levee. The Board of Directors of the Merchants and Manufacturers' Association, for instance, had recommended that a million dollar bond be submitted to the people in a special election. Leaders of the Augusta Chamber of Commerce had approached him, he explained, simultaneously endorsing the suggestion, pointing out that the costs of repairs and replacements made necessary by the recurrent "freshets" exceeded, in their opinion, a million dollars.¹⁹

Accordingly, it was announced that a special city election would be held in June to approve or disapprove the passage of a \$1,250,000 bond issue for the funds to complete the levee, build a new University Hospital and greatly improve the city waterworks system so that the new sixth ward could be provided with better public services. Recognizing that the "factory-district vote" had been responsible for the defeat of the adoption of a commission government, a concerted effort was made to "educate" the working classes and their representatives to the immense importance of sustaining the proposed bond.

Newspapers, especially the Herald, strongly endorsed educating the mill section to the ways in which industrial life would be made more secure. Workers, it must be acknowledged, clearly understood that recurrent floods demoralized the industries, especially the textile mills upon which

their daily income depended. Permanent flood protection would prevent industrial shutdowns and eliminate the "humiliating" charity campaigns that followed every flood and the relief work initiated by the city government. No longer would it become necessary for workers to stand in the long lines to be chosen to work on the public projects of re-grading streets, re-building parks, re-planting trees and bushes and restoring the canal. Furthermore, it was the sick of the laboring classes who also realized that they could not afford the benefits of private physicians, hospitals, sanitariums or health resorts, but needed a city hospital staffed with professional doctors, nurses and aides for emergency medical treatment and daily care. No worker needed to realize the vast need for pure fresh water. Mineral water was readily available for those who lived in the fine hotels and homes and those who worked in the best offices, banks and mills of the town but the workers, on a first-hand basis, knew the inadequacy of the waterworks system and the urgent need for expanding the services to other areas of the city.

The Central Trades Council, representing all of the labor unions, enthusiastically endorsed the passage of the bonds. Trade union leaders, with very few exceptions, endorsed the bond issue with their unqualified approval.

Many stated that it was to the material benefit of the mill district, especially, to vote for passage of the bond so that construction of the proposed improvements could begin immediately. Some stated that only "selfish" individuals could adopt the attitude that floods were only an "inconvenience."²⁰

The combined, united efforts of the business community and the working class section of the town achieved success. In all three areas--the levee, hospital and waterworks--an overwhelming majority in every single ward in the city voted for approval of the \$1,250,000 issue.²¹

In the spring of 1913, river water backed up in the underground utilities partially flooding some of the main thoroughfares of the business district. Once again, as the Savannah overflowed its banks, boats were seen plying up and down Reynolds Street, especially between Thirteenth and Fourteenth. Rising flood waters also forced many occupants to abandon their homes as water crested over the banks of the canal. Although it was generally conceded that there were no extensive damages, nor serious business losses, the "mini-flood" reinforced convictions that the city must hasten the completion of the levee.

Commissioner Nisbet Wingfield traveled to Washington, where he appeared before various congressional committees

and also personally discussed the matter with Senator Hoke Smith, Congressman Carl Vinson and Brigadier General Dan C. Kingman, Chief of the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers. Returning, he informed the city that the federal government had finally agreed to appropriate \$218,000 for the construction of the Augusta levee. Wingfield, in order to determine the best possible way of preventing Augusta from being constantly inundated, also visited numerous other river cities and inspected the methods adopted to assure flood control. After inspecting 600 miles of the levees built along the Mississippi river, he reported that in his opinion "they haven't got a thing on us, we've got it on them."

Chairman Thomas Barrett, Jr., who succeeded Frederick B. Pope after ill health had forced him to resign from his position on the Flood Commission, carefully evaluated the complex problems of purchasing property, acquiring rights-of-way, municipal financing of the project and letting-out contracts to the construction firms.

Consistently ignoring the many skeptics who doubted the possibility of checking the mighty Savannah, Barrett and Wingfield meticulously studied the situation perceiving that with modern engineering achievements and rational city fiscal planning the levee could become a reality. Civil engineers, military advisors, municipal officials and competent busi-

ness advisors greatly assisted them in systematically planning the completion of the levee. The proposed line was determined, surveyed, mapped out; rapid construction was initiated and a vast concourse of steel and concrete was erected as tons of earth, stone, cement, sand, steel beams and other structural component parts were hauled to the construction site and a gigantic twelve-mile levee was completed that successfully contained the immeasurable billions of gallons of murky water that traversed the Savannah on its way to the sea.

Finished in 1918 at a cost of \$2,198,000 the Augusta levee stood the test. Christmas even the Savannah rose to a height of thirty-four feet but the city remained safe and dry, unharmed by the rampaging waters of the river. In times past it would have meant the stopping of industrial production, ending of retail sales, preventing of out-of-town people from buying goods, ruining of streets, buildings, sewers, stocks, goods, records, necessitating extensive urban repairs and the drowning of many residents. "Today Augusta enjoys a glorious Christmas Day and the cost of the construction of the levee has almost been repaid in one instance of high water," the Chronicle joyously proclaimed. Without a doubt, the greatest municipal project ever inaugurated in the city during the urban Progressive Era was

the Augusta levee. In the opinion of the oldest newspaper of the South, Augusta was "looked up to by many southern cities as a model city of determination, which stepped out of the mud and destruction of floods to wall herself forever against repetition of inundation."²²

NOTES

1. Allen D. Candler, Georgia, Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons, Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1906), I, 131-132, III, 538-540; Joel Candler Harris, Memoirs of Georgia (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1895), II, 773-774.

2. Augusta Chronicle, April 14, 15, 1929; Lucian L. Knight, Encyclopedia of Georgia Biography (Atlanta: A. H. Cawson, 1931), I, 89-90; The Industrial Advantages of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Akehurst Publishing Company, 1893), 74; Harris, Memoirs of Georgia, II, 773-774.

3. Augusta Chronicle, May 10, 1885, January 30, 1912; Augusta Herald, July 1, 1912; The Industrial Advantages of Augusta, 68-69; Augusta City Directory, 1895-1896 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1896), 69; Georgia Directory Company's Directory of Augusta, Georgia, 1898 (Richmond: J. L. Hill Printing Company, 1898), 49; Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1903 (Augusta: Chronicle Job Office, Printers and Bookbinders, 1903), 274; Walsh's Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1904 (Augusta: Press of the Augusta Chronicle, 1904), 66, 68, 254; Eugene H. Hinton, A Historical Sketch of the Evolution of Trade and Transportation of Augusta, Georgia (Atlanta: South-eastern Freight Association, 1912), 6.

4. Charles C. Jones, Jr., and Salem Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, Georgia (Syracuse: D. Mason and Publishers, 1890), 420-422; Georgia Directory Company's Directory of Augusta, Georgia, 1898 (Richmond: J. L. Hill Printing Company, 1898), 42; Augusta City Directory, 1899 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1899), 115; Augusta Chronicle, May 5, 1907.

5. City Directory, 1895-1896, 14; Augusta City Directory, 1896-1897 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1897),

47; City Directory, 1898, 43; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory for 1909 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1909), 170; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1912 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1912), 30, 150; Augusta Chronicle, March 27, July 1, 1910; Knight, Encyclopedia of Georgia Biography, I, 89-90.

6. Candler, Georgia, III, 538-540; City Directory, 1899, 86.

7. Augusta Herald, May 9, 1909, March 27, 1910; Augusta Chronicle, May 9, 1909.

8. Augusta Herald, June 25, July 9, 1909; Augusta Chronicle, July 9, 1909.

9. Augusta Chronicle, January 4, 1910.

10. Ibid., February 3, 8, 1910; Augusta Herald, February 3, 4, 11, 1910.

11. Augusta Chronicle, February 8, 1910, February 20, 1911.

12. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 104; Nineteen Twelve Year Book of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Chronicle Job Print, 1913), 29; Augusta Chronicle, January 1, 2, 1912; Augusta Herald, January 1, 1912.

13. The actions of the committee for annexation, statements by interested parties and comments by sundry political officials supporting the merger of Summerville with Augusta can be carefully traced in the following editions of the two leading daily newspapers: Augusta Chronicle, July 8, 13, 15, 25, 28, August 2, 16, 25, 27, 30, October 27, 29, 30, 1911, January 14, 17, 23, 1912; Augusta Herald, July 24, 25, 28, August 13, 16, 17, 19, 24, 26, 30, 1911.

14. The "whirlwind campaign" for commission government is developed in the following editions of the daily newspapers: Augusta Chronicle, January 26, 27, February 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 22, 1912; Augusta Herald, January 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 23, 27, 30, February 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 1912.

15. Augusta Herald, March 15, 1912.

16. Augusta Chronicle, March 16, 17, 1912; Augusta Herald, March 16, 17, 1912.

17. Augusta Chronicle, March 17, 18, 21, 22, 1912; Augusta Herald, March 17, 18, 21, 22, 1912.

18. Augusta Chronicle, March 17, 1912.

19. Augusta Herald, March 18, 21, 22, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, March 18, 21, 23, 1912.

20. Augusta Herald, May 13, 14, 15, June 3, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 30, 1912.

21. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 140-141; Augusta Chronicle, June 25, 1912; Augusta Herald, June 25, 1912; see appendix, Table V, "The Special Bond Election for the Levee, University Hospital and the New Waterworks System."

22. Augusta Chronicle, January 7, March 17, 18, June 15, July 11, 18, 27, August 17, September 1, 2, 5, 12, October 3, 1913, January 14, February 5, 15, April 19, 21, 26, May 3, 12, 20, 21, 28, 30, 31, June 1, 2, 20, July 16, 19, September 1, October 7, November 12, 28, 1914, January 1, 20, March 1, July 16, August 19, 22, September 18, December 11, 1915, January 17, May 21, December 10, 1916, June 13, October 29, 31, 1917, December 24, 25, 27, 1918, January 4, 31, 1919, April 14, 15, 1929; Augusta Herald, February 5, 6, May 21, 22, 24, 28, 30, 31, June 1, 2, 3, 4, 1914, August 19, 20, 22, 23, 1915, December 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 1918, January 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 28, 29, 30, 31, 1919.

CHAPTER IX

STRIKERS, SCABS, SOLDIERS AND ARBITRATORS

The Trolley Car Strike of 1911 and Temporary Resolution of Differences

Congenial and courteous relationships between employees and employers were gradually destroyed when E. C. Deal of North Carolina was appointed General Manager of the Augusta-Aiken line in 1911. Even before Deal arrived, rumors were rife among the men that new, stringent rules and regulations would be adopted. Furthermore, it was common gossip among the employees that Deal had greatly disrupted and totally disorganized good management-labor relations in Carolina. Upon arrival in Augusta, Deal's new methods became immediately "visible and very tangible." A plethora of new "regs" were put into effect and rigorously enforced; much to the¹ chagrin of the employees.

Orders were dispatched by the general manager that some men were to be placed on a fifteen to eighteen hour a day work schedule without relief. The old twelve hour work shift was abandoned. "Split-run" men were required to work

six hours, off for six hours and then return to work for six more hours. Employees were deprived of many of their traditional benefits and their on-the-job responsibilities increased significantly. Trainmen were notified that the large potbelly iron stoves at the ends of the lines would henceforth be discontinued, leaving them without provisions for comfort in the way-stations in inclement weather. Notices were served that no employees were permitted to eat their meals on the road or at the end of their workday on company property because accurate time schedules had to be maintained at all times; "Meals or No Meals." Their responsibilities, they were informed in company bulletins, were far greater than the mere operation of the vehicle and the collection of passenger fares. They were expected to offer physical assistance to all women and children boarding and departing from the trolleys; help aged passengers board, find their seats and assist them in stepping off the iron platforms onto the streets below; evict drunks; chase free-loaders from the cars; and, if necessary, whip all "Toughs" who challenged their authority or attempted to damage company property. Moreover, their responsibilities to the company did not end when they returned their vehicles to the car barn on Fifteenth and Broad streets but they were expected to clean up the cars, dust the seats, polish the

chrome and brass attachments and wash the lamp globes and windows every night before leaving for their homes. Any signs of uncleanness meant a demerit point against them; when points accumulated "too high" they were suspended for three days. If their trolleys happened to "jump" the overhead wire or, worse yet, tear them down, it was considered to be prima facie evidence that they had been shirking their duties on the job and, accordingly, they were fined for such "needless accidents." In most instances the minimum penalty imposed was "Three times TWELVE TIMES NINETY SIX" meaning a docking of \$3.88 from their pay envelopes on pay day.²

The growing inability to achieve any compromises with General Manager Deal was largely, though not completely, responsible for the organization of most of the city division of the company into "Old 577" of the Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees. "Snooping" upon the union members, their leaders and meetings were quickly introduced, it was stated, as an unofficial policy of the company and the clandestine strategy of Deal to learn of the bickerings of his employees. "Attentive ears were awaiting any and all reports" from them by the "Bosses," it was charged. Workers who were particularly active in the union discovered that they were shadowed, harrassed, intimidated and fined for misdemeanors trumped-up against them by the

company. In the first week of November, 1911, several employees--including W. H. Bagby, President of Old 577, J. E. Findley, E. G. Coursey and D. E. Boozer--were summarily discharged without explanation and without sufficient cause.³

Motormen and conductors, claiming that the Augusta-Aiken Railway and Electric Corporation had discharged some of its employees without sufficient cause, walked off their jobs. A strike was formally called on the city lines shortly after a "thirteenth hour" early morning conference between the company's representatives and union officials failed to achieve any satisfactory understanding. The major factor which had precipitated the strike was intense dissatisfaction of the union men with General Manager E. C. Deal who had arbitrarily dismissed one of the leading organizers of the union and two conductors on the grounds that they expressed "disloyalty to the company interest." E. G. Kalbfleisch, attorney and city councilman heading a special delegation, had attempted to reach a last minute understanding with the general manager of the company maintaining that the dismissals had occurred without "sufficient cause." Kalbfleisch requested that the matter be reopened for investigation and, unless significant charges were substantiated, those fired were to be fully reinstated. He also requested that the accusations made by the discharged

employees about unfair treatment by management be either confirmed or denied after a thorough investigation. But the Kalbfleisch conference failed.⁴

After the unsuccessful conclusion of the conference, the union committee members departed to the corner of Broad and Jackson streets where they intercepted all trolley cars and notified the men that they were officially on strike. No disorders transpired; not even large gatherings took place. Everything proceeded peacefully according to a pre-arranged plan of operation worked out in a close union meeting the evening before. The union men, after receiving notification, returned their trolleys to the car barn, placed them in their regular stalls and quietly left. A few men paraded up town, but in general the pattern was "impressively orderly." They did not shout, hurl threats, shake their fists in the air, nor make boasts of conquests, but in a peaceful, nonviolent demonstration they staged their public protest against what they believed were intolerable working conditions and unjustifiable treatments. "They were quiet and orderly; indeed, there was even an absence of loud talking," the Chronicle observed. Small groups of men congregated on various street corners in the factory district, but reporters noted that they talked in a "good humoredly nature" among themselves and then dispersed.⁵

Company officials announced that there would be no effort made to operate the cars. Those people who lived a great distance from their jobs were advised to make other transportation arrangements or walk home. They also confidently stated that they did not expect the strike to last for any lengthy time. Besides, they explained, although the trolley cars were silent, "hackmen" were readily available to transport people from their downtown offices to their suburban homes; admitting, however, that cabs were "going at a premium" but that was a matter over which they had no control. The Chronicle explained to its readers that the transportation of businessmen was also being facilitated by five "straw-ride wagons." "Old-fashioned sleigh bells hung from the horses' necks and jingled merrily as many a party of staid businessmen rode to their homes," the Chronicle stated.⁶

Strikers maintained that they firmly intended to remain "out" until all disputes were resolved. Throughout the duration of the "walk-out" they had no intention of disrupting civic life nor attacking company property, providing that there was no effort by the office staff to operate the cars, nor to transfer men from other departments within the company to run the vehicles, nor to import "outside help" to restore transportation services. Furthermore, as long as

the company negotiated in "good faith" with the strike representatives, they promised not to call for the men on the Augusta-Aiken line to leave work, thereby shutting down the entire commuter transportation system. They also indicated that they intended to affiliate with the National Amalgamated Association of Carmen in the hopes of achieving leadership direction in their fight for industrial justice and of receiving some economic assistance. Strike officials especially acknowledged that they were seeking to pursue a consistently cautious public policy, believing that if they avoided any violent action and constantly provided sufficient advance notices of their intentions, public sympathy would be on their side. The Chief of the Augusta Police Department, George P. Elliott, stated, "I have talked to a number of the leading carmen who are on strike and have been assured by them there is to be no disorder. I told the men that as long as there was no violence or attempt to damage the property of the company, the police department would not interfere."⁷

A temporary truce was established and streetcar service was resumed the second day of the strike after a special arbitration committee was appointed to work to achieve a "fair and just settlement" of all differences. Mayor Thomas Barrett, Jr., R. Roy Goodwin, city councilman and

managing director of the Chamber of Commerce and Thomas W. Loyless of the Chronicle were largely responsible for effecting the temporary restoration of trolley services in the city while the differences between the company and its employees were being arbitrated. In the meantime, however, those employees discharged by the company remained suspended until the board of "five fair minded arbitrators" rendered a final verdict.⁸

Reverend M. Ashby Jones, Irvin Alexander, James C. Harrison, Thomas S. Gray and Rufus H. Brown were selected to comprise the special arbitration committee. As pastor of the First Baptist Church, Reverend Jones was considered to be impartial, humane and tolerant toward all views. Forty-five-year-old Irvin Alexander, a graduate of the University of Georgia and prominent attorney of the Planters' Loan and Savings Bank, was viewed as providing the necessary fine insights into the legalities of the disputes. Moreover, since he was not only the ex-Clerk of the County Ordinary, a former city councilman and had served as United States Commissioner and deputy clerk of federal courts in Augusta, his opinions were regarded of utmost importance. Youthful thirty-five-year-old Harrison was looked upon for his objectivity; a skill allegedly acquired as a result of his professional training on the Columbia Sentinel, Augusta

Chronicle and his managerial position on the Augusta Herald. Moreover, as past president of the Augusta Typographical Union it was believed that he would be sympathetic, but fair in evaluating the complaints of the disgruntled laborers. Thomas S. Gray and Rufus H. Brown, the head cashiers of the Union Savings Bank and the Georgia Railroad Bank, were selected as two prominent citizens skilled in grasping the complexities of high finance. It was widely believed that the board of five "unbiased citizens" would readily establish a "prompt and peaceable settlement" of the dispute.⁹

The Board of Arbitrators, after carefully considering the complaints of the carmen against the Augusta-Aiken and Electric Company, rendered a decision against the corporation. Attorneys E. G. Kalbfleisch and Samuel L. Olive, representing the strikers, persuasively showed how the discharge of two of the men had been completely unjustifiable. However, counsel for the plaintiffs had been unable to show injustices in the dismissal of former superintendent, W. H. Bagby, and J. E. Findley. Dismissal was sustained. Other concessions won included recognition of the union by the company, protection from discharge from the service of the corporation except for serious infractions of the rules and assurances that working conditions would improve in the

near future. Effective January, 1912, wages were to increase and work hours shorten. The attorneys for the striking carmen regretted that they had not been successful in reinstating all of those dismissed but recognized the validity of the claims of the corporation against Bagby and Findley. Mr. E. C. Deal and Vice President Pardee of the company, while speaking highly of Bagby "as a man" regretted to state that they "doubted his ability to properly handle the men." Furthermore, Olive and Kalbfleisch expressed great satisfaction that through their efforts they had persuaded the company to have the "imported carmen" brought to Augusta as "strike-breakers" sent back to New York. In short, they were most pleased with the concessions granted by the company and announced that the motormen and conductors would abide by the findings. Such swift conclusion of the strike led the Chronicle to predict that there would be no future disturbances since all the basic grievances had been so "happily settled."¹⁰

The Trolley Car Strike of 1912 and Martial Law

In the following months, however, the November, 1911, rapprochement rapidly disintegrated as the company apparently forgot many of its pledges and ushered in a period of reaction against its union employees. Proceeding along the age-old proposition of authoritarian rulers that the "King

can do no wrong," General Manager E. C. Deal broke promises that had been made. Wages were not increased in January, 1912, nor were other benefits fulfilled. Hours of employment were not shortened. Strikers had been promised the right to return to their jobs without any demerits against them or any display of hostilities, but Deal began to "Tighten-the-Screws." All promises were abrogated. Working conditions failed to improve and men were harrassed, suspended, fined and discharged without justification, indicating that there had been no real mutual understanding nor genuine reconciliation. Life on the job for others was made most miserable and almost unbearable. Every effort by grievance committees to appeal to a company arbitration board and redress problems met with failure. It was hoped that such tactics to make working conditions "so unpleasant" would force the union men to quit and go elsewhere.

"Poverty," however, observed Samuel L. Olive, attorney for local 577, "makes a man stand for hard lines sometimes."¹¹

Conductors, of course, were required by the company to turn in all cash at the end of a day's run, but received a receipt for "one sack of money, contents unknown." All too frequently, several days later shortages were "discovered" and then the missing sums were deducted from their weekly wages. Despite repeated requests from a union committee,

the company refused to have a cashier count the amount of money when it was turned in and give them a receipt indicating the exact amount. Furthermore, "pimps" were planted by the company inside of the union to "create internal strife" and inform the company what the men were planning. Failing to successfully infiltrate the union, however, Deal "founded, funded and fostered" the growth of an "independent" union-- a "fake union," a "company union." Non-union employees were encouraged to organize a rival union, thereby splitting some of the men off from the regular union and retarding its growth. Once a "dual organization" was created, he freely discharged the members of 577, after trumping up accusations of incompetence and vague statements concerning bad "past records." Those who were dismissed frequently appealed for reinstatement only to discover that they were forced to spend their entire time appealing for a hearing before a board of arbitration.¹²

After numerous conferences and counter-conferences extending over a period of ten months, efforts to achieve a genuine understanding between company officials and union representatives failed. Confronted by the recurrence of old problems and the refusal to compromise differences, labor leaders finally terminated all efforts at negotiation and called a strike. Motormen, conductors and other union

employees were greeted by a committee representing the Amalgamated Association of Carmen No. 577 and were advised to stop their cars, discharge their passengers, abandon the trolleys standing on the tracks and attend a special union meeting at Mechanic's Hall. Simultaneously, transportation services on the interurban line to Aiken ceased.

Accompanying the first day of the strike were pervasive rumors that strikebreakers had been imported from other cities to operate the Augusta-Aiken trolleys. Deal neither denied nor confirmed the rumor but assured reporters and citizens of Augusta that he would shortly have "an ample number of men to operate the cars" soon; maintaining that the "public need" for dependable commuter transportation was the primary concern of the company. "Reliable" authorities interpreted Deal's comments to mean that strikebreakers were enroute from Savannah, Atlanta, Macon and other nearby cities.¹³

"Scabs" climbed aboard the trolley cars on the second day of the strike. Regular daytime schedules would be maintained on the city lines, the company announced, but no nighttime service could be provided. Furthermore, no trolleys would operate between Augusta and Aiken until it was felt "safe" by the company to resume its operations on the Carolina side. Mayor Barrett, fearing the worst, issued

orders to Chief Elliott to "maintain order and protect life and property" by providing the company all the police protection necessary. Each car was protected from possible damage or attack by policemen stationed on the front and rear platforms. Squads of police officers were also stationed to patrol the plant and the carbarn of the corporation, by order of the mayor and chief of police. Striking carmen were advised to stay away from the Fifteenth Street carbarn and power house and were urged to refrain from any acts of violence or lawlessness.¹⁴

Groups of strikers and sympathizers were frequently dispersed during the day by special details of officers on duty but little "rowdyism" occurred early in the day. Some minor incidents erupted later on in the day, however. Large crowds hooted, jeered, cursed, taunted and shook their clenched fists in the air at the trolleys as they rolled past. W. H. Bagby, J. W. Casey and eight other strikers leaped from the Confederate Monument onto the top of a passing trolley car and snipped the guide wires, but prompt police action resulted in the swift arrest of the ten men. At Center Street several demonstrators were arrested when they attempted to board a car, halt it and jerk the motorman off. Timely police intervention prevented it from being successful. "I deplore the conditions that exist in the

strike, and I dislike to hear of any differences between capital and labor, but the City of Augusta will maintain order and protect person and property at any cost," Mayor Barrett emphatically stated.¹⁵

That evening some tracks were ripped up but they were speedily repaired and cars continued to run on the Lake View, Turpin Hill, Monte Sano and Summerville lines throughout the next day by members of "Mr. Deal's union" and "Mr. Barrett's police force." Incidents continued, however. Several hundred feet of track near the old exposition park grounds were ripped up, feeder wires were cut, trolley wires on other lines were ripped down and occasional "rumblings" broke out as police attempted to enforce the "move-on" ordinance. One conductor was struck by a piece of scrap iron hurled by an unknown person. Despite these minor incidents, relative peace prevailed in the city. Police remained on guard at the company grounds and continued to ride "shotgun" aboard the trolleys to preserve "law and order." Furthermore, Chief Elliott had ordered his men to quickly disperse all "crowds" from the streets and corners. In addition, Deal informed the Chronicle that the company had employed "security guards" as watchmen for the power plant and carbarn at Fifteenth Street to protect it from any possible assault.¹⁶

Members of the Amalgamated Association were drafted for picket duty to wave placards. Others volunteered to station themselves at the depot and make reports on all "new arrivals" on every train coming into the city. President Albert J. Allen of the Augusta Federation of Trades announced that the men in his organization strongly commended the strikers in the battles against grievous injustices. He also stated that he was contemplating calling a meeting to determine if the affiliated unions in the city should stage a sympathy strike. The carpenters' union passed a resolution endorsing the strike. The Augusta Typographical Union passed a similar resolution and pledged its moral support to the strike cause. Union men also started a badge-campaign with hundreds of laborers displaying white badges with the slogan "We Walk" in an effort to arouse public sympathy for the strikers. Many of the members of other labor unions independently announced that they were in sympathy with the strikers who quit their jobs.

17

The Augusta-Aiken trolley car strike assumed larger proportions when all seventeen crafts comprising the Augusta Federation of Trades adopted a blanket resolution threatening a general city-wide strike. Allen, presiding at a mass meeting in the Knights of Pythias Hall on Eighth Street, announced after extended discussions that the delegates from

all the labor unions had concurred that the company had not acted in good faith, "had grossly violated" all of its pledges, had frequently resorted to cheating its employees of their rightful pay and ultimately had dismissed responsible employees because of their union affiliations in an arbitrary, ruthless fashion. Unless the company renounced its old ways, initiated arbitration proceedings and promised to deal fairly with the strikers, a general strike would be called, practically paralyzing all business in the city and vicinity. Building construction would cease, railroad shops would be closed down and plumbing, electrical repairs, painting and masonry work would be declared "off."

"We believe that the cotton mill people are so strongly with us that only the word is wanted to close the doors," it was announced. Some 5,000 union employees stood ready for an immediate strike; all President Bagby of Local 577 had to do was to say the "word." Allen further charged that the city had not acted in an impartial manner by dispatching police to protect company property and assigning them duty to ride aboard trolleys being operated by scabs. Accordingly, a special labor delegation would be calling upon the mayor and chief of police to request the removal of all patrolmen. The passage of the resolution was followed by wild scenes of enthusiasm as men shouted, clapped their hands and thrust

their clenched fists into the air in a sign of total defiance. At the conclusion of the meeting, union leaders, speakers and men marched out of the hall and paraded through the downtown district.¹⁸

Deal declared that there was "nothing to arbitrate." The men had walked off their jobs and their places had been filled by others who were eager to work and anxious to advance upward into the ranks of the company. Streetcars were running providing businessmen with transportation to and from their jobs. Barrett, although refusing to make any statements regarding the threats of a general strike, privately told personal acquaintances that he had hoped for an early settlement of the strike. Publicly he announced that police would remain aboard the cars, continue to patrol the streets dispersing small crowds of strikers and sympathizers and maintain a careful watch at the company plant. "I am the executive officer of this city and I conceive it to be my duty to protect the men who are operating the cars," he stated to a Herald reporter.¹⁹

An estimated crowd of 2,500 men, women and children gathered at the courthouse Thursday evening, September 27th, to listen to prominent labor leaders and friends of the working man discuss the interurban street railway strike crisis. Attorney Samuel L. Olive, retained by Local 577,

reviewed the grievances of the strikers and summed up events to date, concluding that they had not been given a "square deal." C. A. Picquet also spoke of the injustices done by the company against its employees, declaring that they had certain basic human rights that were protected by a higher law and urging them to stick with their battle against the company. Dr. James R. Littleton addressed the audience in the smoke-filled auditorium, expressing extreme sympathy for the plight of the strikers but, like the other speakers, as a real friend of labor, he cautioned against any acts of physical violence. Richard Cornelius, a national labor leader, strongly condemned the company, reciting the various acts of unfairness against the men and asserting that their rights would only be restored by a united, determined fight. At the conclusion of the meeting, a resolution was again passed stipulating that all labor unions comprising the Augusta Federation of Trades were awaiting the plea for support from the Amalgamated Association No. 577 to join in a general strike. For a second time, the motion carried unanimously amidst a deafening roar.²⁰

After the meeting adjourned, numerous extemporaneous speeches were made by several strikers, denouncing the presence of scabs in the city and calling for a concerted, massive demonstration against the company at the power

plant. Only a few men spoke out, urging that they keep their emotions under control, remain peaceful and law-abiding citizens and refrain from any acts of vandalism or rowdiness. The vast majority, swayed by the fiery, emotional oratory of a few, marched in mass toward the Fifteenth Street powerhouse, waving red flares, chanting, cheering and crying out: "Down with the Scabs!" At the plant, a vast multitude of around 1,500 people swarmed outside the gates and fences, shouting at the scabs to come out. A few exceedingly naive company-men, believing the promises that no harm would come to them, stepped out into the milling crowd. Fists lashed out, heads were cracked together, noses were punched, eyes were gouged and feet kicked out at the fallen, crumpled bodies. Simultaneously, as the scuffles broke out, pistol shots rang out. "If there was one shot there was a hundred," Bagby recorded in his reminisces, and "bloody faces and scared heads a plenty" abounded. Hundreds scrambled over the fence, causing it to buckle and collapse, as they rushed into the yards of the carbarn searching for other scabs, hurling bricks, rocks and other missiles and shattering the windows of the buildings. But the real target of the enraged mob was not the company property nor buildings but the hated non-union employees. Frightened and powerless to resist the onrush of several hundred angry

men, the strikebreakers rushed further back into the yards, seeking safety under the old, run-down and discarded vehicles at the rear of the power house and on top of the boilers. Captured, they were dragged from their hiding places, hot, dirty, exhausted, sweaty and trembling and then "violently handled" and "badly beaten." Several were pistol-whipped, slashed and mauled, necessitating emergency hospital medical treatment.²¹

During the carbarn riot, a great many revolver shots rang out; indeed, "there was a regular fusilade of bullets," the Chronicle reported. Some of the guards had exchanged shots with unidentifiable persons. Overwhelmed by the sheer numbers, police units were apparently powerless to prevent the "degradations of the mob" even though additional squads had been rushed to the scene. Rumors quickly spread through the city after the midnight civil disturbance electrifying community tensions. Rebel forces, it was said, were planning an all-out attack upon the company and possibly the city. Common street gossip also included the story that some "anarchists" were plotting to dynamite certain key buildings.²²

Notified about the "dangerous turn of events," Mayor Barrett, possibly over-reacting, hastily called Governor Joseph M. Brown at Marietta requesting assistance in

maintaining "law and order" in the city. "Little Joe" Brown, former Vice President of the First National Bank of Marietta and railroad traffic manager of the Western and Atlantic railroad, quickly responded to the formal request, declaring that a "state of insurrection" existed and dispatching an order through the adjutant general to Major Abram Levy, commander of the local battalion, to call out four companies and assemble them at the Augusta armory. The governor's order was simple: "Put down disorder and rioting."²³

At 1:15 A.M., Friday, September 28, 1912, Major Levy placed the city under martial law. For the second time in the peacetime history of Augusta, a military commander was placed in charge and given full power to protect the company, its properties and employees from any further attacks. Some 260 soldiers were stationed at various check-points, civil law was virtually suspended and military control was an established fact even though most residents were unaware of the full meaning of martial law.²⁴

Benjamin F. Baker, father of seven children, and youthful, eighteen-year-old John Henry Carl Dorne, brother of an Augusta policeman, were shot down after an encounter with the guards at 6:30 P.M. on Fifteenth and Broad. According to an eyewitness, H. H. Whitehead, a Herald reporter, Baker

and Dorne were apparently unaware that the street was closed to through traffic and ignorant of the fact that troops were guarding the area. Soldiers appeared, waved their hands, hollered at them to "Halt!" Not comprehending the meaning of the military command, they mistakenly continued. Several rounds were fired at them which frightened their horse, causing it to bolt and gallop pell mell toward the sentries. The soldiers reacted by firing at the runaway horse and buggy as it dashed toward them. In the general fusilade of shots, Baker was mortally wounded in the shoulder, arm and hip. Dorne's chest was ripped open by steel jacketed bullets.²⁵

Charles W. Wilson, his wife and a small child were driving past the scene. Wilson was just shifting into second gear when a National Guardsman suddenly stepped into the middle of Fifteenth Street in front of his car and ordered him to "Halt!" But before he could stop his automobile, within a few seconds "probably a dozen shots" were fired. Crying out, he exclaimed, "My God, don't shoot any more, don't you see my wife and child?" But the troops continued to fire at the car riddling it with bullet holes. The Wilson vehicle was "badly damaged," but, miraculously, none of the occupants were injured or killed.²⁶

Thirty-three-year-old Robert V. Christie, a traveling

salesman for the Nixon Grocery Company and former part owner of the Black-Christie Overall Manufacturing Company, was far less fortunate. Arriving on the scene after the shootings, but apparently ignorant of the tragic events that had transpired, Christie was startled when armed guards leaped out into the roadway commanding him to "Halt!" When he failed to comply with the order, a number of guardsmen simultaneously fired their rifles. Christie slumped forward in his roadster, mortally wounded in the chest and lungs. "I told the militiamen not to shoot any more for God's sake; you have already killed him," an eyewitness who rushed to the scene reported, but they "paid no attention to me."²⁷

Several of the buildings and homes in the area were shot-up as "wild bullets" thudded into their walls, shattered windows and terrified occupants. "Residences were hit and the air was dangerously laden with bullets from these army guns at and during the time of this horrible triple slaying at the power house," Bagby recorded in his memoir. Pedestrians walking past ducked in horror as bullets zinged overhead. Will Cain, sputtering past on his motorcycle, skidded to a crash, the handlebars shot off by stray bullets. A large crowd which quickly gathered at the scene was stunned, shocked and horrified when the militia dispersed them by firing several rounds into the air. One

irate, innocent bystander who was shot at wired Adjutant General William B. Obear after the fracas, "Militia shooting down citizens like dogs. Can you give us any protection?"²⁸

News of the shootings spread rapidly through the community, promoting a general panic. On almost every street corner there congregated small groups of citizens discussing the recent events. Private homes were alive with heated debates about the justice or injustice of the guards in slaying citizens. Special conferences were held by the mayor, chief of police, city councilmen and the key figures in county politics. "Men who had never in their lives carried a weapon commenced buying all kinds of weapons as a move for self protection against the unexpected," Bagby recorded. Rumors were rife that a general bloodbath was impending. Charges and counter-charges were made against the owners of the electric railway company. Some city officials hired Pinkertons to protect themselves from possible injuries or attacks. Company men were too frightened to appear on the streets without body guards. "Scabs" armed themselves in self-defense; some, fearing the worst, quietly left the city. Police, in an endeavor to prevent further strife, cautiously patrolled the streets, stopping to interrogate loiterers, encouraging people to go to their homes,

breaking up small crowds and arresting "suspicious" persons. In order to ward off any further violence, Major Levy announced that full military controls would be exerted. He also stated that a "careful examination" of the shootings by military authorities would be forthcoming; although, in his opinion, the errors had been made by civilians ignorant of the meaning of martial law. Nevertheless, he placed Captains James F. Henderson and Thad C. Jowitt, commanders of Company A and B, First Infantry Regiment, under military arrest for violations of the fifty-eighth and the sixty-second Articles of War to await court martial proceedings before a military tribunal. In the meantime, as military commander of the city, he was initiating all steps necessary to assure the maintenance of law and order.²⁹

Troops were ordered to patrol the streets, affording protection to all of the important financial industrial and commercial enterprises. Several infantry companies were stationed at the carbarn and posted at the power house. Also a gatling gun squad was assigned to guard company property and its employees from further attacks. Check-points, controlling the entry and exit of all vehicles in the vicinity of the company, were hastily constructed and manned. Three powerful searchlights were installed upon the tops of buildings, illuminating the streets and grounds

surrounding company property. Large signs were posted on Greene Street, west of the Enterprise mill and on Fifteenth Street, north and south of the power plant, warning all unauthorized personnel to stay out. "Anyone passing this point without authority will be SHOT--By Order of Major Levy." Squads guarded the two river bridges that spanned the Savannah, stopping all vehicles entering and leaving the city, inspecting them for arms and ammunition, and requiring pass permits for those traveling to Aiken. In the immediate vicinity of the Augusta-Aiken headquarters, no through traffic was permitted. All persons in the area were stopped, interrogated, and after stating the nature of their business, were permitted to pass. It was also announced by the military authorities that "crack troopers" from Savannah "known for their marksmanship" were scheduled to arrive aboard four day coaches at 7:50 P.M., Saturday evening, to reinforce key points in the city.³⁰

Pressures to secure peace developed quickly in the aftermath of the recent events. Merchants, businessmen, cotton factors, bankers, attorneys and industrialists pointed out that while waiting for the company and the union to reconcile all their differences, trade in the city had been almost completely paralyzed. They pointed out that their rights were being ignored even though they were not

a party to the controversy. Business sales had greatly suffered while company officials, strikers, scabs and soldiers had battled out their differences with little success other than to seal off the city from external trade and even discourage internal trade because people were too frightened to leave their homes and apartments. They emphatically stated that mediation was the only means of bringing about a satisfactory and permanent resolution of differences. The Chamber of Commerce, Augusta Cotton Exchange, Augusta Board of Trade, Merchants and Manufacturers' Association and the Chronicle and Herald newspapers joined together in a common plea that strikers and the officials of the company negotiate their differences at the conference tables instead of in the streets, alleys and major intersections of the city. Repeated efforts were also made to bring the strike to the conference tables by the political leaders of the city and county. The mayor called for an end to the "great turmoil" which had prevailed in the city. The City Council passed a resolution urging the Augusta-Aiken Railway and Electric Corporation to initiate arbitration with the representatives of the striking carmen and recommended that the officials and attorneys representing the Amalgamated Association of Street Railway Employees adjudicate their differences with management.³¹

Repeated attempts to bring the strike to a swift conclusion, however, were unsuccessful. Every peace proposal put forth by the mayor, aldermen, recognized leaders of the various business organizations, editors and influential citizens in the community met with colossal failure. In each instance, peacemakers were ignored, and occasionally ridiculed as being either pro-union or sympathetic to management. The strike situation remained virtually unchanged--not because of the adamant attitudes of union officials, but because representatives of the company, especially General Manager Deal, asserted that there was nothing to discuss with labor.³²

There were no pressing reasons for Deal to respond to the requests for adjudication since trolley cars were back in operation in the city and commuter services were being provided. Moreover, the vehicles, employees and passengers were being protected by policemen, deputy sheriffs, "special deputies" and guardsmen. Mayor Barrett, Chief of Police Elliott, Sheriff John W. Clark of Richmond County and Major Levy, in order to preclude further violence, had sworn in a "large posse" of 100 men, many of whom were "most influential businessmen," to ride the trolleys, patrol the car-lines, trail behind the trolleys in their own vehicles and act swiftly to provide immediate additional assistance in

the event of any disturbances. Not only was Deal being assisted by the local city and county authorities but, even though the total number of National Guardsmen had been considerably reduced, nevertheless, a squadron of forty enlisted men and three officers remained stationed at the power house, protecting the plant from any mass attacks and continuing to stop all "suspicious" parties in the vicinity. Small squads of deputies were also stationed at crucial junctures along the belt line looping the city. All persons, it was announced in the daily newspapers, who attempted to interfere, would be immediately arrested and turned over to the military authorities for incarceration pending trial. Deal, moreover, was unconcerned about job replacements, stating, "I have been receiving applications from a number seeking employment, and have also had application from ten of the striking carmen, asking that they be reinstated."³³

Refusal to arbitrate with the union leaders was largely responsible for subsequent new outbreaks of violence against the strikebreakers employed to operate the cars of the Augusta-Aiken Electric Corporation. Minor clashes erupted when the company attempted to restore intercity transportation services. Scabs were attacked and beaten up by angry strikers and sympathizers near Belvedere, South Carolina. Tracks in North Augusta were carefully inspected after

rumors persisted that they were rigged for explosion; a half-pound stick of dynamite was discovered. In North Augusta, as a trolley departed for Aiken, it was halted, two men boarded it, pulled the whistle strap, and guards made a fast "get-a-way" when they saw swarms of men rushing toward the vehicle from both sides of the track. Numerous shots rang out; one of the scabs was shot in the hip. Another's face was grazed. Roughly hauled off the car, they were forced to "dance" while men fired shots near their feet. Clothes were ripped from their bodies as angry men grabbed them, twisted them around, pushed them back and forth between strikers, punched them in the face, clobbered them in their bodies and cracked their heads with clubs and butts of guns. Thoroughly "thrashed," they were left lying on the ground. "Pistols were pulled by a score or more, and it is said that fully 100 shots rang out," Sheriff T. P. Rabon of Aiken County, South Carolina, reported. He also estimated that around 600 men were in the mob that attacked the trolley car. Furthermore, he explained, the leaders boasted before departing that all future attempts to operate cars on the Augusta-Aiken line would fail; strikebreakers would be seized, beaten and run off.³⁴

Violence across the Savannah brought a corresponding increase in physical attacks upon scabs operating intracity

trolleys. Motorman Frank Lichenstein "Kelly" was shot down. Conductor Allen Brooks was mortally wounded after a mob attacked the trolley as it clanged past the Scheutzen Platz. One of the belt line cars of the Augusta-Summerville-Monte Sano run was attacked on Gwinnett Street near Fifteenth Street. The motorman was pulled off, beaten up and several shots were fired at the fleeing scabs as they ran towards the safety of the dark woods. By the time squads of policemen and special deputies arrived on the scene, it was too late to apprehend those involved in the fracas.³⁵

Recognizing that physical assaults were achieving little results in forcing the company to negotiate with its representatives and perceiving that these events were rapidly estranging public opinion for their cause, union officials decided that if they threatened a general strike again, possibly closing down all industries in the city and affecting around 5,000 to 8,000 workers, it might encourage politicians to respond to the plight of labor and seek to coerce management to meet at the conference tables, achieving eventually an amicable resolution and ending the protracted strike which was disrupting normal conditions in the city.

In a vigorous determined effort to avert the impending general strike, Mayor Barrett and various key aldermen met

the representatives of the Railway Company and their legal counselor. In the discussions they emphasized that there was a broad, intense and general desire by city leaders and the vast majority of businessmen to reconcile all differences between the strikers and the company at the conference tables. Greatly stressed was the fact that speedy but fair resolutions would be for the benefit of the entire community. In numerous heated, independent and lengthy conferences, Mayor Barrett urged that the company should increase its wages, shorten hours, adopt a "broad liberal spirit" towards its employees and even hire only "bona-fide citizens of Augusta."³⁶

At a special meeting of the Chamber of Commerce, Frederick B. Pope, while expressing his personal sympathy with the union and strongly deploring the acts of violence that had occurred in the city, called upon all the "good citizens" to unite on some plan of action to restore peaceful relations. The Augusta Cotton Exchange also held a special session deploring the recent events and calling for the creation of a board of arbitration. James P. Doughty drafted resolutions resolving that all members of the organization were greatly concerned by the ways in which the strike had adversely affected the cotton business in the city and were seriously alarmed at the steady increase in

"violence and crime" that was continuing to erupt. They strongly recommended that concerted action be put forth to force the two warring parties to adjudicate their differences at the conference tables. The resolutions were passed with unanimous support. Both organizations called for the creation of a special board of arbitration. Mayor Barrett, responding to the rising tide of opposition to violence, lawlessness and the general demand for arbitration, announced that a special arbitration board would be created with Frederick B. Pope acting as chairman and selecting the five mediators. The power behind the board, it was announced, would lie in the fact that if the company refused to accede to its suggestions that negotiations begin with the union, the city would order that all trolleys be returned to the car barns, locked up inside them and the city, county and state forces that were responsible for protecting the company would be withdrawn.³⁷

Pope appointed to the five-man board Thomas W. Loyless of the Chronicle as chairman; James Paul Verdery, President of the Enterprise Mill; J. L. Janes, the first vice president of the Merchants and Manufacturers' Association; Judge Enoch H. Callaway of the Richmond County Superior Court and Albert J. Allen, the President of the Augusta Federation of Trades, charging them to bring together the two contending

parties, achieve a reconciliation of all basic differences and terminate the streetcar strike as quickly as possible.³⁸

To a certain extent, the arbitration board was successful in securing concessions from management beneficial to labor. The "money bag question" was solved. All conductors were promised that in the future their cash returns would be counted at the end of their runs and receipts issued. Second, the board recommended that shorter hours of employment be introduced by the company, suggesting that a ten-hour work day was accepted on almost a nation-wide basis for workers. Third, wages were to increase, effective January 1, 1913. The proposed hourly salary recommended by the arbitrators was a minimum of 17 cents and a maximum of 22 cents per hour, depending upon the number of years of service in the company. The new wage schedule, it was pointed out, represented an increase of 2 cents per hour and was supposed to be on a level of the average wage scale for motormen, conductors and other streetcar employees in twenty-two Southern cities. Last of all, it was requested by the board that the company recognize the Amalgamated Association of Railway Employees No. 577; but no "closed shop" contract with the union was accepted, nor acknowledged by inference. However, it was strongly recommended that the company not "discriminate" in any way against the union and its members.³⁹

Reinstatement of all employees, however, was not resolved. All men "under charges" remained indefinitely suspended until their individual cases were heard by a special arbitration committee appointed by the company. Some thirty-five to fifty former employees would be carefully screened since their return to work was less than desirable. Their work records would be reviewed, the charges investigated and, providing that they were exonerated, they would be permitted to return to their former jobs. If fully cleared, they would receive back wages for all time lost since the day of the settlement of the strike. Second, the questions of "future discharges" and "indefinite suspensions" were not settled by the board of arbitration. Such matters were not subject to resolution by the board, the company maintained. These were internal issues to be handled by appropriate administrators and fell within the exclusive domain of private enterprise operations. Discussion of these matters was irrelevant, since they were not negotiable, nor subject to future public arbitration.⁴⁰

Union leaders were forced to capitulate, albeit more reluctantly. They expressed fears that many of the strikers would be discharged in the near future "on account of lack of unionism." They also pointed out that charges made against the men were often "trivial" or "trumped up" accusations.

Also, they were apprehensive of presenting such cases to a board of appeals selected by the company and staffed by company officials, since they might be denied any further course of action once that board had rendered its decisions. Promises that all strikebreakers would be deported from Augusta and most strikers hired back by the company, however, swayed them to end the six-week strike.⁴¹

The day after the contract was signed and the strike was declared officially over, union officials learned about slight modifications in the agreements established with management. They were informed that there was a slight "hitch in the agreement" on the reduction of hours. The company regretted that it could not honor the recommendations of the board and that future working time would remain "the same as at present." Second, no detailed copies of the specific charges made against the former employees who were remaining "on the bench" would be furnished because such requests were a "physical impossibility." Moreover, preliminary screening determined that there were only twenty-three cases that were going to be actually considered by the board of arbitration; the others were ruled out in informal discussions with company representatives. After lengthy sessions for two weeks, union leaders were told that only thirteen men were reinstated and that the dismissal of the

others was totally justifiable. Since employment and discharge of all employees was justly and properly a matter to be determined by management--and this had been a basic point agreed to by the union leaders--there was no process for appeal.⁴²

The Georgia Railroad Strike, Atlanta Joint
Terminals Strike and the Threat of a
Southeastern Rail Transportation Strike

A major explanation for the concerted pressures of the business leaders and municipal authorities to bring the Augusta street railway strike to a swift conclusion was related to their awareness that a broader more complex strike--involving far greater numbers of employees, eclipsing the local trolley car strike, focusing attention away from Augusta to Atlanta and ultimately threatening to shut down the entire Southeastern railroad transportation system--was developing as a result of conflicts between union leaders and officials of the Georgia Railroad Company.

Officials of the Georgia Railroad had been anticipating a strike since early September. It was almost a certainty that the firemen, conductors, flagmen, baggage masters and yard trainmen would go out on a strike, especially since several months of preliminary conferences and extensive correspondence between the superintendent, general manager and executive leaders of the union had not achieved any

amicable resolution of differences over the firing of two union employees.

It was the contention of Vice President James Murdock of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen (B.R.T.) and Vice President T. A. Gregg of the Order of Railway Conductors (O.R.C.) that the dismissals occurred in an arbitrary, unjust fashion without any substantial investigation into the charges made against conductor J. T. Paschal and trainman A. M. Morgan. Until Paschal's abrupt termination, he was regarded by the company as an exemplary and efficient railroad employee. Beginning as a young, ambitious, talented teenager from Harlem, Georgia, after nearly nineteen years of service he had worked his way up through the ranks from a flagman to a top flight conductor. Gregg and Murdock were absolutely convinced that his dismissal was not due to Paschal's failure to comply with the Federal law stipulating that no trains nor crews be operated in excess of a sixteen-hour time limit but that this was a mere technical violation used by the company as a pretext to discharge him. The real reason, in their opinion, was his crucial role in helping to organize the union. They pointed specifically to the fact that no fine had been levied nor even a suspension meted out, both of which were additionally regarded as the most severe penalty for such a minor infraction of the law. But,

according to Superintendent W. S. Brand, the Georgia Railroad was attempting to cooperate with the Federal Government's "Hours of Service" law passed in Congress in March, 1907, requesting that railroads cooperate in recognizing the sixteen-hour maximum work time. Paschal, while in charge as conductor of a westbound freight train destined to Atlanta, exceeded the sixteen-hour period, defying federal laws, failing to communicate with the dispatcher's office and ignoring company bulletin rule 132 instructing employees to honor the Federal law. His action thus placed the Georgia Railroad in jeopardy and subjected it to the possibility of penalties by the law.⁴³

Trainman A. M. Morgan, according to union executives, had also been dismissed on less than plausible grounds. Morgan had been fired because he had made "many errors," or "overcharges" in his company expense account amounting to approximately \$2.75. The company took the position that he was "either inexcusably careless, possessed of a memory which is deplorably faulty, or that he was dishonest. Certainly we cannot retain in our train service those who are careless, or whose memories are treacherous, or who are dishonest. Either cause is sufficient to and should eliminate him from our service," Superintendent Brand informed union leaders. Murdock and Gregg, while admitting the possibility

that Morgan may have attempted to "pad" his expense account, felt that he should have been reprimanded, fined or suspended but certainly not discharged. Accordingly, they demanded that both Paschal and Morgan be fully reinstated, restored their former seniority rights and compensated for all time lost.⁴⁴

Since the railroad failed to comply with their demands or even to work out an acceptable compromise, the union leaders called for a strike ballot. When the ballots were counted, only five out of 300 votes cast were against striking. "Never before in my recollection," said Gregg, "have I known a strike being declared by the conductors and trainmen because of . . . employee[s] being unfairly dismissed by the company."⁴⁵

Effective 7:30 A.M., October 2, 1912, the Georgia Railroad was "locked tight." All trains were idle. The entire line was shut down. No trains were operating out of Augusta nor were trains scheduled to depart from Atlanta moving over the Georgia tracks. No trains were moving anywhere. And no overtures were being made by either side toward effecting a settlement. Within a single day, heavy congestion of all interstate traffic was noticeable, especially since cotton receipts and cash crops were arriving and departing for other cities. All along the main road lines, branches and

the Augusta belt line, bales of cotton, boxes of fruit, bags of potatoes and many perishables were stacking up. Although there was an attempt to re-route mail over different lines, huge bags of United States mail remained standing in the depot untouched.⁴⁶

Within a single day over 300 miles of railroad lines were tied up. The Georgia Railroad territory between Augusta and Atlanta, Augusta and Macon, Augusta and Athens and Augusta and Washington was without train service. Within a week the merchants, businessmen and industrialists were demanding that rail service be promptly restored. Captains of industry urged that the roads be re-opened for freight shipments, especially cotton, or else a large number of the textile mills would be paralyzed and lay-offs would follow. Because of the importance of fall business transactions, merchants, bankers, brokers and factors complained of the impending slump in retail-wholesale trade. Some alarmed businessmen urged that the Federal postmaster and public officials of the city ought to initiate correspondence to appropriate government men in Washington, alerting them to the fact that bags of United States mail were piling up in the Walker Street Depot, informing them that in the other towns along the lines mail was not being delivered and requesting prompt federal government intervention to restore

postal service. Furthermore, many concerned citizens emphasized that consumers in the small towns of rural Georgia along "Old Reliable's" lines were clamoring for immediate relief as local food supplies rapidly dwindled and human needs went wanting. Farmers were also being greatly affected by the strike as they saw their perishable cash crops remain sitting in the crates, bags and boxes on the loading platforms of the railroad stations; indeed, they were most anxious to have their crops shipped to the urban markets as their future livelihood depended upon their sales. Quick restoration of transportation services was being demanded from many diverse groups for many different reasons; but they all wanted to see trains back in operation over the lines of the Georgia road.⁴⁷

The Georgia Railroad strike was fast becoming more than a local Augusta issue. Conductors, trainmen, switchmen and yardmen employed in the Georgia Railroad yard in the Atlanta Joint Terminals walked off their jobs in a "sympathy" strike. Furthermore, union leaders warned that if the company attempted to operate its trains with "outside help," a general rail strike in the terminus would occur and all of the seven major railroad systems--the Louisville and Nashville; Atlanta and West Point; Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis; Alabama, Birmingham and Atlantic; Central of Georgia;

Southern Railway System and Seaboard Air Line--converging at Atlanta would be tied up. The center of the Georgia Railroad strike crisis was clearly shifting from Augusta to Atlanta. Accompanying that shift was the increasing danger of a general strike, tying up the Atlanta Joint Terminals, affecting an estimated 18,000 employees, involving seven major railroad systems and halting the rail transportation operations of the entire Southeast.⁴⁸

Believing that the union was "bluffing" and convinced of the importance of restoring transportation services in the sixteen counties of the Georgia system, strikebreakers were imported to man the trains. The first Georgia train left for Atlanta with strikebreakers in charge of the vehicle. But the first attempt and all successive efforts met with failure as determined strikers and sympathizers stopped all trains. "Passengers" boarded the train at one station and at a pre-arranged point brought it to a sudden, screeching, grinding halt by pulling the emergency cable; conductors, flagmen and brakemen hastily departed. Afterwards, the raiders pulled the train off onto the sidetracks and locked the switches. Passenger train No. 28 was stopped, run into a siding at Dearing and its crew forced to "take to the woods," Sheriff Horace Clary of Thomson, Georgia, and Deputy Sheriff Rheney Wood and other members of a posse

arrived at the scene to protect crews and get the train back into operation but, owing to the large numbers of angry men threatening bodily harm, failed to succeed. At Camak, fourteen trains were tied up as crews walked off the job, fearing that their physical well-being was in dire jeopardy. In Thomson, a train was derailed, the crew scattered and several shots were fired when one of the scabs attempted to throw the switch permitting other trains to by-pass the derailed vehicle. At Union Point when the train started to pull out of the station, several dozen warning shots were fired into the air. When it arrived at Thomson a large crowd jeered, howled, hooted, cursed and gestured with their fingers and fists at the scabs aboard. A freight train from Atlanta to Augusta was forcefully stopped and run into the siding. At Camak, several engines were disabled after unidentifiable persons let the water out of the tenders and drained every boiler. In Hamburg, South Carolina, when a train pulled into the yard of the Southern road, strikebreakers were attacked, punched in the faces with "knucks" and cracked over the heads with "billies." At Macon an angry, seething mob threatened to lynch several scabs if they did not depart Georgia; they were last seen hastily fleeing down the railroad tracks.⁴⁹

Trains were stopped for several successive days. While

conductors naively listened to accounts that the tracks ahead had been torn-up, groups of hostile men swarmed aboard. By the time the conductors realized that they had been deceived they were powerless to act. In other instances, trains, attempting to "highball" through the towns, were brought to screeching halts as engineers spotted glaring red torches brightly illuminating the scenes of derailed disrupted tracks. Forced to stop, within seconds "boarding parties" were searching through the coaches and baggage cars for strikebreakers. Arriving at Lithonia, Buckhead, Union Point, Crawfordville, Dearing, Thomson and other stations, crews discovered that their trains could not depart. Shrill whistles broke the silence but vast crowds refused to leave the tracks and permit the trains to pass. Frequent, repeated "hold-ups" occurred along the line. Revolvers were flashed by some members of the raiders; others brandished clubs. Once they were aboard, scabs were seized, hauled off the trains, harangued by the mob and then had the "hell" knocked out of them. . . . We hate to do things like this, but there is a little war on now--a war for a principle and we are in it to the finish," a raider explained.

After several days of unsuccessful efforts to move freight and passengers and repeated sporadic outbreaks of violence against scabs, Superintendent Brand of the Georgia

announced that there would be no further attempts to operate the trains. General Manager Colonel T. K. Scott, furthermore, regretted to state that Governor Brown had informed "The Georgia" that the state was powerless to act without individual requests from the local authorities, telegraphing the Governor that they were incapable of handling the crisis situations in their towns. In the meantime, the Governor recommended that all trains try to "highball" through the towns non-stop from Atlanta to Augusta or to obtain a federal injunction.⁵⁰

In the Atlanta Joint Terminals railroad employees of the Louisville and Nashville and the Atlanta and West Point struck in sympathy with the Georgia strikers. "Violation of neutrality" was the charge brought against the roads. These lines were accused of lending "active assistance" to the Georgia by switching freight to and from their yards for them; thereby violating neutrality regulations. Vice Presidents Gregg and Murdock charged that the other roads in the terminus were assuming business which had been "purposely diverted" from the Georgia in an effort to destroy the strike. Furthermore, Northern scabs had been hired to replace strikers and the companies maintained that they were permanent employees, not just temporary help who would later be discharged. "We have as many employees just now as we

need," officials in the terminal offices explained. New, experienced men had been imported; hence, strikers were no longer needed since their jobs had been filled. However, officials promised that they were willing to take their former employees back "as fast as we have room for them."

The Atlanta Joint Terminals problem was the "gordian knot" of the Georgia Railroad strike. Union officials maintained that all employees who had walked off in sympathy were to be fully reinstated when the strike was terminated and all scabs dismissed. Georgia Railroad executives, however, maintained that the matter of reinstatement was an issue to be resolved by the board of Atlanta Joint Terminals and the other railroad corporations involved in the broadening strike, as the matter was clearly beyond their immediate jurisdiction. Union leaders, nevertheless, adamantly asserted that unless all employees were fully reinstated, they intended to lock up the rail systems of the Southeast by calling a general transportation strike. Vice Presidents Gregg and Murdock, in a move to prove that they were not bluffing, requested the general national chairmen of their unions to meet in Atlanta "at once" to consider the reluctant "arbitration attitude" and to discuss the possibility of a general rail strike.⁵¹

Departing from Augusta and arriving in Atlanta, Vice

Presidents Murdock and Gregg met with fifteen chairmen of the executive committees of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and the Order of Railway Conductors in a series of lengthy sessions, discussing whether or not a general strike would be called or averted. After conferring with the directors of the boards of the various rail companies, attorneys and other corporation officials, they reached no satisfactory understanding. Majority union sentiment in subsequent conferences was strongly in favor of ordering a general strike. An ultimatum was delivered: all rail lines handling Georgia railroad business refusing to reinstate former employees who had struck in sympathy and ignoring requests to dismiss imported laborers would immediately comply with union demands or else "one by one strikers would get them." Notices of an impending general strike were served on the executive officers of the railroad unions and directors of the Louisville and Nashville; Seaboard Air Line; Atlantic Coast Line; Atlanta and West Point; Atlanta, Birmingham and Atlantic; Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis and the Central of Georgia.⁵²

Also hastening to Atlanta from Augusta were federal representatives of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the United States Commissioner of Labor. Judge Martin A. Knapp of the Interstate Commerce Court and Commissioner

Dr. Charles P. Neill had arrived in Augusta in an effort to negotiate with representatives of the Georgia Railroad and the unions.

Rumors persisted that they would be able to "wind-up" the crisis in short order because of their extensive experiences. Many were greatly impressed with the superb qualifications of seventy-nine-year-old Knapp, who had first been appointed to the I.C.C. by President Harrison, and continuously reappointed by Presidents Cleveland and Roosevelt. When President William Howard Taft had appointed him as chairman of the Commerce Court in 1910, most of the owners of the railroad corporations were extremely well pleased. Consistently viewing the role of the national government as being the force to produce a "stable equilibrium" between private enterprises and the public, Knapp had been enthusiastically championed by the vested interests of the major railroad corporations because they realized that federal regulation was far more beneficial to their private interests rather than the "less controllable and more unpredictable" varied forms of state regulations. As the ex officio mediator of the federal government under the Erdman Act, it was believed that Knapp would resolve the Southern railroad-labor dispute. Forty-seven-year-old Charles Patrick Neill, after departing from his position as a faculty member of

Catholic University, had had a comparable amount of administrative experience as a federal mediator, serving first as assistant recorder in the Anthracite Strike Commission of 1902, recorder in the Arbitration Board in Birmingham in 1903 and becoming United States Commissioner of Labor in February, 1905.

After protracted informal discussions and numerous conferences, Knapp and Neill were not successful in bringing the two contending parties together, much less resolve the rail crisis because neither party was willing to accept the federal government acting in the capacity of mediator-- a fact which was a major weakness of the Erdman Act. Bolstered by the fact that the Georgia Railroad strike was preventing the delivery of U.S. mail and the Atlanta Joint Terminals strike was threatening to interfere with interstate traffic, however, they realized that the government was in a position to seek an injunction, thereby forcing negotiation.⁵³

An injunction was granted, ordering restraint of anyone attempting to interfere with the operation of the trains, thereby preventing the delivery of United States mail and interstate shipments of freight. United States Marshal George F. White and his federal deputies arrived in Augusta to serve the restraining order on the named defendants. If

unsuccessful in handling any "disturbances," White was authorized to request the federal court for the militia. Notices were dispatched to the committee members of the two labor unions, attorneys and officials of the Georgia road. Public advertisements were published in the newspapers. Notices were mailed to authorities of all municipalities along the road and posted at all the train stations, informing readers that federal laws prohibited the interruption of mail trains and cars bearing interstate freight. Marshal White stated that the Georgia Railroad was not being placed under the protective wing of the federal government but that only a temporary restraining order had been granted. "I positively will not myself supervise the operation of any trains on the Georgia Railroad nor put my deputies on any of the trains until I am ordered to do so by the court," he told a Chronicle reporter. The Georgia road, he maintained, was "merely" providing him with two trains to serve "injunction papers to parties living along the lines between Augusta and Atlanta and Macon and Camak." On the assumption that union men would not interfere with the postal service, railroad officials hooked mail cars to the rear of trains to prevent cutting. Confronted with the federal injunction, however, the parties to the dispute accepted mediation.⁵⁴

Commissioner of Labor, Dr. Charles P. Neill, acting as federal mediator between the company and the union, achieved an understanding that J. T. Paschal and A. M. Morgan's dismissals would go before a special Board of Arbitrators in Atlanta for adjudication. This was the first major breakthrough toward ending the strike. Second, Dr. Neill also obtained an agreement from the railroad executives that all "sympathy" strikers would be re-employed within half an hour after the agreement was signed by company and union officials ordering the strikers on the Georgia road to "report for duty." Third, it was mutually agreed that a special Arbitration Board consisting of three impartial persons representing management, labor and the government be created to hear the testimonies presented by attorneys of the company and the union in the Paschal-Morgan matter. Last of all, since the "Articles of Peace" were acceptable to all parties concerned, the Georgia Railroad strike was officially terminated effective October 13, 1912, at 9:30 P.M., thus preventing the threatened general rail transportation strike in the Southeast.⁵⁵

The Atlanta Board of Arbitration to hear the Paschal-Morgan matter was selected in the following weeks. Railroad interests in the board were represented by Charles A. Wickersham, chairman of the board of the Atlanta Joint Terminals

and prominent executive of the Atlanta and West Point Road. Fred A. Burgess, Assistant Grand Chief of the Board of Locomotive Engineers, was selected to be the second member. It was amicably agreed that Dr. Neill and Judge Knapp's choice of Dr. William Lea Chambers as presiding judge in the hearing was acceptable to both parties. They had shrewdly chosen a prominent southerner of considerable merit. Chambers was former President of the First National Bank of Montgomery, a key original organizer of the second ranking southern city in iron production, Sheffield, Alabama and a diplomat of some importance who had served as a member of an international commission responsible for drafting the Berlin Treaty of 1890 between Germany, Britain and the United States. Moreover, he had served as chief justice of the International Court in Samoa, been a member of the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission and been actively involved in the U.S. Commission of mediation and conciliation.⁵⁶

In a series of hearings, Wickersham, Burgess and Chambers listened to attorneys for the plaintiffs and defense testimony by witnesses subpoenaed to appear in court and accepted letters, telegrams and business records for evaluation. Based upon the evidence presented, they would determine the fate of conductor Paschal and trainman Morgan whose dismissals were the primary factor in bringing on the

Georgia Railroad strike and tying up the entire system for several weeks.

First, union officials charged that the cause of Paschal's dismissal was not due to his violation of the sixteen-hour law nor was Morgan's discharge due to his "padding" of his expense account but, in both instances, the Georgia Railroad had fired the men because of its "animus" against the union of which the two men were active members.

Second, it was the contention of Vice Presidents Gregg and Murdock that the dismissals were the result of intense personal animosities displayed towards the two employees by the company. Both Paschal and Morgan, it was contended, were consistently discriminated against by the company. Neither of them had been treated in a fair, just and humane manner. Situations between them and their immediate superiors had been far from pleasant for an extended period of time. For several months the company had displayed strong hostilities towards them and had made little or no effort to listen to their legitimate complaints.

Thirdly, Murdock and Gregg charged that the Georgia Railroad Company had been responsible for precipitating the strike by ignoring an appeal by the union stating that, unless a reply was made to the strike committee before a

specified time, a strike would be ordered. No reply was made until fifteen minutes before the strike order was to go into effect. By that time it was too late to issue orders, contact all officials involved, notify all employees and call the strike to a halt. Thus, through the negligence of the company, a strike had been brought on. The sole reason for the deliberate delay in responding to the union's ultimatum, it was charged, was a skillful maneuver to permit the railroad additional time to fortify itself against the impending walkout by importing strikebreakers.⁵⁷

As proof of the union contention that conductor Paschal had not wantonly violated the federal sixteen-hour law, Murdock submitted a telegram by Superintendent W. S. Brand reading, "Proceed to Lithonia regardless of the 16-hour law." In further defense of his case, Murdock cited 1,079 occasions in which the Georgia road had broken the federal law. To prove his charges, Murdock produced on two different occasions large batches of telegrams instructing employees to proceed regardless of the sixteen-hour law. Moreover, numerous witnesses were summoned to appear testifying that prior to the strike all employees had been allowed to disregard the law even though they knew that the time limit would expire enroute to the next station. The union claim that this was a general custom prior to the dismissal of Paschal was thus substantiated.

In order to substantiate his claim that Paschal and Morgan had been discriminated against, Murdock produced private letters of General Manager T. K. Scott which contained evidence that the higher officials wanted to eliminate the two men because of their involvement in the union. Paschal had been discharged because he was a "marked man." These letters, accepted by the arbitrators, showed conclusively that discrimination existed. Appearing before the court, Superintendent Brand erred, admitting that Paschal was "too high tempered" because he was the chairman of a union committee. Murdock instantly jumped to his feet, stating that Brand's very words revealed that the charge of discrimination was true.

Because Murdock claimed that violations of the sixteen-hour law had been continuous, Judge Chambers ordered the Georgia road to produce its agreement with the Interstate Commerce Commission, showing its agreement with the I.C.C. authorizing it to disregard the federal laws at times when company officials believed it was necessary. His demands, one observer stated, came "as a bolt from a clear sky." Subsequent investigation of all company train records revealed that no violations of the federal law or delay reports were dispatched and filed with the I.C.C. Examination of the train sheets further showed that there were over a thousand violations of speed laws.

On November 20, the Paschal-Morgan hearings abruptly ended. Instead of continuing the investigations, Vice Presidents Murdock and Gregg announced that the unions were willing to let their case rest in the hands of the mediation board for ultimate decision.⁵⁸

NOTES

1. W. H. Bagby, Reminiscences [sic] of the Old Street Car Days of the Yesterdays, 1899 to 1933 (Augusta: R. G. McGowen and Company, 1933), 22. Bagby's memoir is available in the Richmond County Historical Society's special collection at the Augusta College Library.
2. Ibid., 31, 10-11, 6, 26.
3. Ibid., 22, 31.
4. Augusta Chronicle, November 1, 1911.
5. Bagby, Old Street Car Days, 31-32; Augusta Chronicle, November 1, 1911.
6. Augusta Chronicle, November 1, 1911.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., November 2, 1911.
9. Ibid., November 2, 3, 1911; Allen D. Candler, Georgia, Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons, Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1906), I, 35-36; Walter G. Cooper, The Story of Georgia (New York: The American Historical Society, Inc., 1938), IV, 801.
10. Augusta Chronicle, November 4, 5, 1911.
11. Augusta Herald, September 23, 25, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, September 23, 24, October 2, 1912; Bagby, Old Street Car Days, 33.
12. Augusta Chronicle, September 23, 24, October 2, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 23, 24, October 2, 1912.

13. Augusta Chronicle, September 24, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 23, 24, 1912.

14. Augusta Herald, September 25, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, September 25, 1912.

15. Augusta Herald, September 24, 1912.

16. Augusta Chronicle, September 24, 26, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 25, 1912.

17. Augusta Herald, September 24, 29, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, September 24, 25, 1912.

18. Augusta Chronicle, September 26, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 26, 1912.

19. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 151; Augusta Chronicle, September 25, 26, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 26, 1912. After Mayor Barrett learned the striker's dramatic leap from the Confederate Monument onto the top of a passing trolley car, he stated that it constituted an "overt act of hostility" against the company's cars and the men operating the vehicles. Therefore he was duty bound to order the Chief of Police to have officers placed on the trolleys to offer protection to company property, company employees and private passengers.

20. Augusta Chronicle, September 27, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 27, 1912.

21. Bagby, Old Street Car Days, 34; Augusta Chronicle, September 26, 27, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 27, 1912.

22. Augusta Chronicle, September 27, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 27, 1912.

23. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 151-152; Augusta Chronicle, September 27, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 27, 1912; Cooper, The Story of Georgia, III, 406, 412, IV, 45, 356, 719; Lucian L. Knight, Georgia's Bi-Centennial Memoirs and Memories (Atlanta: A. H. Cawson, 1932), II, 50-63.

24. Augusta Chronicle, September 27, 28, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 27, 28, 1912.

25. Augusta Herald, September 28, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, September 29, 1912.

26. Augusta Chronicle, September 28, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 28, 1912.

27. Augusta Herald, September 28, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, September 28, 29, 1912.

28. Augusta Chronicle, September 28, 1912; Bagby, Old Street Car Days, 34.

29. Augusta Chronicle, September 28, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 29, 1912; Bagby, Old Street Car Days, 34-35. The fifty-eighth Article of War is the charge of murder. The sixty-second Article of War is the charge of conduct prejudicial of good order and military discipline.

30. Augusta Chronicle, September 29, 1912; Augusta Herald, September 29, 1912.

31. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 150-152, 156; Augusta Herald, September 29, 1912.

32. Augusta Herald, September 29, 30, October 1, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, September 29, 30, October 1, 1912.

33. Augusta Chronicle, October 2, 3, 4, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 2, 3, 4, 1912.

34. Augusta Chronicle, October 5, 7, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 6, 7, 1912.

35. Augusta Herald, October 10, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, October 8, 1912.

36. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 156-158; Augusta Chronicle, October 10, 1912.

37. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 150-159; Augusta Chronicle, October 12, 17, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 12, 1912.

38. Augusta Chronicle, October 12, 13, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 12, 13, 1912; Candler, Georgia, I, 297-299, 617-618; Joel Candler Harris, Memoirs of Georgia (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1895), II, 365-366, 816.

39. Augusta Chronicle, October 15, 17, 18, 1912;
Augusta Herald, October 17, 18, 1912.

40. Augusta Herald, October 17, 18, 19, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, October 17, 18, 19, 1912.

41. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 159; Augusta Chronicle, October 19, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 19, 1912. For information pertaining to the Board of Arbitration's investigation of the twenty-three cases see the following editions of the Augusta Chronicle, October 25, 26, 28, 29, 1912.

42. Augusta Chronicle, October 19, November 4, 6, 10, 1912.

43. Augusta Herald, September 26, 30, October 1, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, September 30, October 1, 14, 15, 1912.

44. Augusta Chronicle, October 1, 1912.

45. Augusta Herald, October 2, 1912.

46. Augusta Chronicle, October 2, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 2, 1912.

47. Augusta Chronicle, October 3, 4, 1912.

48. Ibid., October 2, 3, 5, 7, 1912.

49. Augusta Herald, October 3, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, October 4, 5, 1912.

50. Augusta Chronicle, October 6, 7, 1912.

51. Ibid., October 9, 10, 11, 1912.

52. Augusta Herald, October 7, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, October 11, 12, 1912.

53. Augusta Chronicle, October 3, 5, 6, 11, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 4, 7, 1912; Who's Who in America (Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company, 1912), VII, 362; Who's Who in America (Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company, 1914), VIII, 415, 1336; Who's Who in America (Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company, 1916), IX, 1794; Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation, 1877-1916 (New York: W. W. Norton and

Company, Inc., 1965), 71, 78, 87-89, 124, 173-174, 178-179, 199.

54. Augusta Chronicle, October 8, 9, 12, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 8, 1912.

55. Augusta Chronicle, October 13, 14, 15, 1912; Augusta Herald, October 13, 14, 1912.

56. Augusta Chronicle, October 28, November 2, 1912; Who's Who in America, VII, 362, VII, 415.

57. Augusta Chronicle, November 9, 10, 12, 1912.

58. Augusta Chronicle, November 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 1912.

CHAPTER X

THE LAST BATTLE

The Mayoralty Muddle of 1912: The Hayne Revolt Against the White Primary Committee

Linwood C. Hayne was born in Waynesboro, Burke County, Georgia, in April of 1858. His father, James B. Hayne, was a native of South Carolina who had emigrated to Georgia after fighting in the Mexican War. Julia Whitehead (Clinton) Hayne, his mother, was a native of Richmond County. As the only son of the family, he was able to receive considerable attention from his parents. His father, who was an attorney, greatly appreciated the value of a sound education and encouraged young Linwood to succeed in the schools of Burke County and Hephzibah High School. After graduating, he attended Moore's Business College in Atlanta, completing an intensive training program in business administration. Linwood C. Hayne chose to locate in Augusta in 1881, beginning work as a clerk in J. B. White and Company, a major department store in the city. For fourteen years he was employed by the firm, acquiring the "very finest business

training to be had" and receiving steady promotions to more responsible positions as assistant bookkeeper, credit manager and confidential adviser.

In 1893, thirty-five-year-old Hayne was elected President of the Planters' Loan and Savings Bank, which was considered to be the "largest and strongest savings bank in Augusta." In January of 1894 he was also elected to the presidency of the National Bank of Augusta, another leading bank established in the postwar era. The same year he terminated his business career with White's Department Store. As President of the Planters' Loan and Savings Bank he was proud to point out that annual dividends paid out to stockholders averaged 16 per cent and, moreover, a "large amount" was yearly carried to the surplus fund. In 1896 he was "highly honored" by being elected President of the Georgia State Bankers Association. Not only was he the head of two key banking concerns but by the early 1900's he was also elected President of the Augusta Clearing House Association. In addition to these positions of economic responsibility, Hayne had also been President of the Sutherland Manufacturing Company, Vice President of the Georgia Chemical Works, a member of the board of directors of the Warren Manufacturing Company, a key leader of the Augusta Chamber of Commerce, a director of the Augusta Land Company, a

director of the United States Fidelity and Guarantee Company of Baltimore and a member of the American Bankers Association.

In community social life Hayne had also been extremely active. He was a member of the Masonic fraternity, past member of the Webb Lodge, No. 156, Free and Accepted Masons, past eminent commander of the Georgia Commandery, No. 1, Knights Templar. He was also a member of the Yaabrab Temple, Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine in the City of Atlanta. In addition, he was a distinguished member of the Augusta Country Club and President of the Augusta Game Preserve Club.

In local politics, Hayne had figured prominently in the formation of the good government clubs in the wards of the city in the late 1890's and had also been extremely influential in creating the white primary system in city politics at the turn of the century. Indeed, for several years Hayne had been the chairman of the white primary executive committee. In 1900 he had run against Jacob Phinizy for the mayoralty of Augusta but had been defeated. Friends of Phinizy and supporters of Hayne agreed that his entry into city politics had been too "premature." With time and greater business experience, many believed that he would serve as a competent executive for the city.¹

During the spring of 1912 many of his personal friends and some of the best respected business leaders approached him, expressing their absolute confidence in his ability to direct the fortunes of two banks, a mill and actively participate on the boards of directors of several other corporations. Furthermore, it was their expressed opinion that he was recognized as being a man of great integrity who should consider making the race for mayor.²

Linwood C. Hayne "finally consented" and officially announced his candidacy for mayor, promising the city another "strong business administration." "The meeting was generally considered the most representative ever held in the city. Practically every business and professional calling was represented and the prevailing spirit was for a progressive standard bearer," the Chronicle reported on the Hayne rally. The formal announcement by Hayne that he was an official nominee for mayor was received with loud cheers and shouts of applause. Among those endorsing Hayne for mayor were former mayors Allen, Barrett and Phinizy. City councilmen--James P. Doughty, J. P. Wood, Howard H. Stafford, R. J. Bates, Samuel A. Fortson, Bryan Lawrence, Dr. W. D. Jennings, J. O. Welch, W. A. Mattison, R. Roy Goodwin and J. W. W. Watson--were also enthusiastic supporters of Hayne. John C. Cohen, Sr. stated that "a man who had made a success

out of his private business was the type of man needed to pilot the affairs of the City of Augusta for the next three years."³

As a candidate for mayor, Hayne pledged himself to a "Clean, Progressive, Business-like Administration" of municipal government. His motto was "A dollar's worth for a dollar." Furthermore, he endorsed the adoption of a commission form of government for the city "as soon as possible." "In my opinion," Hayne declared, "it is a more business-like way of managing a city's affairs." He also pledged that if elected mayor he would not only continue to strive for "solely the progress and prosperity of the community," but the continuation of the Dunbar-Barrett flood protection program until the levee was completed.⁴

In June, 1912, one of the "most sensational pieces of political news" that had "ever developed in Augusta" created a real furor in city politics. Hayne, B. E. Lester, William Boyle, F. L. Boyce, John McDonald and William Martin, candidates for the city council, publicly announced their withdrawal from the white primary election scheduled for July 10, charging the white primary executive committee with passing new "arbitrary" rules and regulations drawn up at the "eleventh hour," creating a special partisan committee for overseeing the registration of voters and publishing

the official voter registration lists. Members of that committee, it was charged, were strong friends of Dr. James R. Littleton, the other candidate for mayor. Mayoralty candidate Hayne and the five candidates for council contended that no fair deal would exist with an "entirely biased and partisan" group of "active supporters" of Littleton being placed in charge of voter registration procedures. Furthermore, this action by the officials of the executive committee was a flagrant departure from the customary practice whereby the current mayor and city council usually appointed the members of the voter registration committee. This maneuver was nothing less than a "political trick." "The manifest intention of the Primary Committee in so radically changing the rules is to do away with the White Primary as heretofore practiced in the City and to boldly substitute its own arbitrary will and partisan schemes for the will of the people," Hayne charged in a personal letter dated June 28, 1912, to Chairman Julian M. Smith.⁵

The decision of Hayne and his supporters was not based on a "snap judgment." They deliberately and strategically chose to withdraw from the primary after the date for closing the entries had passed, believing that it would leave the forthcoming primary with few contestants seeking office and therefore no valid reason for holding a primary

election. Furthermore, it was their overall strategy to initiate a "very vigorous" campaign for the regular general election to be held in December.⁶

The White Primary Executive Committee met to discuss considering the action of the "Hayne ticket" for mayor and City Council. After lengthy discussions, Dr. H. W. Shaw, W. D. Hopkins and Julian M. Smith arrived at definite conclusions regarding the position of the committee. First of all, they ruled that there was not sufficient justification for striking the names of the "dissenters" from the primary ticket because they had already made the proper pledges, paid their assessments and taken oaths to abide by the rules, regulations and results of the primary election. Secondly, even though the Hayne candidates were requesting the removal of their names from the ballot, they regretted to announce that the white primary could not strike their names from the ballot at such a late date. Chairman Smith directed all officials in the registry office to proceed with the approved plans for the July primary, ignoring the action taken by the "Hayne ticket." Third of all, in the opinion of the White Primary Executive Committee, the "loathsome" actions of Hayne and his friends had legally ruled them out as candidates standing for office even in the general election. Fourth of all, Hayne and his supporters

would be given the opportunity to authenticate the allegations of "high handedness, revolutionary methods, partisanship and unfairness." "The question of who shall be mayor of Augusta," Chairman Smith charged, "is a secondary consideration to the preservation of the white primary and secret ballot system, and all Augustans who remember the disgusting scenes with the negro and open ballot will agree with me that it is of the greatest importance to preserve the white primary and the secret ballot." In short, Hayne and others were charged with attempting to destroy the political system which had been responsible for maintaining white supremacy and therefore favoring a return to black participation in city elections.⁷

In a letter dated July 1, 1912, addressed to Linwood C. Hayne and others, Chairman Julian M. Smith explained, "We feel sure that you gentlemen have not yet fully considered and realized the disastrous effect which your attempted action will necessarily have upon the white primary system which has been in force in Augusta now for a number of years, and has relieved us from the burden of fighting over the purchasable negro vote holding the balance of power." Perhaps Hayne and his group did not realize it, but they were involved in "treason"; a deliberate, shrewdly calculated effort to destroy the basis of white power and return

to the old system of city politics with blacks casting their votes in elections.⁸

A petition, however, was filed in the name of Linwood C. Hayne and a temporary restraining order was granted enjoining the White Primary Executive Committee from listing Hayne as a candidate for mayor on the tickets to be used in the forthcoming primary. Concurrently, it was requested that the committee remit a certain portion of the \$200 registration fee paid by Hayne. The injunction brought by Hayne against the committee was heard by Judge Henry C. Hammond in the Superior Court with Boykin Wright, Enoch H. Callaway and C. Henry Cohen representing the plaintiff. Wright, Calloway and Cohen principally contended that Hayne had entered the primary with the belief that the same rules would govern it that governed all previous primaries. When the rules were changed, he had the perfect legal right to withdraw because it constituted a breach of good faith. Judge Hammond ruled in favor of the plaintiff, prohibiting the White Primary Committee from using the name of Hayne on the city primary ballot on the basis that the fundamental rules had been changed without any prior notice to the plaintiff or without his consent. By agreement among counsel for both sides, the injunction also applied to the five Hayne candidates for City Council.⁹

Confronted with the injunction suit, the White Primary Committee announced that it would not hold a primary as scheduled, but declared that Dr. James R. Littleton, Harry H. Jones of the first ward, Lewis F. Goodrich of the fourth ward, Julian M. Smith of the fifth ward and Robert G. Barinowski of the sixth ward were the "official" nominees of the primary for mayor and members of the City Council. At a later date, John M. Cozart and A. B. Culpepper were also declared to be the "official" nominees for the second and third wards, respectively. Furthermore, since all of the "official" candidates were virtually unopposed they were the actual elected officials, according to the committee. Littleton and his supporters would simply be declared the victors and inaugurated into their respective offices in January of 1913. Ultimately, however, the White Primary Committee was forced to reluctantly acknowledge that the entire "Hayne ticket" would be able to stand its chances for the offices at the regular election, but in the meantime it called upon all "concerned" citizens who favored the continued existence of the white primary system--"which alone stands between us and political debauchery, intensified by race antagonisms"--to stand loyal to those candidates whose nominations were in "strict conformity" to the rules and regulations of the primary.¹⁰

After Hayne "cut loose" from the white primary system, he and his candidates stumped the city ward by ward attempting to build political support. Addressing large crowds, Hayne was frequently interrupted by tart and humorous remarks. In one instance when Hayne boldly stated that he would take the victory away from James Littleton even though Littleton had "won it" in the primary, there was a loud howl of indignation, mumblings of dissension and even some horrendous laughter. Forced to stop, within a few moments Hayne proceeded again. Taking off his coat, rolling up his sleeves and raising his arms high in the air with his head thrust back, he shouted with great emphasis that the battle had only begun. As the meeting broke up, many who departed remarked that Hayne was "mighty sassy"; others leaving stressed that things would be made "mighty hot" for him and "his kind."

In the pre-election days, some of Hayne's close associates approached him to abandon his position, pointing out that no one else had contested the white primary nominees since it had been informally adopted as the basis of city politics around 1900. They warned him that he and his supporters would most certainly lose favor in the community.

Undaunted and absolutely certain that the majority of the people endorsed his cause, Hayne continued his campaign

for the mayor of Augusta. Declaring that Littleton had not bargained in "good faith," he queried whether such a man should hold a position that was regarded as a great public trust. Littleton had not gained true representation from the people, he stated, nor had a primary election even been held confirming his election. Nor had the Littleton candidates for City Council secured their nominations in a just fashion. Meeting the issue of calling for a return of the Negroes as a factor in city elections, Hayne declared most emphatically that he was "still an enthusiastic advocate" of white supremacy. Indeed, he favored a perpetuation of the white primary system but "on an honest basis" with no "packed" registration lists and no political "frame-ups." He also pointed with enormous pride to the fact that in the early 1900's he had been an ardent champion of the primary, responsible for introducing it as the basis for city politics and served as chairman of the executive committee for a number of years. To his fellow business associates, Hayne reminded them of his initial pledges of a "Clean, Progressive, Business-like Administration" of city government, advocating "Economy in the Public Service" with no "petty graft." Praising the Barrett administration for its accomplishments, he pledged that if elected mayor he would continue the "progressive policies" inaugurated by all

administrations since the days of Patrick Walsh. He also pointed out that many of his backers included the most substantial citizens of the community: Thomas Barrett, Jr., Boykin Wright, Enoch W. Callaway, C. Henry Cohen, Richard E. Allen, Jacob Phinizy, Alfred Cuthbert and numerous other original supporters of the Good Government movement. The rich, powerful and few were extremely important for political success but Hayne also perceived that the special bond elections, campaign for commission government and the series of labor strikes had served to reactivate mass public attention upon city elections.¹¹

In one of the most determined, short but hardest fought election battles in Augusta during the Progressive Era, Hayne and his fellow candidates for office worked relentlessly to get a greater number of people to turn out to the polls and cast their ballots against Littleton. Practically every voter in the city, it was said, was at one time or the other personally solicited by the candidates and their friends. In stumping the wards in the factory district Hayne and his candidates especially emphasized the duplicity of Littleton in the recent strikes, pointing out that Littleton had made numerous public addresses in support of the strike but later repudiated labor.

"SEEMS CERTAIN DR. LITTLETON WILL BE NEXT MAYOR," read

the headlines of the Herald the day before the election. Election day, after the polls were closed, large crowds of people congregated on the streets and sidewalks in front of the Chronicle News Building and the Herald office, nervously awaiting the official election results. When the ballots were counted and the results dispatched to the newspapers for public announcement, the Littleton supporters were shocked to learn that Linwood C. Hayne had achieved a victory by a very slim margin of seventy-nine votes. The Hayne ticket for council, moreover, won in four out of the six wards in the city.

Convinced that political chicanery was responsible for the Hayne victory, Littleton supporters ironically charged that Hayne had not legally won the election, filed protests alleging that the election was not conducted in a proper manner and requested that a recount of the ballots be made, especially in the second, third and fourth wards where it was alleged that Hayne ballots had been substituted for Littleton ballots. But the charge of theft of ballots was ultimately dismissed on a demurrer and Hayne was properly notified that the election was no longer contested. Littleton, although acknowledging defeat, promised his close associates that he was not retiring from city politics but would await another opportunity to serve the people.¹²

Putting an End to Political Revolts and
Progressive Democracy

The Hayne Revolt had clearly created a "mighty hub-bub" in city politics in the urban Progressive Era. Recognizing that political victory was dependent upon both getting out the mass popular vote of the working classes and the well educated, affluent and urbane upper classes, the Hayne candidates had simultaneously stumped all wards, holding large public forums and arranging smaller, limited conferences with select representatives, influential personalities and special guest speakers. In the "super-heated" atmosphere of the meetings in the factory district, speakers had frequently and deliberately attempted to identify with their audiences, hitching their thumbs beneath their suspenders, rolling up their shirt sleeves, stalking back and forth on the platforms, hurling uncomplimentary, terse insults at the Littleton supporters and vehemently denouncing the anti-Hayne forces as being a bunch of "yellow-legged hounds," "fcols" and "cowards." Boldly marching down into the crowds, they had elicited strong emotional responses as they strolled forward with arms outstretched. Jumping from their seats, the common folk had swarmed about them, embracing them and shouting out "Hayne! Hayne!" In other circles, however, friends of the Hayne candidates had quietly put in a

word for "the cause" and diligently drafted political advertisements, contacted city reporters, urged editors to provide extensive news coverage and encouraged large voter turn-outs. Election day "flivers," furnished by patrons and friends, had toured the city, picking up small groups of select voters, taking them to the polling booths and motor-ing them back to their homes, offices and business firms.

Continually "on the go" up to the last hour, the Hayne forces had paid greater public attention to more voters than possibly over a decade with the inevitable result that the election of 1912 had been the most important general election involving greater numbers of voters since the initial good government campaign of Patrick Walsh in 1897. In the heated Walsh-Kerr election over 7,500 votes were cast for the mayoralty candidates, but in no general election after 1899 had there been more than 1,300 total ballots cast. Indeed, in the general mayoralty elections of 1903, 1906 and 1909 the total ballots cast in all three elections had barely exceeded 1,400. But in the Hayne mayoralty battle, through consciously reactivating the moral outrage of the established groups in society and deliberately recultivating massive lower class white participation, over 5,400 voters had cast their ballots.¹³

The Hayne Revolt, however, was not long lasting but

limited. In subsequent elections a consistent effort was put forth by the key leaders of the primary committee to "choke down" or "throttle," "old-time" partisan rivalry by sharply curtailing the number of candidates standing for all public offices. Evidences of their retention of firm controls and the end of future "progressive-democratic" upheavals was clearly manifested in the re-emergence of no opposition city council primary elections. In 1913, when rival contenders failed to emerge in four wards opposing the primary candidates for council, the committee ruled that the four unopposed candidates were officially the nominees of the party. Accordingly there was virtually no necessity of going to the expense of holding primary elections in all six wards. The following year, the chairman of the executive committee, was pleased to announce that it was only necessary to hold a primary election in just one ward and that the five entries who were unopposed were the official nominees and therefore duly elected.¹⁴

Maintaining that Augustans must forget all trivialities and non-essentials, terminate all quarrels with any who "shinnies on his own side" or who "hits the line hard" and announcing that he personally held no "political grudges," forty-seven-year-old Dr. James Rufus Littleton formally announced his candidacy for mayor in 1915. Citing his

public endorsement of the levee in 1914 as an example of how he had transcended "personal or factional politics," the former state representative of Richmond County, pledged himself to a "sound municipal government and the continued upbuilding of Augusta." As a practicing physician in the community for more than twenty years, Littleton asserted he was just interested in keeping "old Augusta moving forward."

In the opinion of the Chronicle, Littleton had lifted himself above the level commonly attributed to the "factional leader and self-seeking politician" to the "higher ground of good citizenship." It further expressed hope that the former graduate of the Medical Department of the University of Georgia would be elected mayor "without a contest."¹⁵

"Yesterday was the date set for the primary election, but there being no opposition to any of the announced candidates, under the rule, no election was entered into," the Chronicle blandly informed the public. Since no opposition emerged challenging political aspirants, it was decreed by the executive directors, that there was no reason for a formal primary election. Furthermore, since only official nominees had given notice of their intention to stand for public office and there were no contenders, under the

provisions established by the primary, the polls were not opened for the general election. Their declaration of candidacy had taken the place of formal elections, primary or general! And in January, 1916, James R. Littleton and six new members were installed in office after being duly sworn in by the clerk of the council.¹⁶

Centralization of political power into the white primary committee had achieved numerous significant results. It had, of course, initially settled the political fate of the blacks by depriving them of any right of participation in elections. Secondly, it had assured the full triumph of business domination of city politics. In a very real sense it had been the means whereby the significant business leaders were able to gain access to urban government and utilize the power of municipal government to solve basic, critical, internal economic problems; representing, perhaps, a form of local "political-capitalism." Thirdly, it ended in entirety all public political strife by ending campaign speeches, parades, crowds, editorials and ward politics by requiring office seekers to privately appeal to the directors of the primary, secure official endorsements, announce their candidacies, acknowledge their nominations and await their installation in office. But, lastly, it had effectively destroyed any and all semblance of urban democracy in

the Progressive Era. Thousands of voters ceased to flock to the polls, not because of apathy, but because they had been deliberately deprived of any means of democratic participation in all elections, primary or general.

NOTES

1. Augusta Chronicle, June 10, 1904, May 26, November 24, 27, 1912; Augusta Herald, November 26, 1912; Augusta Daily Tribune, July 19, 1904; Allen D. Candler, Georgia, Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons, Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1906), II, 244-245.
2. Augusta Chronicle, May 23, 1912.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., December 3, 1912.
5. Ibid., June 30, 1912; Augusta Herald, June 30, July 2, 1912.
6. Augusta Chronicle, June 30, 1912; Augusta Herald, June 30, 1912.
7. Augusta Chronicle, July 1, 1912; Augusta Herald, June 30, July 2, 1912.
8. Augusta Chronicle, July 2, 1912.
9. Ibid., July 4, 6, 7, 1912; Augusta Herald, July 4, 7, 1912; "Minutes of the Superior Court of Richmond County" (September Term, 1912), 321-325.
10. Augusta Herald, July 7, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, July 7, 8, 31, 1912.
11. Augusta Herald, June 30, 1912; Augusta Chronicle, December 3, 1912.
12. Augusta Chronicle, December 4, 5, 1912; Augusta Herald, December 4, 5, 8, 9, 14, 21, 1912.

13. "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 481-485; "Minutes of the City Council, January 6, 1902-December 29, 1909," 160, 387; Augusta Chronicle, December 2, 1897, April 18, 1899, November 21, December 6, 1900, July 17, 1903, July 19, 1906, July 9, 1909, December 5, 1912.

14. Augusta Chronicle, October 29, 1913, June 26, July 7, 10, 11, 1914; Augusta Herald, October 26, 1913, June 21, 23, 26, July 1, 1914.

15. Augusta Chronicle, May 8, 10, 28, 30, 1914, January 31, June 17, 1915, July 24, 25, 26, 1925; Augusta Herald, January 31, June 11, 12, 20, 1915, July 25, 1925; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1919 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1919), XI, 505; Clark Howell, History of Georgia (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1926), III, 218-220.

16. Augusta Chronicle, July 11, 10, November 5, 1915, January 3, 4, 1916; Augusta Herald, June 20, 1915, January 2, 3, 1916.

CHAPTER XI
IMPRESSIONS OF AN ERA

The Economic Significance of Augusta and
American Historiography

The study of the growth of Augusta during peace, war, reconstruction and the age of enterprise not only represents a "classic" example of almost consistent, uniform economic progress in the rise of a Southern textile city but also supports the major interpretations of Thomas C. Cochran, William Miller and Edward C. Kirkland on the "take-off" stage of American economic growth, 1840-1880. The founding of several stable, prosperous and solvent banks, the converging and departing of different railroad lines connecting up Augusta with other regional cities, the growing urban population, commercial prosperity, the building of the Augusta canal and the rise of textile mills and other collateral industries were indicators of the shift from a commercial to an urban industrial economy in the antebellum era; a period generally known in the South for its strong, anti-industrial attitudes. They represented the beginnings

of Augusta's "take-off." Wartime Augusta, like many mid-western and northeastern cities, moreover, witnessed a booming expansion of its industrial sector because of the tremendous demands of the "military machine" for supplies, the destructive nature of modern warfare and the urgent exigencies of the central government in fighting to attain its political and strategic objectives. Except for the obvious financial difficulties that accompanied the waning years of the Confederacy, Augusta at the end of the Civil War was in a most fortunate situation for rapid recovery.¹

Contrary to the general negative views of E. Merton Coulter's The South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877 Augusta, while under reconstruction, experienced substantial, progressive and relatively swift economic recovery; as manifested in the return of business prosperity, steady high profits reported by local mills, creation of a "new," larger industrial sector, reconstruction of a "new" banking system and the rebuilding of a "new" railroad network that was far more complex than that of the antebellum era. It was most evident that no dark, bleak and tragic era befell the city in the immediate postwar period. Indeed, from a business viewpoint, the so-called era of "Bayonet Rule," "Black Republican Reconstruction," "Blackout of Honest Government" and "Carnival of Corruption" saw substantial, rapid growth

and new policies planned by white leaders and politicians of the city, most of whom came from the "established" families. Either Augusta was atypical or perhaps there is a need to take a fresh look at the nature of the postwar South from an urban perspective.²

By the 1890's, Augusta, as the "Lowell of the South," was part of the Bourbon crusaders' success story in attracting textile mills to the New South. Vigorously determined to "bring the cotton mills to the cotton fields," Southern promoters were responsible for founding a cluster of new mills in the piedmont areas of Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia and Alabama. Patrick Walsh, Charles Estes, Landon A. Thomas, Thomas Barrett, Jr., Hamilton H. Hickman and other talented founders of the Augusta cotton mills and vicinity were local examples of Henry P. Hammett, founder of the Piedmont Manufacturing Company and later mayor of Greenville, South Carolina; Daniel Augustus Tompkins, president of three mills, director of eight others and stockholder in several North Carolina textile corporations; and George A. Gray, founded of the Gastonia Cotton Manufacturing Company, Gastonia, North Carolina. Moreover, the rise of Augusta as a textile city represented not only the pattern of regional growth but indicated the "beginning of Northern mill migrations to the South"; a trend well docu-

mented by John Samuel Ezell, Thomas D. Clark, Albert D. Kirwan and C. Vann Woodward.³

Many factors had been responsible for the growth of Augusta: an antebellum "head-start," wartime expansion, swift "recovery," considerable venture capital, favorable political climate, adequate water power, effective rail and water transportation systems, close proximity to the cotton fields and an abundance of cheap labor. But certainly the greatest factor was the role of leadership. Shrewd, cool-headed, business-minded Augustans raised the venture capital, re-established old financial and commercial ties, created new business associations, promoted the expansion of old industries, established new factories and planned the future of the city, perceiving the interrelationships between banks, railroads, mills and industries and the rise of a "Greater Augusta." Since business was the guiding force in the city's development, the accomplishments of the men in business must be viewed as nothing less than "heroic." As creative innovators, planners and bold entrepreneurs they can hardly be regarded as "robber barons," "moguls" or "capitalistic buccaneers" in the tradition of Charles A. Beard, Vernon Louis Parrington, Matthew Josephson and others who developed an "anti-business cult." Instead, they must be properly viewed from the perspective of the research

and publications of Allan Nevins, Edward C. Kirkland, John Chamberlain, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., and other scholars of American business history.⁴

Augusta, furthermore, was a microcosmic example of the serious urban disorders of the new nation. Though not as large as New Orleans, Atlanta or Memphis and considerably smaller than Chicago, Pittsburg, New York and other northern cities, increasing urbanization and industrialization had created basically similar problems. Rapid growth had created acute social health problems; revealed the urgent need for new public municipal services, especially fire, police and sanitation protection; divided the city into distinct zones or sections; intensified "class feelings," particularly between laborers and capitalists; and seriously taxed and challenged urban government to resolve the cluster of new problems. The crisis of political leaders in Augusta was not unique but representative of the problems confronting the "decision-makers" in larger cities.

Moreover, in developing the history of Augusta, every effort has been made to present ideas in concert with the basic findings of Constance M. Green, Charles N. Glabb, A. Theodore Brown, Blake McKelvey and other urban historians who have not only focused their attention upon the history of individual cities, accompanying socio-economic problems,

emerging urban political problems, but have presented a composite historical and sociological study of the urban nation.⁵

The Significance of the Augusta Strikes, Southern
Labor and National Unions

The recurrent Augusta labor strikes were not isolated, local affairs holding little significance beyond the scope of the history of an individual city but, on the contrary, were a crucial aspect of the "Southern Strategy" of the Knights of Labor and the American Federation of Labor, two of the major national unions of the postwar era. The Knights of Labor Strike of 1886 in Augusta, properly viewed, was the beginning of the concerted drive to crack the newly created textile mills in Roswell, Georgia; Cottondale, Alabama; Greenville, South Carolina and Maryville, Tennessee. The second wave of mill strikes that erupted in Augusta in 1898-1899 and again in 1902 were part of the American Federation of Labor's campaign to unionize the "lintheads" in the textile factories of the New South. Its affiliate, the National United Textile Workers' Union, "called" strikes in the Carolinas--Greenwood, Abbeville, Bath, Durham, Greensboro and Fayetteville---as well as in Columbus, Georgia, and Danville, Virginia.

Nor, for that matter, were the Augusta trolley car

strikes of 1911-1912 and the Georgia Railroad Strike of 1912 mere "local history." The National Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees had begun a general Southern campaign with Augusta as the first target city of the attack. No less than ten cities in the southeast were rocked with streetcar strikes, often involving confrontations between strikers and scabs, deployment of troops and urban violence. The Georgia Railroad Strike, which began in Augusta due to internal local disputes between employees and owners, spread to Atlanta and soon became of immense regional importance. Union officials of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen and Order of Railway Conductors came into direct collision with the owners of the Louisville and Nashville; Atlanta and West Point; Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis; Alabama, Birmingham and Atlantic; Central of Georgia; Southern Railway System and Seaboard Airline . Because the Georgia Railroad strike threatened to halt the rail transportation services of the southeast, federal intervention occurred to force arbitration, thereby representing another significant national theme of the Progressive Era.⁶

Despite the existence of a Southern campaign strategy, however, the major initial factor precipitating almost every strike in Augusta (except in 1902) was announcements that

wages were to be slashed. In this respect the local capitalists were indeed "robber barons" who ruthlessly exploited their workers, completely ignored the grim reality of wage-earners trying to survive in an inflationary era with declining wages and consistently rejected all individual or collective arbitration efforts to raise salaries, improve factory conditions or to provide fringe benefits. Strikes were therefore not forced by either the national representatives nor the local union leaders but by the owners of the enterprises! They usually involved the desperate struggle to hold wages at old levels--not to demand increased wages, decreased hours of employment, improved industrial conditions and other gains usually associated with unionism in the Progressive Era. Recognizing that the brutal, unrealistic tactics of management had created a real sense of labor solidarity among workers, national and regional representatives usually responded, hastening to the "Augusta stronghold," offering assistance in uniting the strikers, calling for economic aid from other union affiliations and, eventually, suggesting the objectives to be sought in mediation.

The Augusta strikes also have broader, meaningful significance regarding Southern labor. The Mind of the South stressed the "shiftlessness and ineptitude" of the poor

white textile workers, who not only failed to perceive that they were "at the command and mercy of the masters of the mills," but were exceedingly naive innocents ignorant of the full meaning of the term "scab." Wilbur J. Cash even referred to the strikes of March and April, 1929, as being the "first genuinely serious labor revolt the South had ever known; the first that represented a more than casual and passing break with their masters." But the willingness displayed by "lintheads" of Augusta to join the unions, wage wars against management and stage prolonged strikes attested to their recognition of the vital importance of combining together to secure common gains. Such demonstrations strongly support a conclusion of Ray Marshall's Labor in the South that no substantial case exists for the "docility" of southern laborers. "Textile unionism took its last big chance in Augusta, Georgia, in 1902 and lost," John Samuel Ezell has observed in The South Since 1865. Defeated in the campaign to organize textile workers, national labor organizations "temporarily withdrew from the South."⁷

Last of all, the local significance of the Augusta strikes should not be ignored. Capital, not labor, was triumphantly victorious; attesting to the overwhelming greater economic resources of management, the enormous power of the tight, interlocking structure between mills, banks

and railroads. the shrewd perceptiveness that lead to importation of strikebreakers and scabs and the powerful bond of unity between the business community and the political power structures. Neither the municipal, county nor state governments were genuinely "neutral" but displayed the same intense anti-union activity of the rest of the nation.

Victory for the capitalists meant that the owners, investors, directors and supervisors would continue to increase their personal fortunes, assure their privileged positions in middle and upper class society and perpetuate their wealth--all factors which definitely tended to tighten social solidarity among the top strata and widen the distinctions between upper and lower white society. Defeat of labor organizations meant that there were no significant increases in wages; nor, of course, any substantial gains in realizing a better standard of living for the white industrial workers. And, in an era of rapidly inflating prices, with wages declining, there was little possibility for the individual worker to advance. The inevitable consequence was the general tendency for the same families to remain as the labor force in the city from generation to generation and the undeniable stagnation, dissolution and destruction of strong, unitary local unions.

Augusta Politics in the Age of Reform: Progressivism.
Pluralism or Southern Elitism?

Events in the political history of Augusta almost consistently contradicted most of the standard explanations offered by some scholars on the Progressive Era. There was no muckraking campaign criticizing either national big business corporations nor local interlocking, powerful business concerns. None of the journalists were ardent crusaders against the business community nor critics of the social conditions in the white factory district and the black ghetto. The "socially responsible reporter-reformer," deemed by Richard Hofstadter to be a critical influence in the rise of Progressivism, was not apparent. Neither the Chronicle, Herald nor the Daily Tribune were replete with dramatic exposes. Instead of a crusading spirit to curtail the powers of the local or national "Captains of Industry" and to reform human society, there was a persistent, strong veneration of men in business, an intense desire to offer them protection and assistance and a consistent effort to ignore acute social problems. The muckraking sentiments, which Vernon Louis Parrington emphasized as being the "comet" of reform, which Richard Hofstadter stated as contributing to the "Progressive impulse" and other scholars attributed as playing a crucial role in the "compulsive

desire" for reform, were conspicuously absent in Augusta politics.⁸

Other important ideological sources of "Progressivism" usually cited by historians as being crucial to the rise of a reform spirit were not apparent in the "Good Government" reform movement in Augusta. There were no urban reformers such as Jane Addams of Chicago, Robert Wagner of New York or Louis Brandeis of Boston. Few persons displayed a genuine sympathy towards the plight of industrial workers in Augusta. Nor did Augusta politicians and legislators work feverishly to push through a spate of factory legislation to ease intense personal hardships caused by on-the-job accidents, provide workmen's compensation benefits, or eliminate other abuses. "Hot" Social Gospellers such as Walter T. Rauschenbusch, George T. Herron and William D. P. Bliss, preaching social Christianity and outlining programs that chiefly called attention to the urban problems of the lower classes, were not to be found as a major moral force calling for tempering the consequences of rapid urbanization and industrialization.⁹

To be certain, there was a superficial resemblance to the classical pattern of a growing Protestant moral crusade, an ideological factor greatly stressed as crucial to the rise of a Progressive ethos and the subsequent assault upon

men in business. But the end objectives differed greatly from those goals defined by George E. Mowry and Richard Hofstadter. Protestant middle class moral indignation was replete in the sermons of Augusta ministers, speeches of crusading politicians and editorials of journalists calling for "cleansing" the city of its "wicked excesses," "purifying" or "redeeming" elections from corrupt practices and demanding an end to the "depravities" of the "political hell-hole" that called itself the government of Augusta. But, unlike Mowry and Hofstadter's moral Protestant crusade, the Augusta reformers were not seeking to deliver government from the entrepreneur nor to attack the wicked, naughty trusts and the unscrupulous businessman. That was hardly one of the intentions of local reformers. Their aspirations included the hope that the responsibilities of city government could be bestowed upon the "best businessmen." Their hope was for massive business domination of city politics so that the efficiency of businessmen might be applied to municipal policies. The target of reform was not the secure, affluent middle and upper classes of urban society but the lower classes. The Protestant moral and evangelical fervor called for the reformers to systematically work to eliminate the "corrupting" influences of the blacks and, if necessary, all lower class whites, who sold their votes to the highest

biidders. If all the "good people" supported the reformers' crusade, a "pure white man's government" would be triumphant. Thus the dual themes of racism and class antagonisms accompanied the rise of Southern Progressivism in Augusta, Georgia.¹⁰

Existing evidence on Augusta, furthermore, seriously questions the validity that conservative, middle-class, white Anglo-Saxon Progressive reformers pursued political power and public office because of an "upheaval in status" or a "status revolution." Instead of being frightened by the triumph of capitalism, the "Progressive" reformers in Augusta politics--Patrick Walsh, Jacob Phinizy, Richard E. Allen, William M. Dunbar, Thomas Barrett, Jr., and Linwood C. Hayne--were from some of the most socially prominent, economically stable "aristocratic" families which had created the industries, founded banks, developed the railroad corporations and established the suburban real estate development companies. Certainly none of them exhibited a strong "disdain for money and monetary success."

Many of the leading politicians in Augusta in the urban Progressive Era were prominent businessmen of the New South. Every single one of the mayors were businessmen, financiers and industrialists who acquired economic wealth as a result of the rise of industries and the prosperity of the "Lowell

of the South." Patrick Walsh, for example, the first reform mayor, had been a vigorous supporter of forward growth and an outstanding champion of the industrial gospel preached by Henry W. Grady, Walter Hines Page and Henry M. Watterson. Jacob Phinizy, scion of the Georgia Railroad Bank, was most concerned with the economic growth of the Queen City of the Savannah.

Moreover, not only were the "progressive" mayors, Charles A. Robbe, Alfred M. Martin, Jr., Richard E. Allen, William M. Dunbar, Thomas Barrett, Jr., and Linwood C. Hayne key members of the economic infrastructure, but ninety-nine out of a hundred and eleven aldermen elected to the city council were prominent, hardworking, thrifty, aspiring young businessmen. One of the major objectives of the Good Government reform movement--total business domination of municipal politics--had therefore been achieved.¹¹

Municipal elections, furthermore, flagrantly contradicted the theme of a titanic democratic struggle by frustrated, insecure middle class politicians to gain office. Seven out of the nine mayors were virtually unopposed in seeking office in the general elections, a factor hardly conducive to acute "status anxiety." Martin was appointed acting mayor by the City Council. James Rufus Littleton and his successor, William Penn White, were "elected" to

office without a single ballot being cast in any elections, primary or general. Only Phinizy, Allen, Hayne and Dunbar faced opposition by "serious" rival contenders in the white primary elections, but three out of the four challengers virtually represented the same strata of society and were widely regarded as "worthy" of holding public office because of their socio-economic status in the community. Hayne, Littleton and Young, the three rival mayoralty contenders, were very wealthy citizens, presidents of four of the eight banks, executives associated with several business enterprises, prominent merchants and former aldermen. One of the opposition candidates had already served a term as mayor of the city and the other two were subsequently elected mayor in the Progressive Era. The sole mayoralty candidate who failed to gain political victory was the only genuine rival, John Allen Mette, the editor of a labor newspaper and a major union organizer. Primary and general elections were "sham" affairs, rarely offering voters a choice between two opposing candidates---much less archrivals who represented different segments of society. Such circumstances render it exceedingly difficult to portray Progressive politicians being motivated by declining power, prestige, influence or vigorously pursuing public office in a desperate attempt to restore a "loss of status."¹²

In securing "controls" of government, the Augusta Progressives were definitely not committed to restricting the power of the business community; were vigorously shrewd in ignoring the possible application of "trust-busting" tactics to local monopolies; and extremely clever in providing the protection necessary for the victory of capital in all labor strikes. As elite representatives from the principal industrial, commercial and financial sectors of the urban economy, they were quite naturally concerned with introducing public policies that would enhance the further growth of the city. Among the new municipal policies that were sponsored and inaugurated were the paving of the main thoroughfares; building of a city-wide sewer system; installing of new hydrants; locating new fire department substations in the business and residential areas; planning and completing a new waterworks system; and beautifying the city with a series of parks and plazas. All of these urban reforms enhanced property values, encouraged construction in new areas and tended to promote the growth of the white suburban areas. Other reforms included the successful incorporation of the village of Summerville into the city and the completion of the construction of the levees. The latter represented the creation of permanent flood protection to the entire city, thereby ending periodic interruption of

industrial production, slumps in business activities and destruction of valuable homes, warehouses, offices and bridges. Such urban "liberal" policies of municipal reformers reflected the influences of their middle and upper class constituents' demands and definitely were not related to the "pressures" exerted by the wage-earning classes in determining crucial public policies.¹³

Such evidence suggests that many aspects of the Hofstadter-Mowry "middle class anxiety" interpretation of Progressivism seem to be invalid for Augusta in the Progressive Era. Certainly neither big business, nor big labor, nor an urban political machine actually threatened the reformers' status in Augusta society. The progressive agitation for good government reform instead appears to more closely conform to the view of Gabriel Kolko who essentially regards the Progressive movement as being organized, directed, dominated and controlled by the aggressive, secure middle and upper class businessmen whose fundamental objectives involved the acquisition of political power to maintain the status quo.¹⁴

The nature of the primary and general elections for candidates to the council revealed almost the identical pattern as that of mayoralty elections. There was no "status anxiety"; nor was there genuine political rivalry;

nor was there even a remote resemblance to urban democracy in a southern textile town. One hundred and eleven councilmen were elected to public office in the primary and general elections from 1897-1917. Ninety-nine were totally unopposed in the general elections and sixty-six were unchallenged in the primary elections. Forty-five were "elected" to office without a general election even being held! Seven of the councilmen were either former mayors or ultimately elected mayors during the Progressive Era. Thirteen were elected to office twice. The vast majority of the winning aldermanic tickets were almost always affiliated, identified and associated with either the successful mayoralty candidate or thoroughly sympathetic to the incumbent administration. Although a select few represented the most important, substantial manufacturing and financial corporations in the city, the majority came from general "middle management" business positions. To be certain, there was a degree of representation from the lower socio-economic classes, but it was indeed extremely modest. Only seven of the one hundred and eleven were mechanics, superintendents, salesmen, mill operatives, drivers and laborers. In most instances when persons from the factory district were elected, they tended to represent the upper strata of the laboring classes, being supervisors, paymasters, clerks or party hacks retained by various enterprises.¹⁵

The socio-economic composition of those political aspirants who failed to obtain seats in the City Council superficially suggested that they represented a different strata. In the Council election of 1900, Judson Lyons, a bright, intellectual, forty-year-old "light bronze" man, ranking in capabilities with ex-Senator Bruce of Mississippi, John M. Langston of Virginia, Congressman White of North Carolina and several other very capable Negro politicians, opposed William A. Latimer in the race for the Council, but most unsuccessfully, receiving only one vote. Many had not forgotten that Lyons was the Republican candidate for the postmastership in 1897 but, owing to a powerful "lily white contingent" that was opposed to having a "nigger in the woodpile," had failed to gain that office. Other would-be aspirants had also failed in their bid to the council. Charles Keel in 1900 had avoided the primary but announced for the general, thereby permanently cutting himself off from the white people of the community." "The white people are going to run Augusta and anyone who does not like their election ought to pack up bag and baggage and emigrate," the leading daily newspaper informed its readers. In the 1901 and 1905 Council elections Herman Boetjer and Joseph H. Milligan, respectively, opposed the official candidates. Boetjer, an announced socialist, went down in glorious

defeat. Milligan was strongly attacked for "party dis-loyalty," charged with engaging in "political trickery" and accused of attempting to destroy the system which had "rescued" the city from the spectacle of corrupt elections dominated by blacks. "The negro has been shorn of power, but it has been the dream of some people that the negro return to politics," the Chronicle explained. "The white primary is the safeguard of our people; it not only guarantees white supremacy, but it is our greatest protection against political fraud."¹⁶

However, the vast majority of the "losers" or rival candidates in City Council elections from 1897-1917 were not representatives from a different segment of urban society. Of the forty-seven would-be candidates only thirteen were laborers, socialists or dissenters, and twenty-nine were prominent businessmen representing some of the major banking, real estate, insurance firms, cotton brokerages, textile corporations and railroad corporations in the city. Thus, even those who failed to gain political power were largely of middle and upper class business origins.¹⁷

A crucial objective of the Augusta reformers was a campaign to "purify" political democracy or to restrain mass participation in city elections. Essential to the attain-

ment of that goal was the elimination of the Negro as a force. Since the Reconstruction era, the blacks had participated in all county, city and state elections, but, on the basis of existing evidence, by the manipulation or purchasing of their votes by white wardheelers. Furthermore, the black vote apparently wielded the balance of power in many elections. City politics in the age of reform-minded businessmen demanded the elimination of "vote-buying." The target was the blackman. It was widely believed by the whites that the blacks were the central cause of corrupt elections and that "Good Government" could be created by disfranchising them. A concerted, community-wide campaign was successful in arousing public opinion to the notion that the solution to reforming elections was the adoption of the white primary system. Southern progressivism, after all, was for "whites only" as C. Vann Woodward has emphasized.¹⁸

Disfranchisement of the Negroes, of course, abnegated any possibility of influencing political decisions and urban policies. The major consequences were the failure of a white-dominated, business-controlled government to provide any significant municipal services to most blacks and the corresponding development of a significant discrepancy in the death rate between blacks and whites.

No adequate sewerage and waterworks systems were con-

structed for the densely packed "Terri"; or if some underground pipes and drains existed they were usually not connected up with the main systems. Scavengers, retained by the city to collect refuse, failed to offer similar necessary public services; vast quantities of trash piled up in the alleys and streets; huge mounds of debris were to be found in almost every vacant lot and many lots were "miniature dumps" for discarded, worn-out commodities. Small stagnant pools of greenish-black water were also common in almost every depressed vacant lot. Barrels, discarded cans and other rubbish collected stagnant waters in which mosquitoes flourished in "unlimited quantities." No building codes were introduced, no municipal nor county inspections were made and few roads were paved. In short, no systematic urban reforms to solve critical problems in the black ghetto were initiated simply because it remained "outside the arbitrary boundaries of the City."¹⁹

The crowding of numerous families together into close cramped quarters in badly ventilated tenements and grimy, substandard tin shanties and tar-paper shacks unquestionably affected the life-span of all blacks living in the "Terri." Poorly clothed, badly housed, seriously overworked, drastically underpaid, unavoidably exposed to inclement weather, Negroes were very susceptible to pulmonary tuberculosis,

malarial and typhoid fevers and other communicable diseases. Sick and dying, they were nevertheless multiplying. Official Board of Health records, replete with statistical data, documented the undeniable fact that the death rate among the blacks was consistently and substantially greater than that of the whites from 1880-1918. Grinding poverty was certainly the main factor which contributed to the higher death rate, but, according to local health inspectors, the Negro death rate "remains high in part, no doubt, because we have not yet been able to properly sewer these outlying districts." Dr. Eugene F. Murphey, President of the Board of Health, regretted and deplored these intolerable conditions, frequently criticizing the lack of governmental action which was a "menace to the health of the whole community." But free from political pressures, urban reforms revealed the "color line."²⁰

Although the "Good Government" reformers had been striving to achieve clean elections, vote-buying and vote-selling remained rampant as lower class, illiterate whites sold their votes to supplement their incomes and to retain or receive favors from their supervisors. Realization that elections were still a community moral problem provoked a vigorous, righteous protest. The daily newspapers and Sunday sermons championed "progress or politics" and calling

for a new spirit of reform to purge the city of "evil" influences at the polls that were shocking to a "white man's government." A grand jury investigation of the "traffic in votes" and subsequent city-wide meetings led to recommendations that the "wicked" excesses could be significantly curtailed if all the "good people" expressed total faith in the "purely business methods" of the white primary committee. Prospective candidates for public office were obligated to pledge themselves to support the policies, rules and regulations of the primary. Voters were urged to cast their ballots for the "official" candidates endorsed by the white primary. All laws which governed the real elections, it was said, were deemed to be made applicable to the primaries. Furthermore, proclaiming that they were champions of good clean government and the friends of democracy, they urged the elimination of unnecessary political rivalry at all elections through limiting the voter's choice to one "official" candidate---a factor not exactly conducive to the growth of democracy. The response was not to attack the vote buyer but to further restrict the "privilege" of casting ballots in elections and to limit the choices--preferably to one candidate.

Adoption of the white primary system, therefore, had not only served to disfranchise the blacks, but it had

achieved other significant results. It had served to reduce the size of the electorate and to centralize a greater degree of political power in the white primary committee. The primary had attained the real force of the regular elections and assured the victories of its candidates. It had, furthermore, served to end the blatant, public spectacle of vote-buying by driving it "underground" or behind "closed doors." Unlike reform currents in some northern cities and states, no real faith was exhibited in democratic Progressivism in Augusta, Georgia. The reform-minded businessmen-politicians of Augusta had boldly and skillfully countered direct democracy and mass participation in city elections with the implementation of considerable restraints.

Urban policies in Augusta in the Progressive Era were not determined by the influence of "multiple" rival forces in the society and economy but were determined by a small, powerful and resourceful minority that represented the white Southern elite. Contrary to the pluralist elite interpretations offered by Robert A. Dahl and Nelson W. Polsby, the power structure of Augusta in the Progressive Era seems to support the ruling elite model of C. Wright Mills, Floyd Hunter and Gabriel Kolko. A conservative, white, business Southern elite ruled the city. Mayors and aldermen shared some extremely important common characteristics and objec-

tives in their pursuit of political power and in the rewards provided by the political system.²¹

First, they were largely drawn from the wealthy, well-educated, well-bred, socially prominent, business-oriented white Anglo-Saxon and Protestant groups which either owned, directed or represented the dominant industrial, commercial, financial and legal enterprises. Second, they shared a common set of social values including the preservation of the status quo and the perpetuation of their wealth and power. Third, they shared a basic consensus about the objectives of urban reform. They believed in introducing reforms, such as the construction of streets, drains, sewers, hospitals and parks, as well as a giant levee, for the purpose of protecting the residential, industrial, financial and commercial zones of the city. Public programs, therefore, were not based upon the demands of the masses so much as they reflected the interests and values of the ruling elites. Fourth, they were in absolute total agreement that "whites only" should control city government, participate in elections, stand for public office and determine reform policies. They accepted with little debate the goal of disfranchisement of the blacks. Fifth, the power structure was not substantially changed during the Progressive Era but the same type of leaders continued to sys-

tematically exercise political control. Elite "cleavage" appeared with Linwood C. Hayne but the Hayne revolt strongly repudiated any effort to permit the re-entry of the blacks into city elections and shared the same conservative consensus that political power rested with the white business leaders who would introduce the necessary public policies beneficial to the business community. Sixth, there was a clear cut distinction between the political-economic leaders and the non-business groups that constituted the masses of society. Very few members of the common folk acquired political power, determined public policies or even fraternized with the upper strata of society.

Last of all, the "Good Government" reform struggle in Augusta was not fought to achieve liberal, democratic, egalitarian and progressive ideals at all; but to sustain illiberal, anti-democratic and oligarchic privileges. The goals of the reformers were clear and simple: to prevent government by all the people by restricting the franchise to as few as possible, to protect the special interests of the urban elites through favorable government policies for the business community, and to enact a series of new measures that would centralize power in the hands of the members of the white primary committee so that only the "right kind of people" would run for public office.²²

NOTES

1. Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of Enterprise (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961), 111-114; Arthur C. Bining and Thomas C. Cochran, The Rise of American Economic Life (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), 313-317; Edward C. Kirkland, A History of American Economic Life (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 251-252. Viewing American economic development from the broad perspective of the nineteenth century, Cochran, Miller and Kirkland believe that the "middle decades" constituted a long period of self-sustained growth critical to the later triumph of American industrial-finance capitalism. Also see Ralph L. Andreano, New Views on American Economic Development (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, 1965), 245-260.

Harold U. Faulkner, American Economic History (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1960), 327-322, 339-341; James G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1961), 480-497; Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, An Economic History of the United States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 271-295. The general viewpoint of Fite, Reese and especially Faulkner is that the Civil War acted as a massive stimulator to national economic growth. Although initially the outbreak of the war brought a sharp recession in the North, manifested by bank failures, some business firms collapsing and falling profits, by 1861 a wartime boom assumed extraordinary proportions and continued unchecked until the panic of 1873. Cochran, Miller and Kirkland, however, vigorously disagree; stressing that the war impeded, even retarded the rate of national industrial growth.

In Augusta it was most apparent that there was a proliferation of antebellum growth, an "invasion by industry" during the war, a "critical period" as the collapse of the Confederacy appeared imminent, but a swift return to the wave of prosperity that accompanied the war. In fact the basic contours of the urban economy in the Progressive

Era took shape during the era of peace, war and reconstruction. Augusta, therefore, seems to represent a synthesis of both schools of economic history.

2. The fundamental viewpoint of E. Merton Coulter's, The South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1947) is largely compatible with the ideas of William A. Dunning's, Reconstruction, Political and Economic, 1865-1877 (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1907). Other writers who subscribe to the Dunning version of Reconstruction include: Claude G. Bowers, The Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929); George Fort Milton, The Age of Hate: Andrew Johnson and the Radicals (Hampden: Archon Books, 1965) and Hodding Carter, The Angry Scar, The Story of Reconstruction (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1959).

Most historians since the publication of Howard K. Beale's, The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1930), however, have significantly revised the basic assumptions of the Dunning school. Revisionists have totally rejected the interpretation that no positive accomplishments were achieved during Reconstruction and have refused to subscribe to the thesis that the postwar era witnessed vindictive Yankee military subjugation of the Southland. Moreover, they do not accept the version that the Radical regimes were maintained by incompetent, plunder-bent, evil, wicked foreigners who exploited the South through a sinister coalition with treacherous turn-coats and villainous, illiterate blacks. Some of the leading revisionist scholars include: John H. Franklin, Reconstruction, After the Civil War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); Eric L. McKittrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); Kenneth M. Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965); David Donald, The Politics of Reconstruction, 1863-1867 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965); and Rembert W. Patrick, The Reconstruction of the Nation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967).

By ignoring the controversial, hyper-emotional issues about Union occupation, "tragic" reconstruction of Augusta and emancipation of slaves it was possible to trace the busy mercantile, financial and industrial activities of Augustans and depict the positive economic accomplishments.

3. John Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), 136-143; Thomas D. Clark and Albert D. Kirwan, The South Since Appomattox (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 147-153; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 131.

4. The viewpoint that men in business were predatory, amoral capitalists with an insatiable lust for profits and power was a major theme of Beard, Parrington, Josephson and other critics of the American business community. Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), II, 166-210; Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1930), III, 10-12; Matthew Josephson, The Robber Barons (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1934); Frederick Lewis Allen, The Lords of Creation (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1935); Stewart H. Holbrook, The Age of the Moguls (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1953).

In an effort to study American businessmen more dispassionately, evaluating their creative responses to the challenges of building business empires and recognizing that business has been the central guiding force in the nation's development, the "new" entrepreneurial school has studied capitalist enterprises and leaders from a positive perspective; concerning themselves with the dynamics of urban industrial growth, managerial associations, business concerns and the sociology of businessmen. Among some of the leaders who have contributed to the rise of business history are: Allen Nevins, John D. Rockefeller, The Heroic Age of American Enterprise (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940); Edward C. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business, Labor and Public Policy, 1860-1900 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961); William Miller, Men in Business (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952); John Chamberlain, The Enterprising Americans: A Business History of the United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise (Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1962).

5. Constance M. Green, American Cities in the Growth of the Nation (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1965); Charles N. Glaab and A. Theodore Brown, A History of Urban America (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967);

Blake McKelvey, The Urbanization of America, 1860-1915 (New Brunswick: The Rutgers University Press, 1963).

6. George S. Mitchell, Textile Unionism and The South (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1931), 22-25, 27-30; C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 230, 422-423; John Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865, 204-205; F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 81-83.

7. Wilbur J. Cash, The Mind of the South (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1941), 195, 215, 353-354; John Samuel Ezell, The South Since 1865, 205; F. Ray Marshall, Labor in the South.

8. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1955), 135, 186, 174-214; Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, III, 406.

9. Blake McKelvey, The Urbanization of America, 110, 149-151, 157-167, 243-245; Henry F. May, Protestant Churches and Industrial America (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1949), 170-181.

10. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 204-214; George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 87-89.

11. See appendix, Table VI, "Councilmen and Business Associations, 1897-1917." Term Progressive does not delineate a party movement nor alignment and certainly cannot be construed as a liberal faction in Augusta politics, but it applies strictly in the broad sense of the Progressive Era in American history.

12. See appendix, Table VII, "Mayors and Business Associations, 1897-1917."

13. The basic reforms introduced by the municipal government of Augusta contradicts the findings of J. Joseph Huthmacher's studies of New York and Massachusetts. J. Joseph Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (September, 1962), 231-241. The article stresses that many of the accomplishments of the Progressive Era were directly related to pressures from the organized lower class constituencies in the large metropolitan northeastern cities.

14. Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism, A Re-interpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), 2-4, 8-10.

15. See appendix, Table VIII, "Aldermanic Elections, Primary and General, 1897-1917."

16. Augusta Chronicle, June 8, July 2, 8, 14, September 14, 16, 18, October 11, 1897, January 24, 25, February 4, March 8, 9, July 13, 1898, December 6, 1900, December 5, 1901, December 7, 11, 1905.

17. See appendix, Table IX, "Rival Candidates in City Council Elections and their Business and Social Affiliations, 1897-1917."

18. C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 369-395.

19. Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Board of Health of Augusta, Georgia for the Year 1906 (Augusta: The Phoenix Printing Company, 1907), 20; Thirty-Fifth Annual Report of the Department of Public Health, Augusta, Georgia, 1912 (Augusta: Chronicle Job Print, 1913), 7.

20. Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the Board of Health of Augusta, Georgia for the Year 1903 (Augusta: Richards and Shaver, 1904), 135; Thirty-Seventh Annual Report of the Department of Public Health, Augusta, Georgia 1914 (Augusta: Phoenix Printing Company, 1915), 8; Forty-First Annual Report of the Department of Public Health, Augusta, Georgia, 1918 (Augusta: Ridgely-Wing-Tidwell Company, 1919), 15; see appendix, Table X, "Mortality Statistics of Whites and Blacks, 1880-1918."

21. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Nelson W. Polshy, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958); Floyd Hunter, Top Leadership, U.S.A. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959); Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America, An Analysis of Social Class and Income Distribution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962).

22. Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Ziegler, The Irony of Democracy, An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), 5-8, 10.

APPENDIX

TABLE I

Declining Wages of Textile Workers in the
King and Sibley Mills: 1880-1898

<u>Year</u>	<u>Mill</u>	Number of	<u>Aggregate Wages</u>	Average
		<u>Wage Earners</u>		<u>Annual Wages</u>
1880	King	600	\$130,000	\$216
	Sibley	800	196,000	242
1898	King	1,100	200,000	181
	Sibley	900	203,000	225

Source: Augusta Chronicle, November 14, 1898

TABLE II

Declining Wages of Textile Workers in
Augusta, Georgia: 1880-1900

<u>Year</u>	Number of	<u>Aggregate Wages</u>	Average
	<u>Wage Earners</u>		<u>Annual Wages</u>
1880	1,680	\$448,825	\$267
1900	7,092	1,806,654	255

Source: See Table 8, "Manufacturers in the Cities by Specified Industries," Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Manufactures (Washington: United States Census Office, 1902), 144-145.

TABLE III

Wages of the Textile Labor Force
by Sex and Age Groups in 1900

	<u>Laborers</u>	<u>Aggregate Wages</u>
Men, 16 & over	4,341	\$1,353,895
Women, 16 & over	2,081	382,634
Children, under 16	670	70,135
Total	7,092	\$1,806,654

Source: See Table 8, "Manufacturers in the Cities by Specified Industries," Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900, Manufactures (Washington: United States Census Office, 1902), 144-145.

TABLE IV

A Statistical Record of the History of the Savannah River Floods and the City of Augusta

Year	Date of Flood	Height of River	Year	Date of Flood	Height of River
1796	January 17	35.00'	1892	January 15	29.5'
1840	May 25	37.10'		January 23	32.10'
1852	August 28	37.6'	1893	February 14	25.5'
1864	January 1	37.00'	1894	October 11	27.9'
1865	January 15	37.00'	1895	January 11	30.6'
	April	36.11'	1896	July 10	30.3'
1885	January 26	27.7'	1897	April 6	29.4'
1886	April 1	32.3'	1898	September 3	28.5'
	May 1	32.3'	1899	February 8	31.9'
1887	July 31	35.00'	1900	February 14	32.8'
	August 3	33.00'	1901	April 4	31.8'
	August 9	33.3'		September 9	31.6'
1888	March 30	32.8'	1902	February 3	32.1'
	September 10	38.1'		February 28	30.2'
1889	January 27	24.6'		March 1	34.7'
1890	October 1	28.00'	1903	February 9	33.1'
1891	March 8	35.5'	1908	August 26	38.9'
	March 10	35.5'	1912	March 6	36.10'
	March 12	31.10'	1918	December 23	35.1'

Sources: "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1902 to December 29, 1909," 50; "Minutes of the Augusta Flood Commission, September 28, 1908 to January 30, 1919," 29-30, 145-146; Nineteen Eighteen Year Book of the City Council of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: Ridgely-Wing-Tidwell Co., 1919), 27; Augusta Chronicle, March 24, 1909. It should be noted that the flood of 1918 did not inundate the city; the levee prevented the rampaging waters of the Savannah from flowing into the entire town.

TABLE V

The Special Bond Election for the Levee, University Hospital and the
New Waterworks System of 1912

	<u>The Levee</u>		<u>University Hospital</u>		<u>New Waterworks System</u>	
	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>For</u>	<u>Against</u>
1st ward	411	21	427	5	426	6
2nd	287	10	298	6	297	6
3rd	327	20	334	7	323	12
4th	432	43	447	30	449	38
5th	534	100	579	55	567	69
6th	267	26	288	5	287	6
Total	2,258	220	2,373	108	2,347	137

Sources: "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 140-141; Augusta Chronicle, June 25, 1912.

TABLE VI

Councilmen and Business Associations, 1897-1917Attorneys, Physicians & Undertakers

Henry L. Barton	Eugene L. Johnson
Louis L. Battey	Edwin G. Kalbfleisch
Archibald Blacksheare	Alfred M. Martin, Jr.
Austin Branch	Samuel H. Myers
*John M. Caldwell	W. Edward Platt
Bryson Crane	James P. Smith
Robert E. Elliott	George T. Thorne
Oswell R. Eve	Harry A. Woodward
Thomas F. Harrison	George W. Wright

Banking, Real Estate, Insurance & Investments

Irwin Alexander	Alex J. Gouley
Richard E. Allen	Thomas B. Irvin
Albert F. Austin	*James M. Koon
J. Frank Carswell	William A. Latimer
E. Otto Cooper	William Martin
Harriss H. D'Antignac	Frank W. Moore
Mareon H. H. Duvall	Jacob Phinizy
R. Roy Goodwin	

Clerks, Salesmen, Laborers & Others

Samuel C. Adams	Alfred Cuthbert
Newton T. Barnes	(ex-Mayor of
Edward S. Belding	Village)
(P.O. clerk)	Patrick J. Hardin
James L. Cartledge	William R. Mundy
(Journalist)	James B. Pague
Samuel W. Carter	*Thomas W. Pilcher

Cotton & Commercial Interests

Luther L. Arrington	Clement L. Castleberry
Henry L. Barton	James P. Doughty
Robert J. Bates	Francis L. Fuller
*Sandy Beaver	John M. Hayes
*William B. Bell	Newton Heggie
J. Wilbur Boswell	M. C. Butter Holley
James T. Bothwell	*George H. Howard
Fred Boyce	J. Harry Johnson
William Boyle	Harry H. Jones
Bennett W. Burns	*Lewis L. Kent
John B. Carter	De Sassure L. Kuhlke

TABLE VI (continued)

Cotton & Commercial Interests (continued)

C. Gordon Lamback	Edwin B. Pollock
*George Lamback	*Edward J. Rice
*Bryan Lawrence	Joseph P. Saxon
Benjamin F. Matheney	John M. Sheahan
William A. Mattison	James P. Smith
John W. McDonald	Julian M. Smith
Milledge Murphey	Thomas E. Verdery
*Jeremiah J. O'Connor	James B. Walker
John J. O'Connor	William P. White
Thomas Philpot	Ralph B. Willis
William L. Platt	George W. Wright

Manufacturing, Industrial, Railroad & Construction Interests

Thomas Barcott, Jr.	George R. Lombard
Wilbur Boswell	*William H. Lougee
Job A. A. W. Clark	Otis G. Lynch
William M. Dunbar	William S. Morris
Abe Ellis	Samuel B. Platt
*Samuel A. Fortson	Howard H. Stafford
William W. Hackett	George Summers
William Kuhke	Albert J. Twiggs
Alexander T. Lang	Stephen Wiseman

No Information

J. S. Davis	Frank D. White
-------------	----------------

*Elected to office two times.

Note: In compiling data on the city councilmen and their business associations, every effort was made to (1) distinguish between being merely employed in a place of business and being the owner or partner of an enterprise, (2) determine their socio-economic status at the time of their election to office and (3) indicate only their major economic endeavor simply because there was insufficient data available to attempt to cross-reference their diverse business connections.

Sources: Howard's Directory of Augusta, 1892-1893 (Augusta: The Chronicle Job Printing Company, 1893), 173, 344,

385; Augusta City Directory, 1896-1897 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1897), 209, 215, 237, 269, 301, 314, 340, 402, 438, 445, 449, 530, 545, 558; Georgia Directory Company's Directory of Augusta, Georgia, 1898 (Richmond: J. L. Hill Printing Company, 1898), 262, 298, 299, 383, 393, 457, 511, 528, 608, 631, 639; Augusta City Directory, 1899 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1899), 293, 343, 397, 472; Augusta City Directory, 1901 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1901), 197, 209, 219, 241, 255, 269, 341, 346, 388, 445, 459; Augusta City Directory, 1902 (Augusta: W. H. Walsh Directory Company, 1902), 459; Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1903 (Charleston: W. H. Walsh Directory Company, 1903), 275, 280, 297, 315, 353, 389, 389, 586, 605, 609, 655; Walsh's Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1904 (Augusta: Press of the Augusta Chronicle, 1904), 311, 312, 348, 370, 741; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1905 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1905), 269, 307, 310, 357; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1907 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1907), 170, 181, 189, 333, 378, 420, 428, 452, 478, 619, 645, 671, 701, 754, 821; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1909 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1909), 143, 173, 178, 194, 195, 199, 234, 443, 456, 529, 597, 614, 647; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1910 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1910), 215, 530, 553; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1912 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1912), 209, 243, 257, 278, 315, 336, 366, 401, 437, 493, 527, 537, 562, 749; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1913 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1913), VII, 147, 176, 177, 219, 265, 322, 389, 423, 448, 475, 511, 741; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1914 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1914), VIII, 174, 265, 446; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1915 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1915), IX, 211, 291, 451, 551, 697, 747; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1917 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1917), X, 140, 160, 377, 391, 438, 524, 553, 594, 696, 757.

TABLE VII

Mayors and Business Associations, 1897-1917MayorsBusiness Associations

- | | |
|--------------------------|--|
| 1. Patrick Walsh | President <u>Augusta Chronicle</u> ; director Augusta Savings Institute; director Irish-American Investment Company; director West Side Development Company; director Augusta Real Estate & Improvement Company; director Augusta and Summerville Land Company; director Fairmount Land and Improvement Company; director Georgia Mutual Colony Association; director Georgia Railroad Land and Colonization Company; President Augusta and Summerville Land Company |
| 2. Charles A. Robbe | President Robbe and Sons Plumbing Company; director Augusta Real Estate and Improvement Company; major construction contractor in the city |
| 3. Alfred M. Martin, Jr. | Attorney; "planter" |
| 4. Jacob Phinizy | President Georgia Railroad Bank; President Georgia Railroad and Banking Company; President National Bank of Augusta; President Phinizy and Company |
| 5. Richard E. Allen | President Allen Insurance Company; President Augusta Real Estate and Building Association; director Augusta Savings Bank; director Mutual Real Estate and Building Association; director National Exchange Bank of Augusta |

TABLE VII (continued)

MayorsBusiness Associations

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| 6. William M. Dunbar | President Dunbar and Company; general manager and treasurer Clark Milling Company; broker and commission agent |
| 7. Thomas Barrett, Jr. | President Langley Manufacturing Company; President Aiken Manufacturing Company; President Clearwater Bleachery and Manufacturing Company; President Seminole Manufacturing Company; President Mantata Manufacturing Company; President The Augusta Exchange and Board of Trade; director John P. King Manufacturing company; director Commercial Bank of Augusta; director Georgia Railroad and Banking Company |
| 8. Linwood C. Hayne | President Planters' Loan and Savings Bank; President National Bank of Augusta; President Georgia State Bankers; President Augusta Clearing House Association; President Southerland Manufacturing Company; Vice President Georgia Chemical Works; President Chamber of Commerce; Treasurer and director Augusta Land Company; director Warren Manufacturing Company |

Sources: Howard's Directory of Augusta, 1892-1893 (Augusta: Chronicle Job Printing Company, 1893), 192, 437; Augusta City Directory, 1895-1896 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1896), 13-14, 17-18, 49, 69, 95-96; Augusta City Directory, 1896-1897 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1897), 52; Georgia Directory

TABLE VII (completed)

Company's Directory of Augusta, Georgia, 1898 (Richmond: J. L. Hill Printing Company, 1898), 42-43, 52-53, 59; Augusta City Directory, 1899 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1899), 115-117, 411, 472; Augusta City Directory, 1901 (Augusta: Maloney Directory Company, 1901), 66-67; Augusta City Directory, 1902 (Augusta: W. H. Walsh Directory Company, 1902), 61; Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1903 (Augusta: Chronicle Job Office, Printers and Bookbinders, 1903), 61, 67, 274, 449; Walsh's Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1904 (Augusta: Press of the Augusta Chronicle, 1904), 61, 66, 68, 236, 254, 441, 609; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1908 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1908), 19; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory for 1909 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1909), 53, 380; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1912 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1912), 29, 561; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta Directory, 1913 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, 1913), 366, 559; Augusta Chronicle, May 10, 1885, July 8, 1900, February 23, 1901, January 30, 1903, May 5, 1907, January 30, 1912, May 26, 1912; Augusta Herald, July 19, 1906, July 1, 1912, Augusta Daily Tribune, July 19, 1904; The Industrial Advantages of Augusta, Georgia (Augusta: The Akehurst Publishing Company, 1893), 68-69, 88-89, 102-103, 106, 111; Charles C. Jones, Jr. and Salem Dutcher, Memorial History of Augusta, Georgia (Syracuse: D. Mason and Publishers, 1890), 43-44, 420-422; Allen D. Candlier, Georgia, Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions, and Persons, Arranged in Cyclopedic Form (Atlanta: State Historical Association, 1906), I, 633, II, 244-245, III, 516; Lucian L. Knight, Georgia's Landmarks, Memorials and Legends (Atlanta: The Byrd Printing Company, 1913), II, 958-960; Earl L. Bell et al., The Augusta Chronicle, Indomitable Voice of Dixie, 1783-1960 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1960), 84.

TABLE VIII

Aldermanic Elections, Primary & General, 1897-1917

			Primary Election	
Year	No.	Ward	Candidate	Opposition
1897	1	1st		
	2	2nd		
	3	3rd		
	4	4th		
	5	5th		
1898	6	1st		
	7	2nd		
	8	3rd		
	9	4th		
	10	5th		
1899	11	1st	Irvin Alexander(365)	W. J. Rutherford(299)
	12	2nd	Harriss H. D'Antignac(191)	
	13	3rd	James B. Walker(302)	J. C. Flynn(251)
	14	4th	Otis G. Lynch(608)	Arthur Bleakley(568)
	15	5th	Stephen Wiseman(471)	J. W. Parker(302)
1900	16	1st	William Platt(425)	W. A. Ridge(316)
	17	2nd	William Boyle(286)	Wilbur Boswell(247)
	18	3rd	William A. Latimer(377)	John A. Cooney(162)
	19	4th	Edwin B. Pollock(1037)	Otis Florence(563)
	20	5th	Benjamin F. Matheney(678)	Ridgon Heath(391)
1901	21	1st	William S. Morris	
	22	2nd	Abe Ellis	
	23	3rd	John M. Sheahan	
	24	4th	Bryson Crane	
	25	5th	Bennett W. Burns	
1902	26	1st	Thomas M. Philpot	
	27	2nd	Oswell R. Eve	
	28	3rd	Jeremiah J. O'Connor	
	29	4th	Sandy Beaver	
	30	5th	Dr. Henry L. Barton(402)	Albert S. Hatch(314)
1903	31	1st	William M. Dunbar(286)	
	32	2nd	Edward J. Rice(293)	Wilbur R. Boswell(277)
	33	3rd	George H. Howard(394)	Charles J. Crawford(251)
	34	4th	George P. Weltch(509)	R. J. Doris(376)
	35	5th	James L. Cartledge(386)	William H. Lougee(302)
1904	36	1st	George F. Lamback	
	37	2nd	Bryan Lawrence(299)	Hugh McLaws(268)
	38	3rd	John B. Carter	
	39	4th	John M. Hays	
	40	5th	Dr. James P. Smith(417)	Lennie Franklin(349)

TABLE VIII (extended)

General Election	
Candidate	Opposition
William A. Garrett(698)	Alfred M. Martin, Jr.(688)
Jacob Phinizy(1246)	
Thomas Barrett, Jr.(1264)	
George R. Lombard(2544)	
William H. Lougee(905)	
Alfred M. Martin, Jr.(291)	
Richard E. Allen(209)	
Alex J. Gouley(166)	
Job A. A. W. Clark(1367)	W. J. McAuliffe(614)
Robert E. Ellick(432)	W. A. Mathison(429)
Irvin Alexander(266)	
Harriss H. D'Antignac(126)	
James B. Walker(150)	
Otis G. Lynch(287)	
Stephen Wiseman(170)	
William Platt(279)	
William Boyle(153)	
William A. Latimer(187)	Judson Lyons(1)
Edwin B. Pollock(353)	
Benjamin F. Matheney(267)	Charles Keel(40)
William S. Morris(172)	
Abe Ellis(71)	
John M. Sheahan(118)	
Bryson Crane(209)	
Bennett W. Burns(132)	Herman Boetjer(9)
Thomas M. Philpot(197)	
Oswell R. Eve(84)	
Jeremiah J. O'Connor(56)	
Sandy Beaver(135)	
Dr. Harry L. Barton(112)	
William M. Dunbar(116)	
Edward J. Rice(101)	
George H. Howard(176)	
George P. Weltch(258)	
James L. Cartledge(96)	
George F. Lamback(122)	
Bryan Lawrence(61)	
John B. Carter(60)	
John M. Hays(68)	
Dr. James P. Smith(110)	

TABLE VIII (continued)

			Primary Election	
Year	No.	Ward	Candidate	Opposition
1905	41	1st	James E. Woodruff(256)	Joseph Sumerall(214)
	42	2nd	Archibald Blacksheare	
	43	3rd	Samuel A. Fortson	
	44	4th	Lewis L. Kent	
	45	5th	William W. Hackett(282)	C. M. Harrington(274)
1906	46	1st	Albert J. Twiggs	
	47	2nd	Eugene L. Johnson(260)	H. H. Walton(239)
	48	3rd	James T. Bothwell	
	49	4th	Joseph P. Saxon	
	50	5th	James C. Platt	
1907	51	1st	William R. Munday	
	52	2nd	Austin Branch(300)	Charles Howard(160)
	53	3rd	R. J. Bates	
	54	4th	William B. Bell	
	55	5th	Edwin G. KalbFleisch(453)	William J. Henuing(306)
1908	56	1st	Howard H. Stafford(407)	J. F. Jones(240)
	57	2nd	Wilbur Boswell	
	58	3rd	Samuel C. Adams	
	59	4th	Sandy Beaver(573)	George F. Leitner(486)
	60	5th	James M. Koon(554)	John Blitchington(462)
1909	61	1st	James L. Robertson	
	62	2nd	James F. Carswell(353)	Newton Heggie(212)
	63	3rd	J. J. O'Connor	
	64	4th	John M. Caldwell(357)	William C. Seigler(131)
	65	5th	De Sassure L. Kuhlke(647)	James L. Cartledge(337)
1910	66	1st	George W. Wright	
	67	2nd	James P. Doughty	
	68	3rd	Francis L. Fuller	
	69	4th	M. C. Butter Holley	
	70	5th	E. Otto Cooper	
1911	71	1st	Thomas B. Irvin, Sr.(336)	W. Irman Curry(274)
	72	2nd	R. Roy Goodwin	
	73	3rd	Thomas W. Pilcher	
	74	4th	Lewis L. Kent	
	75	5th	Thomas F. Harrison(526)	W. B. Toole(403)
1912	76	1st		
	77	2nd		
	78	3rd		
	79	4th		
	80	5th		
	81	6th		

TABLE VIII (extended)

General Election	
Candidate	Opposition
James E. Woodruff(91)	
Archibald Blacksheare(60)	
Samuel A. Fortson(158)	Joseph H. Milligan(60)
Lewis L. Kent(85)	
William W. Hackett(82)	
Albert J. Twiggs(190)	
Eugene L. Johnson(102)	
James T. Bothwell(114)	
Joseph P. Saxon(188)	
James C. Platt(143)	
William R. Munday	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD
Austin Branch	
R. J. Bates	
William B. Bell	
Edwin G. Kalbfleisch	
Howard H. Stafford	
Wilbur Boswell	
Samuel C. Adams	
Sandy Beaver	
James M. Koon	
James L. Robertson	
James F. Carswell(233)	
J. J. O'Connor	
John M. Caldwell	
De Sasure L. Kuhlke(278)	
George W. Wright	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD
James P. Doughty	
Francis L. Fuller	
M. C. Butter Holley	
E. Otto Cooper	
Thomas B. Irvin, Sr.	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD
R. Roy Goodwin	
Thomas W. Pilcher	
Lewis L. Kent	
Thomas F. Harrison	
Harry H. Jones(389)	B. E. Lester(344)
John M. Cozart(161)	William Boyle(363)
A. B. Culpepper(198)	Fred L. Boyce(386)
Lewis F. Goodrich(459)	John W. McDonald(492)
Julian Smith(836)	G. Ernest Daniels(78)
Robert G. Barinowski(252)	William M. Martin(270)

TABLE VIII (continued)

			Primary Election	
Year	No.	Ward	Candidate	Opposition
1913	82	1st	Clement L. Casstleberry	
	83	2nd	Alexander T. Lang(103)	T. S. Raworth(302)
	84	3rd	George H. Howard	
	85	4th	Newton T. Barnes	
	86	5th	Harry A. Woodward	
	87	6th	Frank W. Moore(358)	T. Frank Morris(215)
1914	88	1st	C. Gordon Lamback	
	89	2nd	J. Wilbur Boswell	
	90	3rd	Dr. George T. Horne	
	91	4th	J. S. Davis	
	92	5th	James M. Koon	
	93	6th	Samuel A. Fortson(333)	George Summers(304)
1915	94	1st	Thomas E. Verdery	NO PRIMARY ELECTION HELD
	95	2nd	M. H. H. Duvall	
	96	3rd	James B. Pague	
	97	4th	Dr. John M. Caldwell	
	98	5th	William F. Kuhlke	
	99	6th	Ralph B. Willis	
1916	100	1st	Luther L. Arrington	NO PRIMARY ELECTION HELD
	101	2nd	Louis L. Battey	
	102	3rd	Patrick J. Hardin	
	103	4th	William B. Bell	
	104	5th	Frank D. White	
	105	6th	William Penn White	
1917	106	1st	Milledge Murphey	
	107	2nd	Newton Heggie	
	108	3rd	George W. Summers	
	109	4th	Thomas W. Pilcher(181)	Warren C. Moran(150)
	110	5th	J. Harry Johnson(270)	W. E. Leonard(97)
	111	6th	W. A. Mattison(381)	F. W. Hulse, Sr.(303)

TABLE VIII (extended)

General Election	
Candidate	Opposition
	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD
	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD
	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD
	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD
	NO GENERAL ELECTION HELD

Sources: "Minutes of the City Council, January 2, 1893-December 31, 1897," 708; "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1898-December 31, 1901," 200, 390, 525; "Minutes of the City Council, January 6, 1902-December 29, 1909," 1, 90, 160, 239, 315, 387, 457, 511; "Minutes of the City Council, January 3, 1910-May 6, 1918," 5, 52-55, 107, 189, 262, 344, 449, 494, 497-498, 569-570; Augusta Chronicle, November 28, December 2, 1897, December 3, 8, 1898, November 17, December 7, 1899, November 21, December 6, 1900,

TABLE VIII (completed)

November 16, December 5, 1901, October 28,
November 5, December 3, 1902, January 4,
July 13, December 3, 1903, July 1, 14,
December 8, 1904, July 13, December 7,
1905, July 18, 19, 1906, January 7, July
11, 1907, January 6, 1908, July 9, 10,
November 3, 4, December 8, 29, 1909,
January 2, 1910, January 6, July 7, 1911,
June 30, July 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, Decem-
ber 5, 1912, October 29, 30, 1913, July 7,
11, 1914, July 10, 11, 1915, July 6, 7,
December 7, 1916, July 8, 11, 12, 1917.

TABLE IX

Rival Candidates in City Council Elections and
their Business and Social Affiliations, 1897-1917

Attorneys, Physicians & Undertakers

John M. Cozart	
W. Inman Curry	*Alfred M. Martin, Jr.

Banking, Real Estate, Insurance & Investments

Albert S. Hatch	William C. Seigler
W. J. McAuliffe	

Cotton & Commercial Interests

*Wilbur Boswell	J. C. Flynn
John Cooney	*Newton Heggie
Charles J. Crawford	Charles Howard
Albert B. Culpepper	F. W. Hulse, Sr.
Otis Florence	*William A. Mattison

Laborers, Socialists & Dissenters

John Blichington	George F. Leitner
Herman Boetjer	*William H. Lougee
Charles M. Harrington	Judson Lyons
Rigdon Heath	Joseph Milligan
William J. Henning	Warren C. Moran
J. F. Jones	James W. Parker
Charles Keel	Theodore S. Raworth

Manufacturing, Industrial, Railroad &
Construction Interests

Robert G. Barinowski	William J. Rutherford
*Thomas Barrett, Jr.	George Summers
Benjamin E. Lester	William B. Toole
Warren A. Ridge	Hamilton H. Walton

No Adequate Information

G. Ernest Daniels	Lennie Franklin
R. J. Doris	T. Frank Morris

Salesmen, Journalists & Others

Arthur Bleakley	William E. Leonard
*James L. Cartledge	Joseph Summerall
Lewis F. Goodrich	

*subsequently elected to office after second attempt.

TABLE IX (completed)

29 businessmen & others
 4 no information
 13 laborers
 only 1 of laborers elected

Note: Twenty-nine out of the forty-seven rival candidates who failed to win in the elections were from the same strata of society as those who succeeded. Only eighteen of them could be classified as possibly representing a different social group.

Sources: Maloney's Augusta City Directory, 1899 (Augusta: Augusta Chronicle Press, 1899), XV, 313, 316, 349, 383, 412, 441, 475, 505, 538, 627; Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1903 (Charleston: W. H. Walsh Directory Company, 1903), 294, 354, 448; Walsh's City Directory of the City of Augusta, Georgia for 1904 (Augusta: Press of the Augusta Chronicle, 1904), 577; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1905 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1905), I, 266, 339, 422; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1907 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1907), II, 408, 428, 773; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1908 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1908), III, 416, 445; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1909 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1909), IV, 189, 383, 622; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1912 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1912), VI, 147, 247, 254, 257, 335, 457, 678; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1913 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1913), VII, 201; R. L. Polk and Company's Augusta City Directory, 1917 (Augusta: R. L. Polk and Company, Publishers, 1917), X, 137, 416, 481, 543, 697.

TABLE X

Mortality Statistics of Whites and Blacks, 1880-1918

	<u>White</u>	<u>Colored</u>	<u>Totals</u>
1880	270	314	584
1881	331	408	739
1882	273	373	646
1883	315	436	751
1884	304	538	842
1885	464	437	901
1886	388	525	913
1887	355	590	945
1888	337	518	855
1889	261	512	773
1890	375	592	967
1891	357	618	975
1892	339	544	883
1893	310	514	824
1894	284	483	767
1895	318	588	906
1896	354	463	817
1897	304	535	839
1898	293	509	802
1899	366	530	896
1900	350	616	966
1901	317	600	917
1902	351	556	907
1903	291	473	764
1904	340	522	862
1905	340	522	862
1906	371	503	874
1907	386	449	835
1908	394	467	861
1909	301	390	691
1910	340	366	706
1911	400	454	854
1912	430	520	950
1913	377	491	868
1914	424	540	964
1915	403	598	1,001
1916	361	519	880
1917	377	484	861
1918	455	617	1,072

Source: Forty-First Annual Report of the Department of Public Health, Augusta, Georgia, 1918 (Augusta: Ridgely-Wing-Tidwell Company, 1919).

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Duane Printer, 1801.

Third Census of the United States: 1810. Washington:
Gales and Seaton, 1821.

United States Bureau of the Census. Fourth Census of the United States: 1820. Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1821.

..... Fifth Census of the United States: 1830.
Washington: Duff Green, 1832.

..... Sixth Census of the United States: 1840.
Washington: Blair and Rives, 1841.

..... Seventh Census of the United States: 1850.
Washington: Beverley Tucker, 1854.

..... Eighth Census of the United States: 1860,
Population. Washington: Government Printing Office,
1864.

..... Eighth Census of the United States: 1860,
Manufactures. Washington: Government Printing Office,
1865.

..... Ninth Census of the United States: 1870,
Population. Washington: Government Printing Office,
1872.

- . Ninth Census of the United States: 1870.
Population and Social Statistics. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1872.
- . Ninth Census of the United States: 1870.
Industry and Wealth. Washington: Government Printing
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Richard Henry Lee German was born March 1, 1937, the second child of Frances Ester (Claiborne) and Henry Tarry German. Until an unfortunate family tragedy occurred, he grew up in South Bend, Indiana. In 1945, his mother decided to relocate, moving her family of three westward to California, like so many other Americans in the postwar era. Subsequently, however, the German family emigrated to Washington, taking up a permanent residence in Tacoma.

After completing a six-month U.S. Army military obligation at Fort Ord, he returned home, resuming employment as an ordinary wage-earner. Dissatisfied and disillusioned, after an extended introspective analysis of his life styles, he decided to "try" college; especially encouraged by Drs. Galen M. Hoover and Miriam V. Engelland of Tacoma, who expressed personal interests in the young boy's potential abilities.

Admitted to the University of Puget Sound in 1959, he became an avid and devoted student of history, captivated by the complexities of the human past. Beginning his sophomore

year, he married Nancy Ann Casperson after a lengthy, romantic courtship of almost two years. Working as a team, his beautiful, dynamic young wife greatly assisted him by sharing his aspirations, typing his papers, helping him to overcome his culturally deprived background and, of course, being employed full time as an executive secretary by several important business corporations in Tacoma. In June, 1963, when he received his degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors, she was particularly well pleased, realizing what a significant accomplishment it meant to her life mate.

Convinced of the importance of pursuing further education to become a professional historian, he decided to accept a teaching assistantship offered to him by the University of Florida. Thus, he and his wife packed up their sparse belongings and moved from the Pacific Northwest to the Southeast, unconcerned about the fact that they were breaking family ties and tremendously intrigued by the Florida mystique. Settling in the University City, he entered graduate school in September and she resumed employment.

In 1965 he was awarded the degree of Master of Arts with a major in History. Remaining at the University, he continued his studies largely under the auspices of the late Drs. Arthur W. Thompson and Rembert W. Patrick. The

following year, after passing his written qualifying examinations, he accepted a full-time teaching position at one of the four-year liberal arts colleges of the multi-campus units of the University of Georgia System.

While living and working in Augusta, in February, 1969, he drafted a dissertation proposal and initiated research on the history of a major textile center of the New South. He had chosen Augusta to research because of his special interests in American urban history, but also because no significant studies had been made of the history of the city in the Progressive Era. Fascinated by the world of research, he agreed with his colleague, Constance Ashton Myers, that Augusta had had a "rich and hoary past." Encouraged by the favorable professional comments by Dr. Herbert J. Doherty, Jr., his dissertation chairman, he vigorously continued full-time research, while fulfilling his teaching commitments in American and Asian history. Simultaneously, he presented papers based upon his research findings to the Richmond County Historical Society and the Georgia Historical Society.

A firm believer in the efficacy of professional organizations, he is a member of the Southern Historical Association, Organization of American Historians, American Historical Association and the American Association of University Professors.


In December, 1967, Angela Michelle was born. Recently, in May, 1971, he and his wife had their second child, Christine Shari.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




Herbert J. Doherty, Jr., Chairman
Professor of History and
Social Sciences

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.




E. Ashby Hammond
Professor of History and
Social Sciences

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John K. Mahon
Professor of History

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Richard T. Chang
Associate Professor of History

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.



Ruth McQuown
Associate Professor of Political
Science

This dissertation was submitted to the Department of History in the College of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and was accepted as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

August, 1971

Dean, Graduate School

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See Mr. B. (89)